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Reflections on the Quarter

THE first quarter of 1963 opened on a note of optimism. President Kennedy's decision of last October to turn back Soviet missile power from Cuba via a naval blockade was still being hailed as an admirable and classic example of the restrained use of power in an extremely delicate situation. The Latin American governments, in recent decades pathologically suspicious of anything suggesting Yankee intervention, had temporarily closed ranks within the OAS in support of measures designed to reduce the threat to hemispheric security. The European allies, long worried over the determination of the United States to risk nuclear war in their defense, were relieved to see that the leader of the Alliance knew how to deploy power to safeguard crucial Western interests. (Cuba, after all, lies in the heartland of the NATO area; the establishment of a Soviet missile base between the United States and Europe would have threatened to splinter the North Atlantic coalition.)

During the aftermath of Cuba, American policymakers waxed confident that the communist world was in deep trouble and that the international tide was beginning to run in the West's favor. The most common interpretation of the Soviets' missile gambit was that it represented an unsuccessful effort to correct an adverse strategic nuclear imbalance, measured by the number of deliverable warheads available to each side. Administra-

tion strategists were heartened by the fact that the "felt pressure" upon Berlin had been reduced. Moreover, the public squabble between Peking and Moscow seemed to have been aggravated not only by what the Chinese called Khrushchev's ignominious backdown in the face of President Kennedy's empty bluff, but also by the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The American press reflected rising hopes that the stage might now be set for working out broad agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Did not both countries realize how close had been their brush with nuclear war in that moment before the "other fellow blinked?" Perhaps the exchange of letters between the Soviet Premier and the American President would pave the way for a *détente* between NATO and the Warsaw Pact members, for a Berlin settlement, and for a breakthrough in the disarmament talks. At the very least, it was thought, the negotiators at Geneva ought to be able to bridge the narrowing gap between the communist and Western positions concerning the appropriate number of "black boxes" and on-site inspections and thereby end the five-year quest for a test ban.

At the end of the quarter, however, all of the things so devoutly wished for still eluded the policymakers' grasp. Cuba's status as a Soviet satellite seemed more irrevocably established than ever. Indeed, after the missile crisis, the

Soviets had been allowed to continue shipments of arms, thereby whittling away at that margin of conventional military superiority which had been one of the United States' trump cards last October. The Cuban problem flared briefly as a subject of acrimonious partisan debate which began to subside only after Premier Khrushchev began very slowly to remove some of the 17,000 Soviet "weapons instructors" from the island. But in the meantime, many Latin Americans were beginning to think that Khrushchev had somehow managed to assure the permanence of Castro's regime, and they were tempted to adjust their attitudes accordingly.

Along other fronts, developments were similarly inconclusive, if not downright frustrating. The Sino-Soviet rift did not develop toward the open break predicted by many Western observers. On the contrary, Premier Khrushchev declared that when the time came to bury capitalism, Chinese and Russian communists together would throw the last shovelful of earth on its grave. In March, Peking and Moscow exchanged invitations for communist "summit" meetings to patch up their ideological differences and work out coordinated strategic policies for the next phase of the struggle with the West. Although there was no sign that Khrushchev and Mao were about to embrace each other, either physically or ideologically, the communist bloc seemed large enough to accommodate the differences between the two partners. Meanwhile, at Geneva, the prospects for

the signing of a test ban treaty went through their perennial brightening and darkening.

But all these events formed, as it were, only a backdrop for the main drama which was being played out within the Atlantic Community. NATO passed through the worst crisis of confidence in its history—worse than the strains experienced at Suez, for those had pertained to a specific dispute over the policies pursued by separate members outside the NATO area, while the crisis which came to a head in January 1963 touched profoundly the structure and life, indeed the very heart, of the Alliance.

The Atlantic Partnership: A Time of Crisis

In January, France rejected Britain's bid for membership in the European Economic Community; France, in turn, was confronted within the Common Market by the "Friendly Five," her EEC partners who favored British entry. The United States found not only its leadership in the Alliance in question, but also in jeopardy the idea of an Atlantic Partnership, upon which rests the success of the Trade Expansion Act as well as the Kennedy Administration's military strategy. In addition to divisions within Europe and between the European members and the United States, the Administration initiated a public dispute with Canada over the use of nuclear weapons in North American defense.

On January 14 President de Gaulle, rejecting Great Britain's application for membership in the

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Common Market, maintained that the British had shown themselves, in the course of sixteen months of negotiations, unprepared to accept the principles of the Treaty of Rome. De Gaulle questioned the eligibility of the United Kingdom for membership in a "European" organization in view of Britain's economic interests elsewhere in the world and her historic links with the Commonwealth and the United States. The British contended that not only were they indeed "European" but the French had chosen "brutally" to end negotiations which were on the brink of success. Moreover, the failure in Brussels evoked in Britons that latent patriotism stirred in times past by threats from the Continent. Somewhat overdramatically, a few British publicists likened the course of events to the British evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940. More realistically, others called for renewed British efforts to achieve greater industrial efficiency and prove Britain's ability to surpass her Continental neighbors in productivity and national economic growth.

The course of the tedious Brussels negotiations revealed substantial differences in economic and political outlook between Britain and the Six. Official British statements to the contrary, there remained many outstanding economic issues on the eve of the French rejection of British membership. The thorny question of the economic future of New Zealand, heavily dependent upon access to the United Kingdom market, had not been resolved. In the face of formidable opposition from the

electorate and from the Labour Party, the British government quite understandably was unable to envisage concessions which would have injured one of the most loyal of Commonwealth countries. Several other tariff questions, notably the entry of certain imports from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Hong Kong, were unresolved. Nor had the form of association between other EFTA countries and the Common Market been decided, although Britain had declared her determination not to join the Common Market without proper arrangements for her partners in the Outer Seven. Finally, the general level of the common external tariff of the enlarged European Community had still to be decided, including the British request to admit duty-free several imports deemed important to Britain's economy.

The Brussels negotiations, moreover, brought forth differing British and Continental conceptions of the political future of Europe and its position within the Atlantic Alliance. British pronouncements stressed repeatedly Britain's unique role as the "bridge" between Europe and the United States, and between the Europeans and the Commonwealth. Such assertions inevitably raised the anxieties of Europeans who have resented the so-called "special relationship" which Britain purportedly has enjoyed with the United States, and aroused the fear that such an arrangement might be perpetuated in a new guise with Britain entering the Common Market as the

spokesman or "trojan horse" of the United States. Furthermore, Britons distinguished between what they termed an "outward looking" and an "inward looking" Europe. They expressed their determination to assume the leadership of the former and thereby diminish Franco-German influence, which they associated with an "inward looking" Europe. President de Gaulle may have placed his signature on the Franco-German Treaty of January 22 and made his decision to veto British membership in the Common Market in order to forestall this threat.

British policy had as its objective to recapture for Britain a semblance of lost leadership in Europe. The British had finally realized that the Common Market was not doomed to failure, but they never fully grasped the political significance of the trend toward European unity. They found themselves, in the long Brussels negotiations, confronted with the problems of joining an organization which had already taken shape and defied their diplomatic efforts to modify it. In the formulation of the Treaty of Rome each of the Six had obtained concessions designed to ease its own peculiar transition problems. Such might have been the case with Britain, had she been one of the original members of the Common Market. The United Kingdom, however, postponed joining until the Community was about to enter its second transitional stage, and at a time when Britain's growing economic problems, together with her diminishing international status, placed her in a dis-

advantageous bargaining position vis-à-vis the Six. In short, Britain was compelled to pay dearly not only for having miscalculated the strength of the European unification movement, but also for appearing in Brussels in what seemed to be the role of a suppliant.

The British failed to understand that at the root of the conflict between *les Angle-Saxons* and the Six was a disagreement over the role which the United States should play within the Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle saw in the Nassau Agreement further evidence of his suspicions that the United States, with British support, was determined to retain its predominance within NATO. The Bahamas Conference precipitated the French rejection of Britain's application to join the Common Market. The British, having decided to apply for membership in the European Economic Community, failed to prove that they were, in fact, the "Europeans" which they professed themselves to be. Such a policy would have involved the formulation of arrangements for political integration in Europe as well as the creation of a European nuclear deterrent. Instead, the French objected, Britain offered to contribute units of her nuclear deterrent to a NATO force. This, in the minds of some Europeans, was tantamount to giving to the United States an even greater voice in the formulation of Alliance policy.

The Brussels failure may have spurred the United States to renew its offer to create a NATO nuclear force. Since the Nassau conference the Administration has

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put forward proposals for what has been termed a "multinational" deterrent and for a so-called "multilateral" nuclear force. The former envisaged the allotment of Britain's aging V-bomber force, together with American and British Polaris submarines and possibly a contribution eventually from France, to NATO. The Administration's proposed multilateral nuclear deterrent for NATO included a force of surface ships (a substitute for the more expensive submarines armed with Polaris missiles) manned by mixed crews from North Atlantic countries. West Germany, which would not have taken part in a *multinational* force, expressed its interest in sharing with the United States the cost of building a *multilateral* deterrent. The British favored initially the multinational idea because it would have left them relatively free to withdraw their contingent in "moments of supreme national emergency."

The West Germans, because they are prohibited by the Western European Union Paris agreements of 1954 from building their own nuclear force, may hope to gain from participation in a multilateral atomic force. Hence their apparent interest in the Administration's proposal. Great Britain and France, however, appear reluctant to divert resources from the building of their respective independent, national deterrents. Understandably, some in Europe see in the idea of a multilateral deterrent an effort by the United States to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons and to retain in its own hands the determination

of NATO strategy. All proposals thus far advanced, including the Administration's idea of a four-power directorate, provide a veto for each member. The United States, however, has indicated that it would agree to discuss the possibility of alternative arrangements. Nevertheless, none of the proposed systems of control appears to grant to Europeans the determination of their own nuclear strategy. This was one reason why France embarked upon the road toward a national deterrent. Europeans are not enthusiastic about proposals which fail to give them the degree of control they ardently desire, but which sidetrack the programs which they themselves have undertaken to increase Europe's influence in the determination of its atomic future.

In short, the question of political control haunts those who labor for a more equitable arrangement for North Atlantic nuclear defense. But political systems are not built in the abstract, except perhaps in the minds of political philosophers. The gap which separates the United States and its allies in Europe with respect to the development of nuclear weaponry must be narrowed if Europeans are to be given an adequate voice in NATO strategy. This in turn makes necessary the reduction of the barriers of secrecy in nuclear affairs between the United States and its European allies. Without such steps Europeans can gain neither the means nor the experience which is vital to the creation of an Atlantic "Partnership" and the building of Atlantic systems of political control.

The United States, moreover, offered in the Geneva test-ban talks on February 27 to include in the negotiations the future nuclear status of West Germany. The Soviets, aware of West Germany's contribution to North Atlantic defense, may be expected to press this issue in future arms control talks as a device for delaying progress toward greater NATO nuclear cooperation and as a means of weakening confidence among Germans in the Atlantic Alliance.

European fears of American "ringmastership" were heightened by the sharp exchanges between Washington and Ottawa which precipitated the downfall of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's shaky coalition. The United States, in its statement condemning Canadian defense policy, exhibited the same lack of appreciation of domestic susceptibilities which had marked its behavior toward Britain in the peremptory cancellation of the Skybolt missile. The Administration's condemnation of Canadian defense policy was bound almost inevitably to bring forth in Canada resentments against alleged domination from south of the border. In Britain and Canada the Administration's respective announcements, highly embarrassing to the British and Canadian governments, engendered anti-American sentiments which might easily have been avoided by a more skillful handling of the points at issue. Beyond the merits of steps to strengthen the nuclear defense of North America, the effect of the effort by the United States to force atomic warheads upon the Canadians, while

denying them to European NATO allies, renewed speculations that the Administration's policy aimed toward eventual nuclear withdrawal from Europe to an atomic "Fortress North America."

Apprehensions about the policies of the United States with respect to NATO and Berlin, in the light of the Administration's "leaked" proposals of the spring of 1962, with which the West Germans took issue, may have led the Adenauer government to attempt to strengthen its position by formalizing its entente with France. By itself, the Franco-German pact is not detrimental to the Atlantic Alliance, for cooperation between West Germany and France forms the basis for the development of European integration. The Franco-German Treaty provides for increased contacts between the youth of the two countries, cooperation in scientific research, regular consultation on questions concerning the European Communities, NATO and other aspects of foreign policy. The treaty envisages exchanges of military personnel, cooperation in the development of armaments, the "harmonization" of strategic and tactical doctrines, and periodic consultation between defense ministers and chiefs of staff. The United States had previously supported, in its proposals for a European Defense Community and for a European Political Community, even more far-reaching steps toward unity in Europe.

The United States retains the power to influence decisively the course of events in Europe. But this power is not so great today as it

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once was, and is likely to diminish as European strength and unity grow. The Administration's proposals for a NATO nuclear force might have evoked a more favorable response several years ago, when President de Gaulle sought a greater voice in the formulation of Alliance policy through the creation of a three-power directorate. Now Europeans are bent upon establishing forces over which they themselves will have command. Likewise, had Britain offered at the outset to join the Common Market, making earlier the concessions finally offered in Brussels, she might have assumed a place in the forefront of European unity. The issues of nuclear sharing and economic integration are closely related. A British decision to participate fully in the development of a political and defense community in Europe would greatly ease the problems of Anglo-European trade. The United States, should it elect to assist in the building of a multi-lateral European deterrent and to take the lead in creating trans-atlantic political arrangements, would further the Administration's goal of an Atlantic Partnership.

The NATO Polaris Deterrent

It is regrettable that the Polaris weapons system, one of the most effective and successful systems ever developed, should be offered to the European allies under circumstances which suggest that the United States is not only modernizing the Western deterrent but seems to be contemplating a nuclear disengagement from the European continent. Many sophisticated Euro-

peans, interpreting U.S. military policy decisions since December 1962, have concluded that the American purpose is to defend NATO Europe primarily with conventional forces, backed by the threat of nuclear retaliation from the rear, i.e., from submarines and/or surface vessels stationed in the Atlantic.

According to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Skybolt missile, which had been promised to the British but canceled in December, was unable to perform any military task which other missiles could not perform more cheaply and more efficiently. McNamara admitted that the Skybolt would have been useful in the defense suppression mission (i.e., the neutralization or destruction of hostile air and missile defenses), but he added that even this particular function could be accomplished more effectively by Minuteman. If this is so, then an interesting question arises: Why did not the United States offer the British a choice of either Minuteman or Polaris? It is generally recognized that Polaris is not particularly suitable for defense suppression. Furthermore, it is clear that the subsonic British V-bombers stood to benefit operationally from teaming up with surface-to-surface missiles which would increase the bombers' penetration capability. If the United States was really interested, as McNamara asserted last summer, in preserving the RAF as a first-rate force, it might have tried to be more helpful. Assuming that the decision to cancel Skybolt was sound (see "Reflections on the

Quarter," ORBIS, Winter 1963, pp. 509-512), there was no need deliberately to shorten the useful life of 180 strategic bombers.

In January it became clear that the United States would recall 105 Thor and Jupiter missiles from Britain, Italy and Turkey. Charles E. Osgood of the University of Illinois, a noted advocate of "graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction," hailed the U.S. decision to withdraw the missiles (especially the ones in Turkey) as a perfect example of what can be accomplished through reciprocal unilateral initiatives with respect to arms policies. Many European observers would be inclined to agree at least in part with Professor Osgood's analysis, since they contend that the U.S. decision to withdraw the missiles was a *quid pro quo* for the Soviet missile retreat from Cuba. Thus, the U.S. missile pull-back invited speculation on a tacit Soviet-American understanding.

Washington policymakers cried "foul" in the face of such an interpretation. They asserted that the liquid-fueled Thors and Jupiters, with their slow reaction times and their soft pads, had become too vulnerable to be of continued value. Their replacement by Polaris submarines constitutes, according to this version, a modernization and strengthening of the U.S. military posture which had been envisaged long before Cuba. It is worth remembering, however, that as late as the fall of 1962, General Lauris Norstad had reiterated the military utility of Thors and Jupiters.

Even if one accepts the Administration's line of reasoning in this

matter, the timing of the transaction served to heighten controversy. There still remains a question of the arithmetic of the exchange. The United States is making available three submarines with 48 Polaris missiles for 105 Thors and Jupiters. Since not all three submarines can remain on station constantly, the United States is actually replacing, in battle order, 105 ground-based missiles with 32 Polaris missiles. This is tantamount to a two-thirds reduction of the European missile force, and no number of sophisticated strategic explanations can hide this fact.

The Soviets are presently credited with about 700 medium-range ballistic missiles, practically all of which are deployed against Western Europe. Up to now, no weapons system has been deployed in NATO Europe which would be capable of neutralizing this formidable MRBM threat. If the United States were to provide European NATO with an equivalent force counted in numbers of missiles (and disregarding the presumed higher yields of Soviet weapons), and if furthermore it was intended to use the Polaris as a balance against Soviet MRBM's, it would be necessary to keep about 45 submarines on station constantly. This means that the United States would have to make available to Europe a fleet of about 70 Polaris submarines, or in some way help the Europeans to acquire a deterrent of comparable magnitude. But nothing of the sort is now being contemplated. American policymakers are talking about, at most, 25 surface ships.

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It appears that one of the Administration's motives in shifting over from a land-based to a sea-based deterrent was to reduce the fear of many Europeans that, with vulnerable American missile targets on their soil, and with hundreds of Soviet missiles aimed at them, they were being held hostage. The assumption seems to be that if the aboveground fixed missile sites are eliminated, the Soviets will be deprived of many first-strike targets in Western Europe and the security of the European populations will be improved commensurately. But the Soviets can hardly re-aim their MRBM's at the mobile Polaris, and there is not the slightest reason to believe that the Soviets will dismantle their MRBM's which now stand poised for action against Europe. Those strategists who are fascinated by the concept of reciprocal initiatives take it for granted that the *quid pro quo* will be complete when the Thors and Jupiters have been withdrawn. In the minds of these strategists, the equation involves not Western Europe and Eastern Europe, but Western Europe and Cuba. Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe will remain in place to form a backdrop for stepped-up Soviet political initiatives toward Western Europe.

Even if one were to concede that the Thors and Jupiters—which by their technological character and forward location seemed “provocative” in the eyes of some despite the essentially defensive psychology and strategy of the Alliance—ought to be gradually phased out in favor of an invulnerable deterrent, one need not jump to the conclusion

that Western missile power should be recalled by several hundred miles to the oceanic areas. Soviet missiles are, from the standpoint of technological characteristics, control systems and the more dynamic strategies of communism, potentially more “provocative” than Western missiles. Yet the Western missiles were pulled back, and the Soviet missiles remained in place.

If NATO were an indestructible confederation in which there could be no doubt that an attack upon any member would be regarded as an attack upon the United States, then there would be no need for a NATO deterrent separate from that of the premier partner. But NATO is not such a confederation. Within recent years, the Europeans have been beset by doubts. The emphasis which the Kennedy Administration in 1961 and 1962 placed upon the need for building up NATO's conventional forces was not calculated to allay European apprehensions over the willingness of the United States to employ its nuclear power in close support of local European defense. The post-Cuban emphasis upon sea-based deterrence was read in many European quarters as an effort to make it still easier for the United States to opt out of a nuclear response in the event of a future Soviet military penetration of Western Europe. This is not to suggest that a Soviet attack during the next few years is a likelihood. But it can be expected that the changing configurations of nuclear-missile power on the European continent will be taken into account

by those Europeans who are responsible for the formulation of diplomatic policies.

If it was the intention of the United States to reduce the vulnerability of the deterrent in Europe, this purpose could have been accomplished by shifting from Thors and Jupiters to protected weapons such as Minutemen and to mobile shorter-range weapons such as Pershing missiles or an equivalent future model, in addition to Polaris. Whether the NATO Polaris deterrent as presently planned will actually be able to deter effectively after it becomes operational is a serious question. There is a very distinct possibility that the NATO deterrent, conceived independently of American nuclear power, will in the late 1960's prove susceptible to the charge that it is even less credible than was the purely American deterrent in the late 1950's, when American nuclear weapons were committed in substantial numbers on the very soil of the countries whose defense they served to guarantee.

The Force de Dissuasion

There has been a tendency in some NATO capitals to deprecate France's pretensions to great power status. British and American writers have vied with one another in dismissing as ridiculous the French plans for a nuclear deterrent force. It is quite legitimate, of course, to question the value of the supersonic bomber in the missile age. According to inspired leaks emanating from the Pentagon, the French supersonic Mirage IV bomber has been rendered obsolete even before

becoming operational because the French lack the "penetration aids," or decoys, needed to confuse Soviet radar defenses. The SAM-3 ground-to-air missile designed to destroy aircraft flying at low levels has been deployed on Soviet territory. Since this same missile was reported successful in the skies over Cuba, it has been suggested that any French bombing mission eastward would be futile, and hence France's nascent *force de dissuasion* (*frappe*) can be written off summarily as a worthless tool, fashioned in a state of strategic blindness.

French analysts do not have as much experience as Americans in the calculus of nuclear deterrence. But they do not deserve, because of that, to be brushed aside as babes in the woods, much less as simpletons. They still know a thing or two not only about mathematics, games theory and the dynamics of military technology (as well as its limitations) but also about such intangible components of strategy as those psychological and political factors which define the uses of power in critical diplomatic situations. President de Gaulle himself was a military thinker of no mean repute in his younger days. He is probably wise enough to realize that at his present age he is no match for those analysts who specialize in quantitative strategic equations. But he may have a hunch that the architects of the "indivisible war" theory are overlooking something, namely, the leverage which might be wielded by the holder either of a "triggering deterrent" or an "attritional deterrent."

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The primary requirement for the player of such a role is the known ability to inflict substantial though not necessarily catastrophic nuclear damage upon key military targets. De Gaulle realizes that he need not concern himself excessively over the estimate which Washington policymakers place upon the credibility of the French deterrent. When all is said and done, he is not trying to deter *Washington* from making hostile military moves against Western Europe or Africa. What counts most is the way in which the *Soviets* regard his deterrent. Just as the Soviets have in the past respected what Herman Kahn called the "rationality of American irrationality," so in the future they may be given pause—if not by the credibility of the French deterrent, then at least by the incredibility of De Gaulle.

All that the French must demonstrate is a capability for getting through. Now it is true that the Soviets have been acquiring defenses against low flying aircraft. It is equally true that the effectiveness of low-level interception is, at best, imperfect. Only the most naïve would assume that it approaches one hundred per cent or that, if it functions at all against supersonic aircraft, the precise speed of the attacking plane makes no difference. The fact is that SAM-3 was not deployed in Cuba. The U-2, a subsonic plane, was shot down at medium altitude by a SAM-2. Hence the Cuban precedent falls somewhat short of settling the issue. The effectiveness of SAM-2 and SAM-3 against a Mach 2.2 bomber has yet to be shown.

According to the published estimates of Western aviation experts, the SAM-3 ground-to-air missile has a slant range which would render it necessary for the Soviets to deploy more than 1,000 batteries of those weapons in order to protect the hundred largest cities in the USSR. This is, by any reckoning, a formidable defense requirement, especially when the need to maintain defense against high-level aircraft and against oncoming missiles is taken into account. The French argue that if the West were to abandon its bomber capabilities altogether, this would relieve the Soviets of a considerable defense burden and allow them to devote additional resources to anti-missile programs.

As a matter of fact, both the United States and Britain will continue to operate subsonic bombers during the next decade. Both SAC and the RAF seem confident that these bombers will continue to be useful, albeit in conjunction with ground-to-ground missiles employed to suppress Soviet defenses. The Mirage IV will have performance characteristics superior to those of present generations of American and British bombers, except for the B-58. Although the Pentagon is still intent upon abandoning the Mach 3 RS-70, it is planning to invest billions in the much discussed TFX. The British, too, are showing an interest in moving into supersonic aircraft.

The French are currently participating with other European nations in the development of a ground-to-air defense system against low flying aircraft. This program is

based upon the American Hawk, which is often compared to SAM-3. The French, therefore, have ample opportunity to study the characteristics of this weapon and they may not find it too difficult to acquire those "penetration" aids on which many Western analysts now place such a high premium. French military planners point out that if the Soviets should ever attempt aggression against Western Europe, and even if Germany and France were the only countries under attack, an enormous number of aircraft would be in the air, confusing Soviet defenses. In any event, if the French could not penetrate to targets across Central and Eastern Europe, they might be able to approach at very low levels over the sea and adjacent coastlands. At least some Mirage IV's, while they might not be able to penetrate to Moscow, could surely make it to Leningrad, Rostov and Odessa. This is a possibility which cannot be dismissed as lightly in Moscow as it is in Washington.

In addition to the twin-jet Mirage IV bomber, the French are planning to equip 150 Mirage-3 fighters and 100 carrier-based Etendard IV fighter bombers with nuclear weapons. At present reading, then, the French nuclear air force is scheduled to grow to 300 aircraft. Furthermore, the French intend to build three nuclear submarines, each with 16 missiles.

Delivery of the Mirage IV is scheduled to begin late in 1963 and to be completed early in 1965. The first model will be designed for attack at high altitude, probably at its maximum speed of 2.2 Mach,

at which the effectiveness of SAM-2 remains an unknown. The second model, which will be operational from 1968 to 1972, will be equipped with the AS-2, an air-to-ground missile designed for launching either at high or low altitude with an expected range of at least 300 miles. (French possession of an air-to-ground missile with a low altitude range of only 100 miles would substantially increase the Soviets' numerical requirement for SAM-3's.) A third version of the Mirage IV will appear in 1970, boasting more powerful engines which, besides increasing the range, will enable the aircraft to remain at low altitude for most of its flight. One liability must be frankly conceded in the case of all Mirage IV models: for strategic missions they will require refueling.

The Mirage-3 fighter is expected to be capable of carrying out both low and high level attacks. At low level, it would have a range of 250 miles at a speed of 0.92 Mach and a payload of 2,000 pounds. At high altitude its range would be extended to 400 miles and its payload reduced to 1,200 pounds. This weapon system is clearly designed for tactical operations and defense against ground invasion by massed divisions. Its precise effectiveness under conditions of an attack upon Western Europe would depend to a great extent upon how far forward it was based.

The Etendard IV is expected to have a range of 400 miles and a speed of about 1 Mach. It could be employed against either strategic targets or massed land forces. Finally, the French hope that the

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missiles which they are building for their nuclear-propelled submarines will have a range of 1,200 to 1,800 miles. Such missiles could reach Moscow from stations in either the Baltic or the Aegean seas.

How vulnerable would the French deterrent be? Undoubtedly, the carrier-based Etendard IV would be just as vulnerable as any other carrier-based aircraft. Operating from the North Sea and off the coasts of Norway, these fighter bombers might be despatched against Soviet coastal cities before the Soviets could destroy the carrier. The French submarines presumably will be just as difficult to track and locate as Polaris, and no easier to destroy in a first strike. The Mirage-3 is a vertical takeoff fighter and consequently quite invulnerable on the ground. As for Mirage IV, the vulnerability problem is more acute than it is for the U.S. Strategic Air Command's B-58, because of the differential in distances from Soviet missile sites and in French and American defense capabilities. But the French hope to reduce the vulnerability of Mirage IV through an airborne alert system after the SAC pattern. For this purpose, and also to lengthen the range of their bomber, they are buying from the United States 12 Boeing KC-135 jet tankers and may purchase six more. Another 12 bombers will be kept on a 4-minute ground alert and 12 will be placed on a 45-minute alert schedule. The remainder would be in maintenance and overhaul.

The official French estimate is that one-third of the planes will be able to reach their targets. This

estimate is perhaps based upon current intelligence regarding present Soviet defense capabilities and extrapolations of the kind of defense systems which the Soviets can technically construct and economically bear in the years ahead. Assuming, therefore, that half of the French force would have a chance to attack, several planes could penetrate to their targets. French authorities declare that, if retaliation against a Soviet attack upon Europe should be necessary, the Mirage IV fleet could destroy five cities. If in addition two of the three submarines are in a position to fire, there would be a threat of 32 more missiles. Even conceding the Soviets have an anti-missile defense system by 1970, nevertheless perhaps 10 missiles could go through, threatening cities or other key targets. (To put the problem in these terms is not to insinuate that the French are any more callous about contemplating the annihilation of whole urban populations than are American planners who have recently expressed a preference for a "no-cities" strategy if such a thing could be worked out. These strategic equations simply indicate the kind of problems which Soviet strategists are compelled to worry about.)

It is expected that the Mirage IV will carry a 70-kiloton bomb and that the AS-2 air-to-ground missile will carry a 50-kiloton warhead. But it must be pointed out that the present yield of French nuclear weapons production is not impressive. Existing French weapons are pure plutonium devices.

(The plutonium comes from the reactor at Marcoule; a second plutonium plant is under construction at Cherbourg.) Christoph Hohe-nemser has estimated that if the French have used only their weapons-grade plutonium, they would have been able to manufacture between 9 and 18 Hiroshima-type bombs each year since 1961. By 1968, they will be acquiring larger quantities of weapons-grade U-235 from a new isotope separation plant at Pierrelatte. This plant is being built at a cost of one billion dollars—the most expensive single item in the national defense budget. Well-informed observers also anticipate that within the next two years or so, the French will test their first hydrogen weapon, probably in the Pacific. After that, the fire-power of the *force de dissuasion* will be magnified commensurately.

By 1965 the French will have spent about five billion dollars on their deterrent. Part of the financing has been made possible as a result of eliminating conventional forces: the French Army has been reduced from a strength of 1,000,000 in 1961 to 700,000 and may be cut further to 450,000. In the minds of French planners there is no doubt whatsoever that the bombers, fighter-bombers and submarine-launched missiles which they expect to possess by 1970 will be infinitely more potent, and therefore comprise a much stronger deterrent, than a quarter million foot soldiers armed with conventional weapons.

One major weakness in the *force de dissuasion* is quite evident,

namely, the lack of ground-to-ground missiles for defense suppression. For this purpose, the French might use modified versions of their submarine missiles or else develop suitable missiles from any of several present proto-types. Moreover, the numerical strength of the deterrent as projected until 1970 is not impressive. This is why it must still be classified either as a "triggering deterrent" which must be respected insofar as it could initiate centralized nuclear war by catalysis, or else as an "attritional deterrent" which, should the Soviets ever try to deal with it separately, would leave them in a dangerously weakened condition while the United States stood by as *tertius gaudens*. Arraigned against overwhelming Soviet might in the total context of the global strategic situation, a French force based upon Mach-2 bombers capable of both high and low altitude attack, and capable of launching air-to-ground missiles, can serve a deterrent purpose in Europe.

The French were fifteen years late in embarking upon their nuclear military program. They never expected to catch up with the leaders in a few years. They are satisfied to think that by 1965 they will possess a nuclear punch roughly equivalent to the one wielded by the United States in 1946-47. In brief, they are constructing a minimal deterrence force. Regardless of what they think of American intentions to come to the nuclear defense of Europe, Soviet leaders will have to think twice about provoking that force.

FRANCE AND HER ALLIES

by Hervé Alphand

THE policies of the French government in two important fields—organization of defense and construction of a united Europe—recently caused a certain amount of turmoil in the Free World. Indeed, by reading the newspapers or listening to the radio, one could easily believe that the Atlantic Alliance is unlikely to survive the present crisis. On the contrary, the immediate reactions seem unduly pessimistic and in large part emotional; already these initial reactions are yielding to a more realistic understanding of the French position.

Persons on both sides of the Atlantic who have been disturbed by recent events are often not fully aware of the background and current circumstances surrounding these problems—despite the clear statement made by President de Gaulle in his press conference of January 14, 1963. Essential elements of French policy and major statements of President de Gaulle have been, deliberately or not, either distorted, misinterpreted, misunderstood or ignored. I would like to set this record straight—using official texts and data wherever possible—for the benefit of the American public, as I have no doubts about its traditional impartiality and friendship for France.

FRANCE AND WESTERN DEFENSE

We live in a time and in a world where the conditions of defense have been entirely transformed by a new fact threatening at every moment the very life of each nation, namely the atomic fact. Until the end of the nineteenth century wars were murderous, but they spared the civilian population and were generally settled by the loss of a province. During the last two world wars, entire countries were flung into the conflict and suffered millions of casualties, great industrial destruction and other losses which profoundly changed the world's balance of power.

Today, however, the problem appears in a basically different perspective: a general thermonuclear war could wreak immense damage in a few minutes. Truly, the future of our planet and of the human race would be at stake. It is easy to see why this new factor completely upsets old political, strategic and even moral concepts. We must face, with a good deal of imagination, the difficulties of a situation which has never existed before; this

explains the unprecedented relations existing between global opponents today and, likewise, the various roads followed by the Allies when they try to solve problems that have never arisen before.

France approaches these extremely complex questions with realism and also with a modesty inspired by the fact that in the modern world her power is limited in comparison to the gigantic strength of the United States and the USSR. She is inspired by two principles in her search for possible solutions. On one hand, she feels that a country of her size must maintain its own national defense, that the task of protecting its population against any threat must remain the government's chief responsibility. It is the only way for her to mobilize and use with the utmost efficiency the nation's total resources. On the other hand, she knows very well that one nation, and especially France, could not, under present circumstances, fight alone a major war, and that, to recall General de Gaulle's expression, "having Allies is natural in the historic period in which we live." *Alliance and independence* are the twin concepts which best describe France's policy today. An understanding of these concepts will correct many slanted or erroneous interpretations of French policy.

Independence. An independent national defense requires in the first place certain indispensable political and economic conditions. These conditions have been realized in France. Through the democratic process, France, in the course of the last five years, has accomplished a profound transformation of her institutions so as to assure stability for her government; a separation of powers, leaving to Parliament the task of voting laws but not the right to interfere with Executive responsibility; and a protection of the fundamental liberties of man.

This political stability has made possible an unequaled economic expansion. Today our gross national product is increasing by 6 per cent each year, one of the highest levels in the Western world. Everywhere new industries are springing up and old plants are being modernized, thanks to the interaction of free competition and a planning system which is not authoritarian.

The rise of prices in early 1963 and the accompanying social tensions are the result of a very harsh winter and current overemployment which contributes to the increase of wages. But the French balance of payments is in a surplus position, so that since 1958 our gold and currency reserves have increased by some three billion dollars and now total 3.85 billions. Not only has France

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ceased to appeal to the generous aid of her friends—and above all to America—but she is capable of paying back in advance her external debts. In this way, a true French renaissance has been made possible in all fields—whether scientific, social or technical. This renaissance constitutes the necessary support for the creation of a modern national defense.

Data in the public domain reveal that, contrary to certain misinformed observations, the French military effort is neither negligible nor deficient. The French military budget represents 7% of our gross national product, as against 10.4% in the United States, 7.2% in England, 3.9% in Italy and 3.4% in Belgium. It is not exceptional that the French ratio should be slightly inferior to that of the United States because our per capita income amounts to only 40% of America's, and the proportion of military expenditures usually is higher in richer countries. Moreover, although France is now freed of the enormous burden of the Algerian war and of her colonial obligations, she still contributes proportionally more than any other nation to the common task of helping underdeveloped countries: 2.41% of the French national product against 0.97% for the United States, 1.32% for Great Britain, and 1.17% for Germany. The end of the war in Algeria, where 440,000 officers and men were still stationed a year ago, has permitted France to bring back a large part of her forces to Europe, to reduce military service to eighteen months, and to add to her labor force a great many workers who were much needed.

At the same time, France is reorganizing her military forces. They will be divided into three groups: the first will be devoted to the defense of the national territory, the second will be a force of intervention, and the third will include our strategic nuclear forces. The latter two elements require clarification.

The "intervention forces" are those which must be ready to act at any time in the air, on land or on the seas, and to fight in France or outside of France. In particular they include the French forces now in Germany and also a division specially trained for overseas operations in order to fulfill French obligations toward the African countries to which she is bound by defense agreements. These divisions, even if they are not all placed under the NATO command, will fight against the common enemy, should Europe be attacked.

The last element of France's national defense is her nuclear force, about which so much misunderstanding exists. France in-

tends to create gradually her own nuclear force; it will become operational in a few months. As General de Gaulle said, this force "will have the somber and terrible capacity to destroy in a few instants millions and millions of men." At first it will consist of supersonic bombers, later of missiles and submarines capable of launching nuclear and thermonuclear warheads.

The French decision to acquire these weapons does not imply a lack of confidence in the commitments undertaken by our Allies and especially by the United States. We acknowledge the great disparity between the present U.S. nuclear capability and the very modest projected French force. These American arms still remain today the essential guarantee of world peace.

But we do not know what the international conditions will be five, ten or fifteen years from now and whether there will not be some instances when France's interests will be threatened while those of her Allies may not be involved to the same degree. It therefore seems normal for France to have at her disposal, and for her own protection, a retaliatory force—not a *force de frappe*, a striking force, as it has been erroneously called—which, though limited, would make a potential adversary think twice before trying to blackmail us. In this respect our position is not different from that of Great Britain, as recently reaffirmed by Prime Minister Macmillan and Lord Home. Why should a policy be considered reasonable when it is Britain's policy and dangerous or ridiculous when it becomes the policy of France?

Furthermore, France is building this force without assistance from abroad. No aid has been offered to France and she does not ask for any. Nevertheless, we believe that this force will constitute a not insignificant addition to the Western deterrent.

Who then could reproach France for wanting to acquire a modern defense? France's rights in this matter are not limited by international commitments. Up to 1940, when France became the victim of aggression and occupation, she held a leading rank in this particular field of science. The development of a nuclear force will open to our technicians, engineers and industrialists new fields of scientific research directly related to atomic energy.

The creation of a retaliatory force does not appear to be beyond French financial or technical capacities, because the particular objectives are not as vast as those of the great atomic powers. France is not planning to develop a "global" rocket and, even without access to U.S. nuclear secrets, she still benefits from experiments performed by other nations.

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Alliance. The second aspect of our defense policy is the Alliance. In the words of General de Gaulle: "As long as the Soviets threaten the world, this alliance must be maintained. . . . France is an integral part of it." The Atlantic Alliance is indispensable to our survival. The most recent events and Soviet statements unfortunately force us to believe that the danger is still present.

Thus, the rumors about the French intention to destroy the Alliance or about her desire to constitute a neutral third force in Europe and play the role of an arbiter between East and West are absurd and quite groundless. No French official voice has suggested, as it has been alleged, that American troops should depart from Europe. French officials simply think it wise to anticipate that in the distant future they might be reduced in number or be entirely withdrawn. Such a move would have to be made without compromising the security of the West or the existence of the Alliance. If France desires to build a strong Europe, her purpose is to strengthen the Western world, to enable it better to resist all that might imperil its independence, its principles and the civilization we share in common.

Nevertheless, it is true that the form of this essential Alliance—a form adopted when NATO was created almost fourteen years ago—does not appear to the French government entirely adapted to present circumstances. We are not the only ones to think this way. The U.S. is also trying to adapt the organization and forces of the Alliance to present needs.

What essential change has occurred since the creation of NATO? In 1950, the United States alone possessed a nuclear arsenal. It could use it for the defense of its European allies without fear of retaliation. In 1963, the USSR now has at her disposal weapons of massive destruction which she claims to be able to use on the very soil of the United States. This means that the Soviet Union now has its own "counter-deterrent" which, under certain future circumstances, might nullify the "credibility" of the American deterrent and its capacity to act as a shield for the European theater of operations. These unpredictable circumstances have produced considerable debate among U.S. government officials and experts, and, of course, among French and other European officials and experts. A profound transformation has occurred in the technological and strategic conditions that we must take into account. This is the objective of the current studies and complex negotiations begun by the Western camp, which bear chiefly on the respective role of conventional and nuclear

armaments, the means to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the measures which Europe can take in order to become more responsible for its defense.

It is normal that problems so new and so intricate should call for discussion and lead to differences among allies. Those who are nearest geographically to a potential enemy are afraid that a strategy which would rely chiefly on conventional arms at the outset of a conflict might result in the abandonment, at least temporarily, of a part of the Atlantic territory. Many Europeans fear, perhaps wrongly, the consequences of a policy that would allow the adversary to seize a vital piece of territory by conventional means before any consideration is given to the use of the nuclear weapon.

A recent aspect of this problem is the agreement concluded between the United States and Great Britain at Nassau concerning the formation of a multinational or multilateral nuclear force composed of submarines and surface ships carrying Polaris missiles and manned by mixed national forces. By this agreement Great Britain would be enabled to manufacture her own atomic warheads and submarines and buy from the U.S. the Polaris missiles. In the event her supreme national interest should be in peril, Britain could withdraw her own nuclear force from the multinational deterrent.

The American government has asked whether France would be willing to enter into a similar agreement. In his press conference on January 14, General de Gaulle replied that we could not and he explained why.

First, and for obvious reasons mentioned above, France wants to have her own independent nuclear force. The idea of participating in an integrated force is contrary to her policy. This is the political reason that led to our refusal.

But there are also other technical reasons that prevented us from accepting an offer similar to that which Great Britain found satisfactory. How do we know whether we can build thermo-nuclear warheads and submarines adaptable to the Polaris missile? In this field we are far less advanced than our British neighbors, and it may be years before we can catch up with them. Would it be reasonable for us to make the great financial and technical effort in which we are engaged to build a French nuclear force and, at the same time, the supplementary effort that would be needed in order to participate in the Atlantic multinational force?

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As President de Gaulle said: "To us, in a technical sense, this matter cannot be considered at the present time."

Does this mean that we are adopting a negative attitude which could be embarrassing for our Allies? I do not think so. There has been a tendency to overdramatize this situation and to ignore the constructive elements to be found in French policy. If we wish, under certain circumstances, to be able to use our own nuclear deterrent force in support of our national interest, we do not at all exclude the combined action of our small nuclear force with that of Great Britain and the enormous force of the United States. Surely, the great majority of cases in which the West's nuclear deterrent might have to be invoked would involve this type of cooperative action by all the Allies. Neither does France refuse cooperation in the technological and strategic fields; but here again this cooperation must also be desired by our Allies. It is in this direction, i.e., joint cooperation and consultation among the major Allies on strategy and technology, that we must seek to strengthen the organization of the Atlantic Alliance.

Meanwhile, even though France has declared that she is not prepared to participate in an integrated Atlantic force, she has done nothing to discourage the efforts being made to set up such a force. At the same time there are great obstacles that will have to be overcome: how will this NATO force be composed in order to insure both efficiency and credibility; who will control the use of this force so as to meet both the demands of the Europeans for an increased voice and the desire of America to keep her veto; how will this project be financed; and is it certain that it will really prevent the proliferation of national nuclear forces which is the constant and praiseworthy aim of the American policy? On all these points, many doubts remain.

Thus defense of the Atlantic world, with its new dimensions, poses difficult problems to each nation and causes misunderstandings and disputes among friends. Let us always try to see what unites us rather than what tends to separate us.

France and the United States are in complete agreement as to the necessity of common action to protect the Western world from communist imperialism. We both agree that the relations between us must be those that should exist between free peoples, and that if the destiny of Europe does not lie in becoming an intermediary neutral force, neither does it consist of becoming the satellite of another power. It was President Kennedy who spoke about an association of equal partners. In the atomic era, it is difficult to

find formulas to reconcile the two notions of alliance and independence. We do not, however, despair of finding them.

In recent months, France has been criticized violently not only because of her stand on military strategy but also because of her European policy. It is important that the Allies of France be accurately informed about her intentions and goals in Europe.

FRANCE AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION

For centuries, since the birth of nations in Europe, it has been France's dream to unite them. The wise Sully presented to King Henry IV his "grand design" for a united Europe. Napoleon thought he could reach this objective by the force of arms. Today, it is through negotiation that France endeavors to organize Europe "in such a way that in a world flooded with hate and demagoguery the center of reason, of progress and of brotherhood represented by our continent, should not be submerged." In spite of all the obstacles born of the diversity of traditions, languages and history, the idea of a united Europe has made more progress in the last twelve years than it had in the past ten centuries.

The six states that today constitute the European Community—France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—have recognized that, in their industrial and agricultural methods, their commercial objectives and markets, their way of living and of working, they resemble one another more than they differ. Moreover, geography and technology combine to bring them together: they are neighbors, and their systems of communications are complementary.

These economic reasons are being reinforced by political considerations. There are no serious disputes over frontiers, and no rivalries; on the contrary, the "Six" are united by the feeling that they are the representatives and defenders of a common civilization, and by the fact that they all face the same threat to their security.

Despite these similarities, the road to European unification initiated in 1950 has been most difficult. The six countries have confronted many serious obstacles; although the progress thus far realized is irreversible, many problems have yet to be solved. Let us examine now the accomplishments of the European Community, the future of a united Europe, and the chances that Great Britain might participate in it some day.

The first initiatives were taken under French leadership in the economic field. These are the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and the European Common Market. In 1950,

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France, through M. Robert Schuman's voice, suggested that her neighbors should unite first to form a pool of the vital steel and coal industries. This was followed several years later by two organizations: one to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy and another to provide a common economic market in production and trade.

By the Treaty signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, the six governments decided to form an economic union which will gradually secure during the 1960's the free movement of goods, workers and capital within its boundaries. Eventually there will also be a common tariff on imports from foreign countries into the Common Market. But the goal is not simply a customs union among the six nations. The European Economic Community is creating other new and special links: for instance, the adoption of legislation against cartels, the harmonization of agricultural, social and fiscal policies, and a common effort to assist underdeveloped countries by an economic assistance program and the stabilization of raw material prices.

These six nations together constitute a vast bloc. They represent more than 170 million consumers and within the Free World they form the first market on a scale comparable to that of the United States. In short, in the Western world there will soon be two Americas. The Europe of the Six is the second largest industrial producer in the world, as well as a major agricultural producer. It produces more steel and more manufactured goods than the Soviet Union, and it is already the largest importer in the whole world, buying more from abroad than the United States does.

It is still too early to predict the degree of prosperity which Western Europe may eventually enjoy. Industrialists and farmers, thanks to more competition, will be able to specialize in producing those goods for which they are best suited. What was impossible within separate and relatively small countries becomes possible within a larger and free market. Increasingly, Europe will use modern techniques of production and distribution, diminish production costs, improve the quality of its products and raise the standard of living of the entire population.

One point needs special emphasis because in recent months it has been the subject of erroneous reports. If it is true that the Common Market shall, above all, bring advantages to its members—an objective common to all associations of nations—it is at the same time not correct to say that we intend to create a protectionist or an autarchic entity. France believes that the

Europe of the Six must support, as part of its overall goal, the expansion of world trade. The Rome Treaty forbids the EEC to adopt a common tariff which would be superior to the average level of national tariffs applied by the Six. The EEC has reduced—and for the time being without requiring reciprocal action—by 30 per cent the tariffs on industrial products existing on January 1, 1957. We have also eliminated all quantitative restrictions, the chief obstacle to trade on the same products. Of course, we do not intend to create a vast free trade area between America and Europe; the size and power of American corporations make unwise a total withdrawal of protection for European industry. But the degree of protection will remain reasonable and, if the Common Market continues to build up as we expect—especially in the field of agriculture and of association with some African states—we will be ready to examine the possibilities of negotiating reciprocal tariff reductions with the other industrial powers of the Free World, especially the United States and Great Britain.

Special problems may arise concerning particular agricultural commodities, although such an eventuality would be nothing new. Some Americans fear that U.S. agricultural exports might decline because of the regulations of the Common Market. The statistical record shows, however, that between 1958 and 1962 American agricultural exports to the Common Market have increased by 41 per cent, amounting to an increase of 338 million dollars in four years. This does not indicate on our part an excessive protectionist policy; in the same period, European agricultural products exported to the United States increased only by 2.6 per cent. In the future the import by the Common Market of some U.S. agricultural exports might be reduced, but others will rise. In any case the aim of the Common Market is to end, even for agricultural products, all quantitative restrictions on imports whereas the United States often maintains quotas for those commodities which are favored by a system of price supports.

The EEC does not intend to maintain, through subsidies, excessively high prices for agricultural commodities which cannot be grown efficiently. At the same time we would like to see an examination on a world-wide basis of the means of maintaining the income of exporting third party countries—especially by assuring them stable commodity prices on the world market—and of increasing assistance to the underdeveloped countries in the form of food surpluses which are a burden to many countries of Europe and America.

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Thus, it becomes clear that France is pursuing a policy which, true to her traditions, remains liberal and outward looking.

This is confirmed by other facts. For instance, President Kennedy in his economic report to the U.S. Congress in 1963, noted that the volume of exports of U.S. manufactured products to the six countries of the Common Market increased by 70 per cent during the four years from 1957 to 1961; at the same time American sales of manufactured goods to the rest of the world dropped by 6 per cent.

Moreover, France believes that the advantages of the Common Market should be extended beyond the economic field, i.e., to the political realm. For this reason the French government a few months ago proposed to its five partners that they should complement the present economic institutions through cooperation in the field of foreign policy and, if possible, in education and culture. France did not mean to modify the existing treaties but rather to add to them in a way we believed indispensable for the success of the whole enterprise. We regret today that this suggestion was not accepted by our partners.

Accepting their reluctance, which we hope will be temporary, France opened negotiations with West Germany in order to initiate the same type of cooperation with that close ally. On January 22, 1963, a Treaty of Franco-German Cooperation was signed which put an end to centuries of wars and conflicts that have caused bloodshed in Europe and twice brought American boys across the Atlantic to the defense of freedom. This Franco-German agreement, which reflects the profound will of the peoples as well as of the governments concerned, is a keystone of the European Community and of the power of the Western world.

This Franco-German treaty does not aim at creating an exclusive community. This fact is confirmed by a recent statement by M. Couve de Murville, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Our European partners can at any time come to us to discuss the conditions of their participation." I have no doubt that one day they will join us; I hope also for the participation of Great Britain.

FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

The Western world is still living under certain misconceptions and misinterpretations regarding the causes for the interruption of the negotiations between Great Britain and the six countries of the Common Market. This development in Brussels is widely

considered to have dealt a severe blow to Europe in its march toward unity and Western solidarity. Thus it requires treatment at some length.

In 1950, when French and other European leaders conceived in the Coal and Steel Community the first initiative toward European unification, we did not forget to ask Britain to join us. At that time, for reasons that were her own and which concerned mainly her ties with the Commonwealth, she refused to take part in the negotiations which then proceeded among the six present partners in Western Europe. While regretting this British attitude, we understood her reasons. In time, European unification progressed to the point where the Common Market idea was conceived. Again, the Six invited Britain to join us and again she did not think it was possible to accept. In turn, she set up an organization designed to compete with the EEC—some even claim that it was meant to destroy the Common Market—although it was quite different from ours because it had no common tariff, and no common policy in fiscal, social or agricultural matters. This organization, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), consisted of countries as diversified as Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria.

As a matter of fact, while the Common Market was making great progress, EFTA remained stagnant. Britain, inspired no doubt by the success of our enterprise, changed her policy again and asked—this is important—*not* to join the Common Market as it exists, but solely to examine with us terms that would make her admission possible.

This change of attitude gave us great satisfaction. But, as soon as the negotiations began, we reminded her of the rules of the Common Market as defined by the Treaty of Rome—rules which had proved very difficult to establish among the Six, but, once established, proved very successful—and also the agreements for the implementation of the Treaty each of which had been negotiated painstakingly during the previous several years. Naturally we told her that we wanted to maintain for newcomers the same rules that were imposed upon the original founders.

At first, Great Britain seemed to accept these conditions. Then the negotiations began in Brussels and continued for fifteen months. They were conducted in good faith by both sides. Despite Britain's expressed desire to accept the principles and rules of the Common Market, it became increasingly clear that there were many obstacles to agreement, especially on such subjects as the

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elimination of the preferences granted by Britain to the industrial products of the Commonwealth nations, the structural reforms required of British agriculture and the extension to the EFTA countries of the common external tariff. Great Britain asked for exceptions or modifications that were contrary to the spirit and the letter of the existing treaties. The five EEC partners of France would have liked to carry on the negotiations but none of them could tell us on what basis they proposed to do this. Reactions in certain Conservative circles and among the new leadership of the Labor Party are an indication that many people in Britain shared the view of the French government that Great Britain is not yet ready to enter the European Economic Community. Therefore the French government thought it wiser to suspend negotiations which were threatening to lead us into a deadlock or a crisis even more serious and more painful than the one we confronted in January 1963.

Some observers asserted that these economic reasons did not entirely explain the French position at Brussels, but that military-political considerations led us to believe that Britain should not join the Common Market, particularly after the Nassau agreements of December 1962.

I do not believe that the Anglo-American agreements on a multilateral and multinational NATO force have been the major element in our decision. It is, of course, conceivable that by merging the British and French nuclear forces the basis of a future European force could have been laid, thus hastening the day when Europe would have a greater voice in political and military decision-making. Britain, indeed, might be interested some day in loosening the "special ties" which link her to the U.S.—ties which do not in the least offend France—in the event that she desires to be as "European" as her neighbors across the Channel.

But this is not the true problem. If tomorrow, Britain decided to accept, without reservations, exceptions or modifications, the rules of the Treaty of Rome and of the agreements which followed, she would be welcomed into the Common Market. She has not yet done so, although a change of attitude is always possible. The French Foreign Minister has predicted: "If Britain has not yet reached the point where the inevitable transformations seem acceptable, this moment will come." The French government fervently retains this hope. It should indicate clearly that we do not intend to change our policy of friendship toward

Great Britain, whom we respect and admire and to whom we are linked by so many memories of cooperation in peace and war.

When, from 1950 to 1959, England refused to negotiate with us on the unification of Europe, nobody thought to criticize her; no one complained then that a Common Market, limited to six countries, would be contrary to the interests of Europe or America. Why is there today fear of something which was considered a few years ago to be innocuous; why imagine that France now desires to reverse a course of events which the United States has consistently supported?

French policy was summed up before the National Assembly on January 24, 1963 by M. Couve de Murville in these few words: Western Europe, which I hope Great Britain will join without reserve, will become a coherent entity capable of fully cooperating with the United States within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and of being this element of equilibrium needed for a general settlement.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing clarification of French policy can be briefly summarized: Through a Europe economically and politically united—a Europe to which we hope Great Britain one day will belong by accepting its rules—and through a close cooperation between this Europe and America, we believe we can facilitate the realization of a *modus vivendi* between East and West, which has always been one of the bases of French policy. But, in order to accomplish these ends, General de Gaulle has often said that the threat from the East must cease, and a true *détente* must exist so that we can discuss in a new atmosphere the really serious problems: controlled disarmament and the problem of assisting through a common program those two billion human beings still living in a condition of moral and physical misery.

To maintain a modern national defense posture, to preserve the Alliance with America, and to safeguard the future of European cooperation, these are our guiding principles. Is there anything abnormal about those principles? Are they inimical to the future of Western civilization? Can they possibly arouse fear or mistrust? I do not think so.

France has just granted independence to nearly twenty African nations; she has no ambition of dominating the proud, old countries in Europe with which she shares the same civilization. Neither has she any intention of changing the cherished Alliance that for nearly two centuries has united her with the United States of America.

FRANCE AND HER ALLIES

In critical circumstances, for instance, when the Soviet Union destroyed the hopes of the 1960 summit conference in Paris, or when she threatens in Cuba or Berlin, France has always proved to be the most resolute and the firmest among the Allies. Her firm policy, her views regarding the organization of Europe and of the Western world, her determination to seek, when the moment comes, a global settlement, do not represent only the personal opinions of the French President. They are supported by a freely elected parliament and by the overwhelming votes of the French people each time they have been consulted.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

by Frederick W. Mulley

THE last days of 1962 and the first weeks of 1963 produced a drastic change in the picture of European politics and NATO relationships, whether viewed from Washington, London or Paris.

The cancellation of the Skybolt missile and the conclusion of the Bahamas agreement between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau was followed shortly by President de Gaulle's declaration that he saw no purpose in further negotiations on the British application for membership in the European Economic Community. While it seems likely that President de Gaulle exaggerated when he said subsequently that his decision was the outcome of the Nassau Agreement, the two events were obviously directly connected. It is a commentary on the state of the NATO alliance that the political problems posed within it by nuclear weapons, and the consequences for NATO and for Anglo-American relations of Britain's entry or failure to enter into the European Economic Community, should apparently have escaped Kennedy and Macmillan and their advisers.

It was no secret that France was the least enthusiastic of the Six toward the prospect of British membership on any terms and it was equally well known that in French eyes Britain's major failing was her close ties with the United States. The sensitivity of De Gaulle about his *force de frappe* and his status within NATO were also, surely, political commonplaces. Looking back, it is fair to say that if these Anglo-American negotiations had been deliberately intended to confirm De Gaulle in his thinking on these issues, they could not have been bettered.

The decision to abandon the Skybolt project was correct, although there is no evidence to suggest that any new technical objections had arisen since the original program was undertaken in 1960. But the timing of the decision was most unfortunate and, in international as well as domestic politics, the timing of proposals is often as important as, and sometimes even more important than, their content.

From the European side of the Atlantic, it seemed that the motivation came wholly from the United States' internal political

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timetable and no account was taken of the repercussions it might have in Europe. It is easy to see how the Nassau Agreement, coming so soon after Macmillan's visit to De Gaulle, when presumably these matters had not been discussed with him, appeared to the General as further evidence of the special Anglo-American relationship which made British participation in Europe so undesirable. In addition Britain seemingly had surrendered her nuclear independence, for which Skybolt had become symbolic, for a dubious multilateral force and distant Polaris missiles.

The offer of like missiles to France probably made matters worse rather than better, since it would seem more feasible for France to produce for herself the missiles she was offered than the warheads and submarines she was not offered. Too often in international relations, and not least in the tangled history of British failure to reach understandings with her continental neighbors, suspicion turns the myopic stupidity of one party into planned duplicity in the eyes of the other.

I

The aftermath of Nassau is particularly bitter and frustrating for the Kennedy Administration, since there can be no doubting its good intentions in promoting the concept of a multilateral force or its sincerity in desiring the bigger European community which would have followed British entry. The failure of the two major objectives of American policy in Europe as a result of the now famous De Gaulle press conference of January 14, 1963, was very hard to bear and it is unfair to blame American diplomacy for this breakdown.

But it is reasonable to suggest that the means by which the Administration pursued the worthy ends of its policies—British entry into the EEC and the elimination of national nuclear independence in Europe—were bound to contribute to their failure. The more Britain was pressed to fit into these preconceived policies, the more the United States fed French fears of a sinister Anglo-Saxon alliance. In these matters there is much to be said for applying the Monroe Doctrine in reverse.

America's irritation at the outcome of events is understandable, as is her resentment of the base ingratitude occasionally displayed by her European allies to her contribution to European defense and, through the imaginative Marshall Plan, to European economic recovery after the war. But Europe now seeks partnership, not patronage, and the unreasonableness of some European views,

as assessed in Washington, must be accepted as basic facts of the situation. It is not sufficient to produce plans after objective analysis and assume that, if the right formulas are found, their logic will compel their acceptance. It is well recognized in American internal politics that this prescription does not often work. Why should it function in the equally imperfect world of international relations, where there is the added ingredient of national suspicions and susceptibilities? Emotion is always stronger than reason. Political facts are what people think they are and not what objective analysis reveals.

Leadership of individuals in a free society is a difficult task, and leading independent nations in an alliance is even more delicate and unrewarding. Yet only the President of the United States can lead NATO. By common consent no European can assume to do so—even General de Gaulle has no such ambition. If no lead is given there are complaints; if action is taken somebody's corns are bound to be stepped on. Why then should the United States bother with Europe? There is, surely, no reason other than the hard fact that it is in her own interest to have a strong NATO.

Leadership does not necessarily call for constant diplomatic initiatives. Undoubtedly the lack of leadership in the 1950's meant that opportunities were lost to solve some of the problems which are more difficult today. But action for the sake of appearing to be doing something can be as disastrous as inertia, and in the present situation there is much to be gained by a pause to allow the dust to settle.

II

In the short term the economic consequences for Britain of the refusal of her entry into the EEC should not be serious. The prescription for the stagnant British economy is the same outside as it would have been inside the Market—economic growth. The only difference is that the patient will perhaps be less willing to take the medicine, since the immediate competition from unrestricted imports would have had a more persuasive effect in shaking British entrepreneurial complacency than exhortations about long-term economic survival. Alternative economic arrangements seem difficult to devise, although bilateral and other *ad hoc* trade agreements may assist the volume of trade pending longer-term assessments. Clearly while Britain was negotiating entry into the Community, with doubts regarding her sincerity as her gravest handicap, it was hardly possible to undertake serious policy

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research as to what to do if the negotiations failed. And well before the negotiations were broken off, it was generally recognized that the basic issue was political rather than economic.

Thus the political impact is more fundamental, and unless carefully handled the consequence could be the virtual breakup of the NATO alliance. De Gaulle has made it clear that he is working toward the creation of a Europe which will become independent of the United States and thus perhaps of the NATO alliance. It is, of course, a long-term objective and it is unlikely that he desires to press further his uncooperative attitude within NATO at present. Indeed France now makes only a minimum contribution and has already shown her willingness to exploit the substantial advantages she enjoys by virtue of her key geographical position.

France also has a strong political hand to play by virtue of her position in the European Community which enables her to exercise a power and influence which she could not attain by her own efforts alone. For emotional as well as economic reasons France is an essential part of the Community and of all the aspirations of federalists anxious to build a United States of Europe. De Gaulle may be willing to risk the rupture of the Common Market, but none of the other five members seems prepared to do so. If forced to choose between the Common Market plus De Gaulle or some other arrangement outside the Market, they will no doubt always choose De Gaulle. And apart from his great successes which assure him of substantial support in France, his thesis appeals to others in Europe, not least in Germany. It must be remembered too that the Europeans' reassessment of their position in the Alliance began with Suez and the Soviet sputnik in the period 1956-57, before De Gaulle returned to the scene.¹ Thus there is no reason to suppose that all would be sweetness and light if he disappeared.

We must, therefore, work on the assumption that France will be difficult and unwilling to participate in any new political initiatives that may be devised. At the same time it is important for Britain and America to refrain from attempting to embarrass France or to intervene in the argument going on within the Six. Germany's role in this is obviously of major importance, and it is a matter of regret that a number of factors render difficult a British-German reconciliation which could play so great a part in lessening German dependence upon the new and important

¹See James E. Dougherty, "European Deterrence and Atlantic Unity," *ORBIS*, Fall 1962, pp. 371-372.

Franco-German *rapprochement*. In fact at the present juncture I believe that statesmanship will consist in leaving the situation alone for the time being rather than in well-meaning but inept attempts to put matters right.

While the economic functions of the Community continue to develop, there could well be a stalemate over the question of the beginning of a political union. The divisions over the Fouchet Plan² were temporarily healed by the postponement of further negotiations, pending the outcome of the British application for membership. Now, however, "the Five" may prevent De Gaulle from imposing the kind of institutional form and character to political unity that he would like, and he, in turn, seems likely to veto any more ambitious federal structure, whether based on a commission or on a stronger parliament. From Britain's point of view, of course, such a stalemate would appear highly desirable.

III

Suggestions have been made, particularly by the British and Italians, that the Western European Union (consisting of "the Six" plus Britain) should be resurrected to play a role in seeking solutions to these problems. Certainly WEU, as an established piece of political machinery, could have been adapted to serve as the political institution of the Community if Britain had entered, since it had already adopted the principle of majority voting. However, it is difficult to see it serving a practical purpose in the current impasse.

WEU was created as a poor substitute for the European Defense Community to serve as a vehicle for German rearmament and entry into NATO, and while its Parliamentary Assembly has done valuable work WEU has never been taken seriously at the Council of Ministers level. All its defense functions were formally transferred to NATO at its inception and the Council of Ministers has

²The Fouchet Plan was named for Christian Fouchet, the French chairman of a special committee on political cooperation among the six members of the European Economic Community. On February 10, 1961 in Paris, the committee began its consideration of a French draft treaty for political union, or confederation, of the EEC member states. The Fouchet Plan was based upon De Gaulle's concept of *L'Europe des patries*, outlined by the French President at a press conference on May 30, 1960 and reiterated on May 15, 1962. It envisages the creation of a Council of the heads of state, a Secretariat and a Consultative Assembly. The confederation would be indissoluble. The draft treaty also called for coordination of foreign and defense policies by the Council at regular summit meetings to be held three times a year. Decisions would be taken by unanimous vote. The draft treaty would be open to revision at the end of three years. No decisions were reached by the Committee because of Belgian and Dutch refusal to discuss the draft treaty unless Britain is included in the political talks.

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always taken the view that it should avoid any impression of forming a bloc within NATO. The Germans see it as the instrument of discrimination against them because it is charged with policing the German renunciation of nuclear weapons production, and the French prefer it to be quiescent because of its responsibility to determine the number of nuclear weapons that France can produce.³

It is now too late, and also undesirable in the light of the current situation, to seek to develop a European Strategic Nuclear Force based upon the WEU Council. When I proposed such a force in 1959 France had not yet held her first atomic test and there seemed to be no willingness on the part of the United States to entertain the idea of any kind of NATO force.⁴ My proposal was designed to prevent the emergence of new national forces which, unhappily, are now here. De Gaulle has made it clear that he would be as unwilling to share control of his *force de frappe* within Europe as he is to participate in a NATO nuclear plan. His interest in a European force is only understood if his observations are interpreted by substituting "France" when he says "Europe."

No more attractive is the "dumbbell" theory of a strong American nuclear force linked to an equally strong European force. It would be many years before Europe could, in terms of delivery vehicles, attain the equal weight which the dumbbell analogy implies. If the time should arrive when it had such a force, the pressure to snap the slender link joining the two would be irresistible. This is a concept to break rather than to unite NATO.

IV

The problem of nuclear weapons within NATO is the vital problem, and until it is resolved we cannot hope to repair the basic weaknesses of the Alliance. But it is not sufficient to grasp the

³For a further discussion of the French view on this matter, see F. W. Mulley, *The Politics of Western Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 87-88. Article 3 of Protocol III of the Western European Union reads: "When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of the Western European Union."

⁴This proposal was originally made by the author before the WEU Assembly in December 1959. It may be found in Document No. 147, *State of European Security*, a report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by F. W. Mulley, Rapporteur. See also the discussion of this issue in Mulley, *The Politics of Western Defense*, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-97.

nuclear nettle: we need to know what to do with it and to understand how it came to grow.

First it is necessary to appreciate that the argument of national or independent "deterrents" versus some kind of multilateral or multinational "deterrent" has no military relevance at all. It is wholly a matter of politics—and of politics within the Alliance, not between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In essence it is a matter of confidence between the United States and her allies, involving also questions of prestige and status among the European powers themselves.

Secondly it is important to recognize how the problem arose. In the 1950's, during the period of the "massive retaliation" doctrine, the anxiety in Europe was that the United States would use her nuclear weapons too soon. Since October 1957, as Soviet nuclear capability has demonstrated its power to hit targets in the United States, the fear has grown that a U.S. President would be reluctant to expose his own population to nuclear attack for purely European interests. In other words, that he would not run nuclear risks for a vital European interest which he was prepared to take for vital American interests, e.g., Cuba. This fear may be quite irrational, but it exists; and it is found not only in those European countries which have nuclear ambitions but in those which have no desire to possess nuclear weapons themselves. In short a muted plea to have a veto on the use of the American nuclear armory has become an insistent demand to participate in the shaping of the nuclear strategy of the Alliance and to have a share in decisions to initiate the use of the American nuclear weapons on which the whole Alliance depends.

It is against this background that American leadership should direct its efforts to restore confidence and to meet European aspirations for genuine partnership. The post-Nassau proposals for multilateral nuclear forces and the intense diplomatic activity in support of them do not seem to be addressed to the right question; in addition they could prove dangerous because of their juxtaposition in timing to the crisis within the European Community.

Indeed in many respects the proposals seem to conflict with the Administration's original objective of avoiding the dangers of a proliferation of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and of retaining effective control over the weapons. These commendable purposes are unlikely to be served by distributing nuclear weapons widely within the Alliance. The formula of mixed-manning mere-

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ly complicates the proposals without basically altering the position. The key question of control remains vague and unresolved. If there is to be a wholly European decision-making machinery, the result is just another "independent deterrent." Resort to such a remedy now is tantamount to saying that the De Gaulle thesis is right and that in fact no one will authorize the use of nuclear weapons except for national interests.

To leave the decision to a military commander, no matter how distinguished, is to surrender the principle of political control which has been scrupulously and properly observed in the national forces (including the national American forces) hitherto. To give physical possession of the weapons to European countries or to composite formations of European sailors while retaining effective American control over their use by means of electronic locks and bomb-alarm systems would seem to produce the worst of all possible worlds. The pretense would be apparent to those whose confidence it is necessary to reassure, while the suspicion would persist among public opinion that in some way the control mechanisms could be bypassed by the persons in charge of the missiles.

V

What, then, should be done? There is no satisfactory alternative to the most simple but perhaps the most difficult course for the United States. The kernel of the argument is national sovereignty, and the function of a leader is to set an example when his followers show signs of lagging behind. In order to get Europeans to surrender a lot of their sovereignty—this is what interdependence really means—it is necessary for the United States to surrender a little of hers. *De facto* a good deal of sovereignty has been given up, but, unhappily, in this case it is some *de jure* surrender that is required. Of course I appreciate that in the United States, as in other countries, a small *de jure* surrender of sovereignty is much more difficult to accept than a substantial *de facto* one.

Not only should the whole of the nuclear strategy of the Alliance be discussed within the North Atlantic Council, but, while retaining American manning of the weapons, the United States should formally assign all her *nuclear* forces located in Europe to the political control of the Alliance. This, of course, means a formal surrender of the exclusive right of the President to give the vital decisions, although *de facto* the appointment of an American as the NATO Supreme Commander involves very little actual loss of sovereignty. In short, it means placing the American

nuclear forces in Europe under the Alliance on similar terms to those already accepted in respect to the six American divisions.

Obviously the North Atlantic Council would be obliged to set up machinery to exercise the joint political control required, as well as to decide the guidelines for nuclear strategy. It could well happen that the outcome would be a delegation of the decision for the use of the force in dire emergency (as in response to a surprise attack) to the U.S. President. In fact the very dramatic question of having to take a decision to move from relative calm to a state of global nuclear war in fifteen minutes (which is the argument usually advanced against the creation of such machinery) seems very unlikely; nevertheless, to preserve the credibility of the deterrent, arrangements for such a contingency must be made. The realistic problem, and a very difficult one admittedly, will most probably be the decision whether to authorize the first use of tactical nuclear weapons, involving all the problems of escalation, in a limited war situation. In such a case there would be time for more formal consultation. In any event, such consultation should and would take place. Is it not, therefore, sensible to provide the machinery to facilitate it, particularly if at the same time one strengthens the cohesion of the Alliance?

This solution is not easy, and clearly it involves a substantial revision of NATO machinery.⁵ Nor is it guaranteed to meet all the aspirations of the Europeans, although for many the desire to participate in the decisions is more important than the wish to acquire physical control of any nuclear weapons. Certainly the objections in the British Labour Party to Polaris and "foreign bases" would be much less if a NATO instead of an American national flag were flying at Holy Loch. However, these matters can never be known unless put to the test by the initiative of the United States government and Congress.

As well as giving substance to the concept of interdependence within NATO, such an initiative would also, by indicating the willingness of the United States to surrender some of her sovereignty, transform the concept of Atlantic Union from vision to possibility. In the long run, if NATO is to achieve its purpose, it must broaden into some kind of Atlantic Community.

⁵I have made some suggestions on this problem in Chapter 7 of *The Politics of Western Defense*, *op. cit.*

DECENTRALIZING NUCLEAR CONTROL IN NATO

by Timothy W. Stanley

FOR several years the NATO alliance has been searching with increasing frustration for answers to the virtually insoluble problem of the control of nuclear weapons. The present system whereby the United States retains an effective monopoly of decision over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance (except for the small national forces of France and Britain) is politically nettlesome for the Europeans: they are denied an effective voice in determining their own destiny, and they fear that Soviet ability to obliterate American cities might deter an American nuclear response to an attack on Europe. Thus, for reasons in addition to those of national prestige and grandeur, most European members of the Alliance in effect want their fingers on both the trigger and the safety catch of nuclear weapons. But it is impossible to combine both within a decision-making system composed of more than one political entity. If everyone has a trigger, then *ipso facto*, no one has a safety catch and vice versa.¹

Prospects for unanimity of decision within NATO are good only in the more unlikely cases, such as a massive Soviet attack on the entire Alliance. At present, capacity for independent action in a crisis is provided by the national nuclear forces of the United States, Britain and France. But only the forces of the U.S. could be really effective either in deterrence or defense against a first class nuclear power like the Soviet Union. The present effort to find a multilateral alternative is based primarily on the need to satisfy the desires of other countries, especially Germany, for greater participation in the nuclear element of collective defense, and to avoid the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Yet the proposed multilateral missile force does not solve the control problem but rather intensifies it. The dilemma is between the possibilities (and limitations) of independent national action—which could tear the Alliance apart in a crisis which threatens immediately only a part of it, such as a communist *coup de main* on one of the flanks

¹A more detailed treatment of the problem is contained in articles by William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony and James E. Dougherty in *ORBIS*, Summer and Fall 1962; Henry A. Kissinger's "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense" in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962, and "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma" in *The Reporter*, March 28, 1963; Malcolm Hoag's "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence" in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1963; and my own "NATO's Nuclear Debate" in *The Reporter*, July 5, 1962.

—and a multiple veto, i.e., a requirement of unanimity, which could cause political paralysis and military ineffectiveness.

Solutions to the nuclear control problem have proved elusive in part because the problem has been regarded as a monolithic whole rather than as several related but separate issues. It is the purpose of this article to show that what appears impossible for the *whole* may become more manageable by treating each of the component parts in accordance with its own particular requirements. The details of the possible arrangements suggested here are merely illustrative; they are only one approach to the problem. But the central point is to recognize that although there is an interrelationship between the uses to which nuclear weapons might have to be put, they fall into different categories which can and should be looked at individually.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS²

First and foremost, there are the major nuclear striking forces of the Alliance—the overall strategic deterrent—for which the United States currently provides almost all of the warheads and the vast majority of the delivery vehicles. Current American strategy combines the concept of deterrence, i.e., an ability to devastate an aggressor even after a surprise attack, with what might be called a “restrained and controlled counterforce option.” Under any strategic concept, whether on a first or a second strike basis, it is desirable to plan to employ nuclear striking forces initially against enemy *military* forces so as to induce the enemy to limit the amount of destruction which those forces can deliver. It is also common sense (to say nothing of morality) to avoid the wholesale or unnecessary killing of millions upon millions of human beings which would be caused by an attack on major population centers. In particular, it is desirable to give an enemy every incentive to avoid attacking American cities.³ It is clear that, if deterrence fails, a doctrine of massive and indiscriminating nuclear devastation gives an enemy no such incentive.

²A distinction between “strategic” and “tactical” weapons is necessarily arbitrary. Under some circumstances a rock thrown by the American Ambassador at Mr. Khrushchev in Red Square could be strategic, while a megaton nuclear weapon against enemy field forces could be tactical. But broadly speaking, strategic weapons are those used against enemy military power (counterforce) or civil society (countervalue) which are intended to affect his will or ability to wage war. Tactical weapons, by contrast, are those employed for the more limited purpose of affecting a specific military situation.

³This was the thrust of the speech given by Secretary McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962 in which he stated that “. . . principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population.”

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Since the Soviet Union now appears to be emphasizing hardened and mobile nuclear forces, the West may no longer be able to destroy almost all of the opponent's striking power. And even a small residue could deliver a multi-megaton blow on Western population centers.⁴ Thus even during a thermonuclear conflict, a portion of the strategic force must be kept in reserve as an invulnerable countercity deterrent. As Secretary McNamara has noted, "the very strength and nature of the Alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy's society if driven to it."⁵ The remainder of the force, however, must be centrally controlled and directed on a global basis. Thus, NATO might as well recognize the *de facto* division of the strategic forces into two categories.

The counterforce striking element—which would be by far the larger—would continue to be operated by the United States as part of its national forces under American command and control. Allied participation in the mission would be governed either by U.S. custody of the warheads, as with the Thor missiles now in England, or by close targeting coordination between national forces. This is the best way to assure the survivability and operability of the nuclear "sword" in a crisis, and to maintain it as a credible deterrent. At the same time, however, the Europeans would be given a much greater voice in what Alastair Buchan calls *contrôle* in the French sense of the term, that is, prior participation in the planning for use of the force and in its targeting.⁶

In the foreseeable future, neither Europe as a whole nor any present or potential nuclear power could possibly envisage conducting a thermonuclear war against the Soviet Union unless the United States was involved. Europe therefore loses nothing by leaving the primary counterforce striking power of the Alliance to the United States as in the past, particularly if Europe acquires a greater voice in its possible employment.

For the second component, the reserve designed to be used only in retaliation for Soviet attacks on Western cities, there would appear to be reasonable possibilities of decentralization even to the point of giving up the American veto. Suppose, for example, the proposed multilateral force of sea- (or submarine-) borne

⁴The "Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, February 6, 1963," spells out this aspect in some detail. See e.g., p. 27.

⁵Ann Arbor speech, *cit. supra*.

⁶See "The Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962, p. 180.

Polaris-type missiles was assigned exclusively to this mission. It could then be truly multilateral in nature⁷ and responsive to a special NATO chain of command terminating in the North Atlantic Council (or, more realistically, in an emergency command center staffed with the highest level representatives of the principal members of the Alliance who were available).⁸

The problem of political control would still exist, but it appears more manageable (or at least less troublesome) by restricting this NATO force to the worst—and least likely—case. One possible solution would be to assign “countervalue” targets in advance. These might be “hostage” cities in the USSR correlated to Western cities. As soon as confirmation had been received (perhaps via an electronic “bomb alarm” system) that an enemy nuclear weapon had detonated within a Western city, the representative of the country concerned could authorize the transmission of fire orders on the appropriate target of retaliation. Since the force would in no case be used except in general war—and even then only if all efforts at restraint and control had failed—little is lost by providing for such semi-automaticity on a “tit for tat” basis.

Whether or not the details of this arrangement should be communicated to the Soviet Union in advance is a complex question, involving the advantages and disadvantages of the so-called “sister city” concept and the possibility (in the 1970’s) of “limited strategic war” in which one side deliberately destroys one or more of the other’s cities to demonstrate its will or frighten the enemy into submission. But these questions are separable from the two main features of the concept: to preserve the vital element of Alliance retaliation for “an attack on one”; and to assure the Soviet Union that Western retaliation will not be paralyzed by Alliance indecision. Here, the country *attacked* would have the option of deferring or waiving the retaliation, but no one else could do so. The reserve retaliatory force would be an instrument of the Alliance, rather than of any one nation; and it could be made secure against unauthorized use through the “permissive link” type of electronic lock and a NATO control system. Unlikely though this *in extremis* type of case may be, this concept does meet

⁷The pros and cons of mixed manning—which is a politician’s dream but a commander’s nightmare—would have to be weighed in the light of the mission and composition of the force; but they are not particularly relevant to the concept itself.

⁸A force designed to be withheld until the final stages of a war requires maximum survivability (an argument in favor of submarines) and would also encounter difficult—and expensive—technical problems of reliable communications in a nuclear environment, penetrability of air defenses in a later time period, and similar problems. These problems cannot be explored here, but they should be no more difficult for a multilateral force than for U.S. “reserve” elements.

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one set of European concerns, for it assures the other members of NATO that no nation, particularly the United States, could veto a nuclear retaliatory strike in response to a Soviet attack on European cities—even though the United States itself had not been attacked.

TACTICAL WEAPONS

Secondly, there is the entire range of tactical nuclear support for the defense of Europe. Here, too, there are two major categories: the “battlefield” weapons designed to be used against enemy combat forces in a tactical defensive situation, and those designed for medium-range missions of an interdiction nature, i.e., attack on enemy airfields, troop concentrations, rail centers, bridges, and other rear area targets. The purpose of the latter weapons is to make it difficult for the enemy to move troops and supplies forward, as well as to counter his medium-range missiles and tactical air power. But this use of nuclear weapons would almost certainly provoke a similar response and escalate to general war, for the possibilities of control (except, perhaps, for the avoidance of major population centers) appear limited. Moreover, the large number (several hundred) and mobility of Soviet medium- and short-range missiles in Eastern Europe make it extremely difficult for NATO to conduct an effective counterattack against them.⁹ Thus it is not necessarily in NATO’s interest to initiate a nuclear exchange at this intermediate level. In intercontinental terms, of course, the West does have a marked strategic superiority, but the uncertain outcome regarding casualties and civil damage in Europe is one reason for the current emphasis on strengthening NATO’s non-nuclear forces. Even meeting NATO’s present goal of thirty active divisions on the Central Front (plus correcting certain easily remedied deficiencies in deployment, equipment and logistics) could enable the Alliance to cope with a surprise Soviet conventional assault which was not preceded by mobilization and forward deployments sufficient to put NATO on notice.

Nevertheless, NATO must be able to counter Soviet use of nuclear weapons and to use protected weapons systems to prevent Europe from being overrun by massive Soviet forces in the unlikely event of general war. Such a defense would clearly involve the strategic forces of both sides. This fact should reduce opposition in Europe to leaving control in American hands as at present, for U.S. control minimizes the risk of improper use and, at the

⁹The Institute for Strategic Studies’ *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances, The Military Balance, 1962-63* (London, 1962) provides some useful estimates of these forces.

same time, the United States would have little to gain and much to lose by withholding release of nuclear weapons under such general war conditions. Nevertheless, it may be desirable to provide for some decentralization in American control of these weapons in order to hedge against a breakdown (or oversaturation) of intercontinental command and control under the confused conditions of nuclear war. Provision could be made—along the same lines as under present arrangements—for release of nuclear weapons by the President to SACEUR's authority once general war was under way. As with the strategic counterforce weapons, NATO planning and targeting procedures could be revised to give the Europeans a greater degree of participation and to develop at least broad rules of engagement under which the President would act for the Alliance. Thus the senior American (and Allied) commander in Europe would have under his control some means of "minimizing disaster" in a massive Soviet attack under conditions of all-out war.¹⁰

In the other, "battlefield" category—as with the reserve elements of the strategic forces—continued U.S. control of nuclear weapons raises major political problems in Europe. For it is the possibility of a massive Soviet conventional attack (or perhaps one accompanied by a carefully restricted use of nuclear weapons) which is very much at issue. If the full mobilized strength of Soviet bloc forces were employed, it is not likely that NATO could cope with such an attack by conventional means alone.¹¹ There is also the more likely contingency of a Soviet *coup de main* against lightly defended areas, such as the flanks or near Hamburg, which worries the Germans, Greeks, Turks, and to a lesser extent the Norwegians. They fear that American controlled nuclear weapons might not be released until it was too late to preclude a *fait accompli* seizure of their territory.

One possible solution would be based on a concept of defensive use of low-yield, short-range nuclear weapons as an initial measure when conventional defenses proved inadequate. Here, nuclear weapons would be employed against enemy forces *actually penetrating NATO territory*. This would both demonstrate NATO's will to resist and serve to redress an enemy's local tactical advantage gained via a surprise attack. In some circumstances, a self-imposed limitation based on geography could be more effective

¹⁰Some aspects of this problem (as seen from General Norstad's standpoint) are described in Charles J. V. Murphy, "NATO at a Nuclear Crossroads," *Fortune*, December 1962, p. 85.

¹¹Secretary McNamara discussed this conclusion in his February 6, 1963 statement to Congress, *cit. supra*.

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than one based on a rigid separation of conventional and nuclear armaments. NATO's objective, after all, is not to use or avoid the use of certain weapons but to deter, and if necessary defeat, any communist attack by the most effective means, taking into account all of the possible consequences.

An enemy could, of course, respond in kind; but his options of escalation are not very attractive, given NATO's overall strategic superiority. If he counterattacked, he would have made the first use of nuclear weapons across a frontier, and would be open to prompt retaliation. A communist power which was met with a "defensive" use of tactical nuclear weapons, and thus found that it had miscalculated, might well prefer to withdraw—in the interests of "peace," as Khrushchev put it in justifying his removal of the missiles from Cuba.

Under such a concept, any NATO member under attack, which believes it could not defend itself with the conventional forces available, would have the right to request nuclear strikes on the attacking forces through the military chain of command. If SACEUR agreed with its estimate and confirmed the fact of an enemy attack, the matter would immediately come before the North Atlantic Council. In the event of disagreement—a not unlikely circumstance should a localized conflict occur, say, in Turkey—NATO's previously agreed procedures would call for delegation of the political decision back to the country concerned. That government would then act *for the Alliance* in authorizing the local NATO commander to execute an atomic strike. The weapons themselves would have to be controlled by a special NATO custodial force under a NATO "permissive link" arrangement; or perhaps the new "mobile task force"¹² set up by SACEUR could perform a tactical nuclear support role. But the final release orders and the political direction of the atomic strike would be the responsibility of the country concerned *without* the possibility of a veto. Initially, weapons might remain in U.S. hands, with the understanding that U.S. custodial forces would act as agents for NATO under this procedure. Such a major concession could be made contingent on Allied commitments to meet NATO's conventional force goals, for this "limited" trigger in Allied hands should be accompanied by measures to raise as high as possible the threshold at which nuclear weapons are necessary. An adequate European conventional posture should also be helpful in gaining Congressional support for any amendments to U.S. atomic energy legislation which might be needed.

¹²See *The NATO Letter*, NATO Information Service, Paris, January 1963, p. 25.

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The risk for the other members of the Alliance from this carefully restricted decentralization would be small, since the nuclear weapons would be used initially only within the territory of the government authorizing their use, and it is that country which would run the immediate risk of any Soviet retaliation in kind. Unnecessary use would be very unlikely because of this fact, and because of the requirement that SACEUR endorse the request; unauthorized use could be prevented by "permissive-link" type controls.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, these proposals would involve several separate command and control systems for NATO's nuclear defenses. The overall "counterforce" strategic force would remain under American control, as would the warheads for medium-range missiles and tactical aircraft in Europe. The present national forces of Britain and France might remain "independent" (but closely coordinated) or those countries might later be persuaded to merge them with the NATO forces—particularly under the incentive of American technical help. The "reserve" elements, however, would be responsive to a NATO command center and would be fired only as a last resort in retaliation for attacks on cities; their use would not be subject to a veto. The decision to use tactical battlefield weapons would be delegated to the country most immediately concerned, provided SACEUR concurred and NATO procedures were followed.

Some of these ideas have been suggested at various times in the past, but have not proved acceptable to the Alliance because they were applied to the whole problem of nuclear control, instead of the particular case to which they were most suited. Europeans are most concerned with the two extreme possibilities: the initial use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet attack which cannot be met by other means, and the ability to retaliate for attacks upon their cities. This proposal should meet these concerns without undue risk. It would therefore allow the most effective organization of NATO's nuclear power to meet the two middle cases—strategic counterforce and medium-range interdiction—via continued American control of the major nuclear forces, at least until such time as Europe may evolve into a single political entity able to act effectively on matters of war and peace. The nuclear control issue has long stymied NATO military planning. The concept of the decentralization of control by categories may offer the Alliance a way out of the deadlock and lead to more effective management of the West's nuclear power.

KHRUSHCHEV'S DISLOYAL OPPOSITION: STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND POWER STRUGGLE IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

by Franz Michael

THE Sino-Soviet conflict has been viewed by many as a sign of ideological and political disintegration within the bloc. Where formerly communist policy was directed from one center—Moscow—there are today, in this view, many centers of communist authority, and one speaks of a system of “polycentrism.”

There is no generally established definition of this term, and its meaning has remained vague. It was first used by the Italian communist Togliatti, who meant to express by it not a dissolution of the communist unity and disobedience to the overall communist program, but rather a greater autonomy of the parties in adapting to their own areas the overall communist line. It has now been applied by students of the communist bloc to describe what they, in different degrees or in different ways, seem to think is a weakening of the ideological and political unity of the communist bloc and movement as a result of the emergence of a number of independent communist centers of authority.¹ The reasons for the emergence of these centers are seen in the different histories, ideological climates and national interests of the communist states, in particular those of the two major communist states today, Soviet Russia and Communist China. In fact, some scholars, focusing on the Sino-Soviet conflict, speak of the de-

¹Among the many articles on the topic of polycentrism, see especially the excellent special number of *Survey*, July 1962, on “Polycentrism,” with articles by Walter Laqueur, “The Schism,” Boris Levitski, “Co-existence Within the Bloc,” Geoffrey Hudson, “Russia and China,” and others; a number of articles in *Ost-europa*, especially July 1962, with articles by René Ahlberg, “Die Dezentralisation der Weltrevolution” and Francois Fejto, “Die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs und der ‘Polycentrismus’”; several articles in *The China Quarterly*, especially Richard Lowenthal, “Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute,” January-March 1961, and the excellent analytical article by William E. Griffith, “The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction,” July-September, 1962. Among the several books on the conflict that have appeared, special mention should be given to: Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961* (Princeton University Press, 1962); Klaus Mehnert, *Peking und Moskau* (Stuttgart, 1962); *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations*, edited by Kurt London (New York: Praeger, 1962); and *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (Praeger, 1961).

velopment of two rather than many centers.² This concept of "polycentrism," or at least "duocentrism," has led to the assumption that different types of communism—different "models," based on different histories and backgrounds—are developing, and that these differences in kind explain the different stands taken by Soviet and Chinese communist leaders on policy issues of the day.³

I

It is the view of this writer that although these different stands on policy within the communist bloc are to some degree real, and make up the form in which the conflict is expressed, yet the conflict itself is not over the realization of different national policies by different centers, or over deep ideological disagreements, but rather over the right to determine the common policy of the whole movement. What is at stake is not the right to a parting of the ways but the leadership of the communist movement as a whole.

In this struggle for leadership Khrushchev has maintained the monopoly of power. Mao Tse-tung has attacked Khrushchev's monopoly of leadership by challenging his application of doctrinal principles to the world strategy of communism. The complex structure of the communist movement and the emergence in it of a bloc of countries controlled by communist parties has provided the arena for this battle; the resulting organizational issues are the weapons with which it is fought, and the ideological arguments furnish the ammunition.

Since the communists claim that, as the vanguard of the proletariat, they represent the decisive historical force of the time, communist leaders must base their claim to leadership upon their ability to apply the ideological framework correctly to each policy decision. All leadership battles consist, therefore, in the main, in contrasting the opponent's wrong ideology with the attacker's better ideological understanding of the given situation. The stand of either combatant can shift according to the opportunities seen in each situation and according to the opponent's changing ideological claims. Neither side has to be consistent and neither

²See Zagoria, *op. cit.*, note 10, p. 452, who however comments that the concept of "duo-centrism . . . would imply a stable division of labor between Moscow and Peking in which the lines of authority and the spheres of influence would be clear," which, as Zagoria realizes, is not the case. See also Karl A. Wittfogel in "Agrarian Problems and the Moscow-Peking Axis," *Slavic Review*, December 1962, who develops the concept of an axis.

³See Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 385 ff. E. G. Boyd, in his *Communist China's Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1962), tried to distinguish national interest from communist policies in the case of China. Many of the authors mentioned in Note 1 *supra* stress national interests, different "ideological climates," and different historical development as the basic reasons for a "polycentric" development in the bloc.

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side has to represent a special historical tradition, a national interest, or a truly ideological innovation. Often indeed the "ideological" attack is no more than a demagogic argument against the opponent's integrity and qualifications for leadership.

All leadership battles in communist parties are fought in these "ideological" terms. What distinguishes the present conflict from such local party power struggles is that it is fought in the communist movement as a whole and reveals a doctrinal and organizational problem that is inherent in the movement, namely, to provide authority in a movement that has no clearly defined theoretical or organizational framework for determining leadership.

Lenin's doctrinal concept of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the international proletariat implied that there was only one world-wide Communist Party, which had its organization or section in each country.⁴ Ideally, then, there would have to be a decision-making procedure in this world party. Such a procedure was meant to be established through the Communist International, organized in 1919 by Lenin to counter and destroy the socialist international movement and to be the tool of the communist world revolution. Theoretically, the Comintern was ruled by its Congress, its Executive Committee, and later its Presidium. It established in time its own bureaus and departments to manage the affairs of the movement through the different national parties. In 1928, the Presidium was described in the words of one of the Comintern representatives from Germany as "a kind of Politburo" for the movement.⁵

But in practice the Comintern was but an arm of Soviet party power extended to the whole world. This Soviet control of the Comintern and the movement was not based on any organizational theory but simply on the fact that the Communist Party of the

⁴All national parties have therefore to accept the name "Communist Party" with the addition of the name of the respective country. The statutes of the Communist International, adopted in 1920, stated: "The Communist International must, in fact and in deed, be a single Communist Party of the entire world. The parties working in the various countries are but their separate sections. . . ." See Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), I, p. 164.

⁵*Ibid.*, I, p. 437. The communist system of "democratic centralism" was applied to the Comintern. The individual parties "elected" delegates, who however did not hold mandates from their parties; the decisions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) and of the Comintern Congress were binding on the parties, which had to submit the record of all their deliberations to the Comintern. The communist movement had thus on paper its own international organization, of which the Soviet party was but a member. In the statutes of the Comintern there was no provision for the location of the seat of the organization. In theory, this seat could be moved, but in practice, it was in Moscow because the Soviet Union was the only party that had conquered a government.

Soviet Union was the only party in control of a government and of the resources necessary to promote and control the movement. This conflict between the fictional sovereignty of the movement and practical Soviet party control served to discredit the Comintern, especially when Stalin's terror was extended through it to other parties.

When this control was criticized in the first years of the Comintern's existence, it was defended by such arguments as: "The Russian comrades on the presidium and the ECCI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] must be accorded the greatest weight, for they have the greatest experience in the field of international class struggle; they are the only ones who have really carried out a revolution and they are therefore far superior in experience to all delegates from other sections" ⁶ The first part of this argument is still used today to justify the practical leadership of the Soviet party.

It was this role of the Soviet Union and its relationship to the Comintern which Stalin stressed when he argued for the submission of all communist local interests to the primary obligation of defending the Soviet Union—the "fatherland" of the proletariat. Since the Soviet Union was the "base of the international movement," "the center of international revolution," "the driving force," and "living example," "a model of fraternal relations," the international proletariat was obliged to "forward the success of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and to defend the country of proletarian dictatorship by every means against the attacks of the capitalist powers."⁷

This contrast between fiction and reality in the role of the Comintern destroyed its usefulness, the more it became apparent and the more the Stalinist purges affected the membership of the whole movement. By 1943, when Stalin dissolved the Comintern as a gesture to his Western allies in the war against Nazi Germany, it had not only become a "discredited symbol of the

⁶Statement by Eberlein, a German member of the ECCI, quoted in *ibid.*, I, p. 437. The special role of the Soviet party was already expressed in the conditions of admission to the Comintern, as approved by the 2nd Congress in 1920. Every party was obliged to "give unconditional support to any Soviet republic in its struggle against counter-revolutionary forces." *Ibid.*, I, p. 171. The twenty-one conditions were of course one of the main tools through which Lenin established the submission of the Comintern to his policy. In the theses accepted by the 2nd Congress, a major focus was also the "struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Russian Soviet Republic, which is rallying around itself both the Soviet movements among the advanced workers in all countries, and all the national liberation movements in the colonies and among oppressed peoples. . . ." *Ibid.*, I, p. 141.

⁷From the program of the 6th Congress of the Comintern, September 1, 1928, *ibid.*, II, pp. 511-13.

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[Soviet] hegemony," but also had lost some of its importance, since "a large part of its political tasks had long since been transferred to the apparatus of the Soviet foreign ministry and the espionage organizations."⁸

When the Cominform was founded in 1947, several parties had gained control, albeit with Soviet help, of the governments in their countries, and the enforcement of central discipline had become more problematical. In theory, therefore, it seemed useful to permit more leeway to each party, to assert the equality of the member parties, and even to imply that "one center" of policy enforcement was no longer needed.⁹ The autonomy of the parties was to be combined with a greater theoretical independence of the organization. Although the statutes of the Comintern had provided that the seat of the organization could be in any communist country, it had, of course, remained in Moscow; by contrast, the Cominform had its seat first in Belgrade and, at the end, in Bucharest. But in spite of the location, the admission of the equality of the member parties, and the conciliar form of decision-making, the Cominform, like the Comintern, remained Moscow-directed. Yet it failed to serve either the fictional or the practical Soviet purpose.¹⁰

The Soviets' difficulty in enforcing their political control over all other parties at this time was not so much the result of the miscalculations of Stalin and his methods or of the growth in size of communist parties in countries outside the Soviet Union, as of the fact that some of these parties now possessed governments and therefore a source of power with which—if they were strong or remote enough—they could defy the Soviet authority's attempt

⁸René Ahlberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 449-450.

⁹The fact that the Comintern had actually been a tool of the Soviet leadership was by implication admitted by Zhdanov, when in 1947 he manipulated the organization of the Cominform. According to Zhdanov the Comintern was useful as long as it gave directions to communist parties which were weak and did not possess recognized leaders of the proletariat in their countries. When the communist parties developed into mass parties, it was impossible to direct these parties "from one center." The Comintern, which had promoted the growth of these parties, became then an obstacle to their further development. See Zhdanov's speech at an international meeting in Poland in September 1947, at which the founding of the Cominform was decided, quoted in Ahlberg, *op. cit.* Ahlberg, who inclines to the polycentrist view, interprets this statement as an indication that Zhdanov and also Molotov, who made a similar statement in Moscow two months later, expressed a Soviet admission that communism could no longer be directed from one center. He concludes that this Soviet admission was an indication of a Soviet willingness to give up the theoretical claim to central leadership, a retreat which has been used by the leaders of other parties to make "polycentrism" a practical principle of international communism.

¹⁰The Cominform was less effective as an instrument of Soviet control of the communist movement than the Comintern once had been. The major use made of the Cominform was Stalin's disastrous attempt to bring Yugoslavia into line.

to dictate policy. The whole problem of the control of the movement, which remained latent throughout the earlier time, now came to the fore as the result of the conquest of state power by communist parties in states other than the Soviet Union, a development that ended the monopoly of the Soviet "fatherland" of communism on the resources with which to back communist policy. The growth of a bloc of states within the communist movement has again made acute the question of decision-making and pointed up the lack of a doctrinal formula which could be used to prescribe the organizational framework for leadership and policy-making in the movement.¹¹

The organization of the bloc is—so far at least—raw and inadequate for the communist purpose, and this organizational shortcoming gives the power struggle its complexity. The question whether the parties in control of governments should play a special role in policy-making, whether these parties should be a sort of inner *gremium* of political deliberations, has become a part of the battle for power. So far, a special role of the bloc parties in determining the overall political line has not been established.¹² It is natural that the Chinese communists, who challenge the Soviet leadership, which was formerly based on the idea of the "fatherland" of communism, are now anxious to give the whole group of "fatherlands"—including their own—a similar role, while the Soviet leaders want to base their authority now on their advanced stage of development toward communism rather than on the "fatherland" argument, which has lost its validity.

Apparently, the communists did not foresee the problem that would arise after the conquest of power by parties other than the Soviet party. When the Bolsheviks conquered power in Russia and established the Soviet Union, they regarded that Union as the core of a world communist state. When the name for the new government was discussed, the first proposal was to call it a "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia." But, as was pointed out by Mikhail Frunze, a comrade-in-arms of Lenin, this name would not do justice to the world revolution, which even-

¹¹This writer does not want to suggest that such a formula could have worked except insofar as it reflected the actual power situation. What we witness today, though, is a power struggle without such a framework, in which the formulation of the framework itself is a part of the battle.

¹²The resolution of the Moscow interparty meeting of 1957 was signed only by the bloc parties, but the statement of the interparty meeting of 1960 was signed by all eighty-one parties represented, despite the Chinese communist attempt to have the statement signed only by the bloc parties. The statement did, however, mention the special role of the bloc parties.

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tually would involve America, Africa, Australia and New Zealand as well. It was therefore decided to call the new government the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," a name that could serve the concept of a new communist world state. This world state was the goal of the Comintern at the time of its founding, when Lenin still expected that the Bolshevik Revolution was to be followed quickly by other revolutions in Germany, France and other countries of Europe. When Béla Kún seized power in Hungary, the intention was to have his government join the Soviet Union.

But even when the prospect of the immediate communist revolution had disappeared, the dream of a federated Soviet state that would introduce the communist millennium had not faded. The program of the 6th Congress of the Comintern, in 1928, projected the communist victory in individual countries or groups of countries which would "finally become the World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, uniting the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as a state."¹³ Yet when the communists seized power after the Second World War in a number of states in Europe and Asia, they did not establish Soviet Republics. Their conquest of power was made possible through the United Front policy, under which (in a violation of the Yalta agreement) the communists prevented the establishment of freely elected governments and used the framework of the United Front to establish what became "People's Republics." The same doctrinal framework was used for the take-over in Communist China.

With the Soviet Union surrounded by People's Republics, the bloc had no structural system that would give expression to the unity of the political purpose of the communist parties in their aim of establishing a world federation. The already existing problem of the absence of an organizational framework to determine leadership and policy-making among the parties of the movement was thus aggravated by the lack of organizational unity among the governments established by twelve of these parties. Treaties of alliance such as the one concluded between Soviet Russia and Communist China in 1950 hardly provided such a framework. They were patterned after traditional interstate relations and served only a limited purpose, though they contributed perhaps to the confusion in some minds about the character of communist states. Nor did the slogans of the communist "bloc"

¹³Degras, *op. cit.*, II, p. 492.

or "camp" or "commonwealth" provide the organizational tool needed.

The establishment of the Cominform, which combined the parties of six East European satellites and of France and Italy with that of the Soviet Union, indicated the Soviet belief that the sheer power of the Soviet Union could keep the satellite parties under control if they were fenced in with the most loyal European partisans of the Soviet leadership. But where the Soviets did not station their troops—in Yugoslavia and later Albania, not to mention China—this expectation proved wrong.

Until his death, Stalin's authority and prestige as the powerful leader of the communist movement enabled him to continue his domination over the new communist bloc, although his authority was already being challenged. But with Stalin's death the authority of his Soviet successors to decide the strategy of the movement could be challenged by any opponent within the bloc who had enough organizational strength and prestige. Mao Tse-tung, in control of a bloc party whose state, largest in population, was most removed from Soviet power, soon posed the challenge to Khrushchev's authority that is at the core of the current Sino-Soviet conflict.

II

In judging this conflict, it cannot be stressed enough that we are dealing with communist parties and not with national states of the nineteenth-century variety. It seems necessary to stress this point because when one so often hears that China wants this or Russia wants that, one is prone to forget that the political authority in these countries rests not with the governments but with the parties in control of the governments, and that these parties are constituents of the communist movement whose policy they represent. There can be no question that the major goal of the policy of the Chinese Communist Party is the communist world revolution and that its leaders regard their own revolution as a part of this world revolution. To the communists the national state is a reactionary bourgeois phenomenon, and it is their purpose to destroy the cultural and national traditions of the countries they conquer. They may use such traditions as far as they serve the communist purpose, but will then give them their own interpretation. What they are trying to introduce is their own order, which is the application in each country of "Marxism-Leninism."

Like all communists, Chinese communist cadres are of course

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not free from the racial and cultural backgrounds from which they came and their subconscious motivations may well be affected by their original environment. But communist doctrine and policy are directed toward eliminating these factors as far as possible and creating a new communist man, whose loyalties are to the party, the world revolution, and a new social order. The products are to be Chinese communists rather than Communist Chinese. Nothing can better demonstrate the Chinese communist hostility to tradition than the attempt to introduce the commune system in China, which, if successful, would have destroyed family cohesion in a country whose social tradition had been based on filial piety and family loyalty.

The application of communist policy has, of course, to be adapted by each party to the conditions of the country in which it operates. The communists have to deal with national traditions which cannot be ignored; but the communist purpose differs basically from that of the fulfillment of a national cultural destiny, which was the purpose of the national state. The country of the party is only the setting within which communist policy is to be applied, and this policy is carried out within the framework of the doctrine and the overall strategy. Conflicts on strategy will therefore concern themselves with the problems of accomplishing the communist purpose, not those of serving traditional national interests.

The fact that governments of communist parties demonstrate territorial ambition does not contradict this view. Expansion at the expense of the noncommunist world serves the communist cause. It is most unlikely, however, that any such territorial aggression will be carried on by China against the territory of another country of the bloc. The purpose of communist policy is communization, not the establishment of national empires at the expense of other bloc countries.¹⁴ The Soviet-Chinese conflict is over the strategy of the advancement of communism in all parts of the world.

¹⁴It seems therefore most unlikely to expect any Soviet-Chinese border conflict for territorial reasons. The view sometimes expressed in popular writing that a conflict is building up between the Soviet Union and Communist China over the threat that millions of Chinese people will overrun the Siberian empty spaces, that Khrushchev is therefore afraid of Communist China and willing to come to terms with the West is clearly mistaken for this reason alone. This view also totally ignores some of the basic problems of relationship between capital resources and population, and of the social and political geography of Central Asia. See Klaus Mehnert's interesting report from interviews with Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. These refugees had been taught (with regard to Outer Mongolia) that what mattered was not on which side of the border people lived, but whether they belonged to the higher or lower social system. Mehnert, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

If the conflict is not based on the clash of national interests, does it express deep-seated ideological differences? Is there a schism in the pseudo-religious doctrines of the communist "church?" It has indeed been held that the different historical backgrounds of the parties of Soviet Russia, of Communist China, and of other countries have led to differing "ideological climates," to basically different lines of thought about communist strategy, and that these differences have caused the conflict.

The communists themselves have, of course, maintained the unity of the doctrine. The very fact that the combatants directly or by proxy call each other "deviationists," "dogmatists," "adventurists," "revisionists," or any of the other terms of communist ideological abuse, shows their mutual accession to the principle of one communist doctrinal line. The intention is to challenge the interpretation and application of the doctrinal system, not to break out of it. And when one examines the ideological argument itself, one finds that it is recent in origin, and thus not a matter of any long-standing convictions; that both sides have shifted their points of view at different times; that the most serious arguments are matters of emphasis of different aspects of a general policy on which there is no quarrel; that much of this argument is more concerned with abstract formulation than with practical policy; and that some of the polemics is purely demagogic.

III

While the entire history of the Chinese communist leaders' policies cannot be examined here, a few major points should be stressed.

That Mao Tse-tung does not want to divide the communist movement or the bloc, or to leave it, that he wants to participate in leadership or even eventually become the first leader, can be seen from the issues of the conflict. Much of the conflict is not concerned with matters of immediate concern to the Chinese communist government, such as the issue of Taiwan or the off-shore islands, on which there has been no open Chinese complaint of Soviet lack of support, or in Southeast Asia where, in this writer's view, the Soviets and Chinese communists have closely co-operated, or in India where an interpretation of divided roles can be as easily argued as one of conflicting policies. Rather, Mao's accusations against Khrushchev concern the overall issues of how tough the policy should be toward the West, and what line to take on summit meetings, *détente*, Albania, Yugoslavia, and the support of Cuba.

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In judging Mao's stand on these issues, it must not be forgotten that he is in opposition and not, as is Khrushchev, in a position of responsibility. It is always the advantage of opposition that it can demand more radical measures than the authority responsible for action can take, and thus discredit the opponent. Where Mao himself has had the responsibility for action, he has not been known as a reckless leader. His record in the civil war in China, his own writings on guerrilla warfare, his action toward the offshore islands and Taiwan have not indicated a willingness to take grave military risks; and his recent venture in India against an unprepared opponent does not contradict this record.

That much of Mao's stand results from his role as leader of an opposition rather than from deep convictions inherent in Chinese communist tradition can be seen from the fact that it has been only during these last years that the Chinese have played the wild men. The radical line expressed in their statements has appeared only since the conflict with the Soviet leadership began. It is therefore more logical to regard the conflict as the cause of the radical line than to regard the radical line as the cause of the conflict.

Mao's rise to power within the Chinese communist organization and the conquest by the Chinese communists of the Chinese mainland occurred during Stalin's time.¹⁵ The communist vic-

¹⁵It has often been said that the difference between Communist China and the Soviet Union is in their different stages of development, and that this difference has caused the present conflict. It is, of course, very true that even at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet Union was far more industrialized than China at the time of the communist take-over. And certainly today Soviet industrial power, at least in the specialized areas of heavy industry that serve to develop rockets and hydrogen weapons and the power of the state, is incomparably beyond that of Communist China, which has not been able to maintain its industrial build-up within the quagmire of its agricultural debacle. But the difference between the Soviet and the Chinese stages had in the past not been a matter of conflict and argument; this difference had always been recognized in doctrine and practice, and there has been no quarrel that communist policy in China has to adapt to a different stage of development.

Lenin's theory of imperialism made it possible to justify doctrinally the United Front policy in Asian countries, which he initiated as a joint fight of several classes against the monopoly capitalism of the West. The Chinese communists can of course point to their experience with handling problems of a different nature from those faced in more advanced countries and can use this experience to point to China as a model for underdeveloped countries. But this difference in itself, and the policies derived from it, are still part of an overall blueprint that takes all these stages of development into consideration. The main road remains the same, even if the stages are different, and the concept of one road on which different countries have reached different milestones is quite another thing from the concept that would prescribe different roads to the same goal. The Soviet Union and Communist China can thus both find their place along a route of march that was started by Marx and widened by Lenin to cover a multitude of economic and social situations without ever giving up the claim of a unilinear human development.

tory in China in 1949 differed from that of the communist parties of Eastern Europe in that it was accomplished without direct Soviet help and even came as a surprise to Stalin and the Soviet leaders, who may have underestimated the communist opportunity in China at the time. Yet the Soviets had assisted the take-over by surrendering Japanese equipment to the Chinese communists in Manchuria, and their obstruction of the movement of Nationalist forces into Manchuria gave decisive aid to the Chinese communist victory there, which in turn decided the outcome of the civil war. Though political and personal slights by Stalin—for instance when Mao had to wait six weeks in Moscow in 1949 to get a rather unsatisfactory treaty—may have rankled in his mind, Mao still accepted Stalin's leadership and political decisions without any sign of opposition. But after Stalin's death Mao had become the most senior among the leading figures in the communist world, and his position must have given him a sense of importance as a leader not only in the Chinese organization but in the communist bloc as a whole.

Mao still followed the line now set by Khrushchev. The loosening of control that came with the "thaw," and the shift from Stalin's method of police control and terror, within the Soviet Union and within the bloc, to a greater participation by the various groups within the party as well as by various groups within the movement in the formulation of policy, was taken up in Communist China by the policy of "The Hundred Flowers" and by more active Chinese participation in bloc policy. The Chinese leaders supported the new line and attempted to assist the Soviet leader in overcoming his difficulties with the East European satellites. The Chinese communists even followed Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy, though with obvious reluctance and in a much more limited form. But already at that time—in 1956—there may have been doubts about the wisdom of Khrushchev's risky policy of attacking the former leader, and dissatisfaction with his practice of formulating policy without consulting the senior Chinese leader.

The change in the Chinese communist line began in the years between 1956 and 1959, when Mao's expectations that he would play a major role as senior statesman of the communist bloc and movement were rudely disappointed, and when he did not even receive from the Soviet leaders the economic support he so badly needed. Up to that time Mao had faithfully carried out the direc-

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tions from Moscow given by Stalin and his successor. There had been no Maoist heresy.¹⁶

In 1957 the Chinese communists not only were willing to accept the interpretation of the overall line adopted by the 20th Soviet Congress, including the statement that war was no longer inevitable; they were anxious to support the Soviet leadership in its troubles with the restless European satellites. When, in January 1957, Chou En-lai went, on Soviet invitation, first to Moscow and then to Poland and Hungary, he supported Moscow's authority and the unity of the bloc. This support may have been given on the assumption made by Mao Tse-tung that his own role in the deliberations on the line and strategy would be greatly increased, that there would be "real, not only formal consultation," as he had demanded in 1956. At the interparty meeting in Moscow in 1957 which brought the acceptance of the Moscow line by the parties of the bloc, the Chinese communists went along.

An indication that Mao favored now a more aggressive line in the continuing diplomatic battle with the West was his speech at Moscow University in November 1957, in which he stressed the superior strength of the communist bloc gained by the sputnik and the development of intercontinental missiles. This was expressed also in the Chinese symbolism used by Mao: "The East Wind is now prevailing over the West Wind," a slogan to be repeated many times and used to press for a tougher communist policy on the basis of a new interpretation of the "epoch." The

¹⁶The argument that Mao was the initiator of the Chinese peasant policy, that he was a "peasant leader" is, I believe, demonstrably false. One of the major misconceptions in this view has been the assumption that Li Li-san followed the Moscow line and was purged for it, while Mao on his own initiated a peasant policy. That Li Li-san really was a "deviationist" from the Moscow line which stressed even at that time the agrarian policy has been brought out more clearly in the recent analysis of the Chinese documents given by Hsiao Tso-liang in his *Power Relations in the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934: A Study of Documents* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961). See the section on Li Li-san, pp. 14ff. At that time, Mao was not yet in a position of control of the movement and certainly never in opposition to the Moscow line. The myth that Mao's peasant policy differed from the Soviet line can be ascribed in my view partly to the original misconception of the "agrarian reformer" Mao. Though this view has been abandoned, it lingers on in several versions in semi-popular and scholarly accounts of Mao's alleged deviation from the Soviet line. It has left its trace in a whole literature that repeats the myth of the special peasant character of Chinese doctrine and practice.

The other source for the claim of Mao's originality is recent Chinese communist propaganda which is designed to create the picture of the leader who always knew better. No such claim, however, was made before the Soviet-Chinese conflict started in the years between 1956 and 1959. The first three volumes of *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, that appeared in Peking in Chinese in 1951 and 1952, did not indicate any claim to such better doctrinal understanding.

same point had been used by Khrushchev to support the argument that war was no longer inevitable, since the new strength of the communist bloc deterred the capitalist warmongers. The question of the exploitation of this changed situation became a matter of emphasis rather than of principle.

In the summer of 1958 the Chinese communists still supported Khrushchev's summit policy which aimed at the inclusion of India in a five-power meeting to handle the Near East crisis.¹⁷ Khrushchev's visit to Peking of July 31-August 3 was apparently the last real effort at consultation on major policy decisions.

During 1957 and 1958, the problem of consultation and participation in bloc policy-making became aggravated by an internal Chinese crisis that must have increased Chinese communist impatience with Soviet strategy. The Hundred Flowers movement in China led to an explosion almost as serious as the uprising in Hungary. The loosening of the reins in China showed the bitterness against communist policy not only among the population at large but especially among the students and intellectuals, including a large section of the party members themselves. The shift back to a reassertion of party control took the form of the "Anti-Rightist Movement," and, as in Eastern Europe, the thaw ended in China with the suppression of the opposition. At the same time, the economic problems caused by the unrest in Eastern Europe had endangered the economic program of the bloc and the Soviet economic aid on which Communist China had to count for its ambitious plans of industrialization.

This was all the more serious because the enforced collectivization of the last years had created difficulties in agricultural production that could be overcome only by permitting a greater freedom to the farming population or, possibly, by a system of a greater control of agricultural as well as industrial labor. These inner difficulties, in combination with decreased outside support, forced upon the Chinese communists the alternative of a slowdown in economic development or a drastic shift in policy. If the missing capital that could not be secured from the Soviet Union had to be provided from within China, it would be necessary to establish an iron control over the faltering agriculture that alone could produce the needed surplus.

It was at this moment that Mao Tse-tung decided to take the radical course of pressing ahead—and of "going it alone"—with a program which went far beyond the accomplishments that could

¹⁷See the discussion in Mehnert, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-486.

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be achieved with decreased Soviet aid. The "Big Leap Forward" and the commune policy, accompanied by so much fanfare, were the result of this decision. To justify this policy of autonomy in terms of the overall communist line, Mao Tse-tung stressed now the necessity of applying the general Marxist-Leninist theory to the "concrete conditions" in China. In a statement before the Chinese Central Committee in October 1958, Mao stressed the need to apply the communist doctrine to "the concrete practices of the Chinese revolution," a statement often since reiterated in China.¹⁸

The principle that each party was free to apply the line in its own country had, of course, been recognized by the Soviet leaders long before. It can be traced back to the time of the establishment of the Cominform.¹⁹ It was expressed fully in the Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956, that formed a part of Khrushchev's policy of loosening the reins at home and in the "commonwealth," and that promised the parties of the bloc equality, independence, sovereignty, noninterference and mutual cooperation. It was assumed, however, that all parties would remain loyal to the overall line and this line included the idea that the Soviets were ahead of the rest of the bloc in the prescribed stages of development. Indeed, their advanced stage and experience was the very basis of the Soviets' claim to lead the movement. Mao's "concrete practice," however, concerned the stages of development themselves.

The commune system was not only an attempted *tour de force* in the Chinese economic and social transformation; it was a direct challenge to Soviet leadership. The mess halls, community living, work teams, combination of agricultural and industrial work, and abolition of private property—none of these characteristics of the commune system was a deviation from communist teachings. The Chinese communists purported to introduce a more advanced stage of development in which the transition from socialism ("to each according to his work") to the more advanced stage of communism ("to each according to his need") was already taking place. This stage, according to communist doctrine, could be reached only when production had advanced far enough to provide the affluence with which to satisfy needs. This, the Big Leap was to achieve.

¹⁸See *ibid.*, pp. 429-430. Mehnert relates this point to the autonomy granted by Moscow to all parties since 1956.

¹⁹See Note 8.

With the commune system, Mao attempted to bypass the Soviet Union on the road toward the communist millennium and to become the vanguard of the vanguard. In that he failed.

Khrushchev reacted strongly to the commune policy. The reorganization of Chinese agriculture was favorably reported in the Soviet papers until the Chinese claim of being ahead of the Soviet Union became known. Then there was silence, followed by a hostile reaction.

The commune policy was initiated in the summer of 1958. At the end of the year the retreat began. In its resolution of December 10, 1958, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party greatly modified the commune. It restored some private property to the farmers, the principle of payment according to work, and family living—all the items that would have put Communist China ahead on the way to communism. At the same time, Mao resigned from the chairmanship of the republic, retaining only his position as Chairman of the Central Committee.

It can well be argued that this retreat was caused by the resistance of the Chinese peasantry. But the doctrinal importance of the retreat in communist terms and the personal resignation of Mao Tse-tung are difficult to explain on that basis alone. The conjecture that behind this policy change was Khrushchev's pressure gains support from the events that followed. In January 1959, Chou En-lai went to Moscow to negotiate a new economic agreement for additional Soviet support for Chinese industrialization. It seems plausible that Mao's resignation was the price for Soviet economic aid in 1959. But Khrushchev went further. In June 1959, for the first time he openly attacked the principle behind the Chinese communes, stressing that such a stage in communist development had to be preceded by vast progress in economic production.²⁰ At the same time an attempt was made at the meeting of the Chinese Communist Central Committee at Lushan, in July 1959, to remove Mao from his leading position in the party. This attack, led by P'eng Teh-huai, the Chinese Minister of Defense, was, as we know today, made with the previous knowledge of Khrushchev.²¹ The attack failed and ended in the purge of P'eng and his group. Khrushchev's attempt to defeat his potential rival initiated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

²⁰See Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

²¹See the article by David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly*, October-December, 1961.

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If the assumption is correct that Mao's resignation from the chairmanship of the republic and the attack against him in summer 1959 were sponsored by Khrushchev, then these moves constituted a declaration of the war between the two men that has continued ever since.

From that time on, Mao again built up his power as the leader of the Chinese communist party and government. When at the end of August 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao's successor as Chairman of the Republic—a reluctant dragon rather than a rival—called the Supreme State Conference to decide on important political matters, Mao did not appear. But in mid-September, Mao called an *ad hoc* conference, with the same participants and a few additions, to pass on the same agenda plus an amnesty as an obvious demonstration of his own authority.

Since that time the hero cult of Mao has risen to new heights in Communist China; the adulation of Mao today at least equals that of the Stalinist cult at its height. Not only is Mao *the* leader of Communist China, venerated in word and image in his role of guiding light, but he is also celebrated as the leading star in the communist world. Some eyebrows in Moscow must have been raised when statements appeared in the Chinese press such as that of January 1960: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the most outstanding representative of the proletariat in our country, and the greatest revolutionary leader, statesman, and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism in the present era."

That Mao's position can be interpreted differently by the Chinese communist leaders and other members of the communist bloc became apparent in October 1959, at the ten-year celebration of the communist victory in Peking, where all communist parties and governments were represented and where Khrushchev appeared—one day late—on his return from his American journey. The Soviet delegate and most other non-Chinese communist leaders began their official liturgy with an order of appellation in which the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, under the leadership of its Central Committee, under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung, had accomplished their great deeds. In the speeches of the various representatives a whole scale of different approaches to the problem of Mao's position can be observed. Khrushchev himself stuck to the official version which limited Mao to the chairmanship of the Central Committee, but found an opportunity during his address to give Mao other, more general praise.

IV

Since then the conflict has been fought by mutual recriminations on a number of what have been called "ideological" issues. The most celebrated of these has been the disagreement over the inevitability of war and the possibility of peaceful coexistence, linked to the doctrinal interpretation of the "character of the epoch." Whether the growth of the "world socialist system" had advanced enough to secure peace or how much "imperialism" still threatened war became an issue used to attack or defend the methods of communist strategy.

How little the Chinese communists' more aggressive attitude has to do with any special Chinese ideological tradition can be seen if the present view is compared with the one expressed a few years back. In 1955, Communist China was known for its great success at the Bandung Conference as the propagator of peaceful coexistence, of *Panchsheel*. According to Chou En-lai, his country was quite willing to talk peace with the United States—the past and present arch-villain of the Chinese communist story. In 1956 Communist China accepted the theory that war can be avoided, advanced at the 20th Soviet Party Congress, and subscribed to it at the interparty meeting in Moscow in 1957.

The seeming shift in the Chinese position on this question was only an abstract argument to be used in the power struggle. The Chinese communists did not return to the view that war was inevitable nor did they call for war.²² They challenged the more cautious Soviet policy of negotiation and demanded, in their role of the opposition, a more aggressive one. The argument shifted soon to different types of wars. Besides world war there were local wars which might or might not turn into world war, and there were revolutionary wars and wars of liberation which were "just" wars. In an argument that was shifting and demagogic on both sides, the Chinese communists attacked the Soviet coexistence policy as shirking the support of revolutionary and just wars.²³

Related to the argument on wars was the one on the possibility of carrying out a revolution through peaceful parliamentary methods, as employed by European communist parties. This brought upon the Soviets the Chinese communist accusation of

²²See Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

²³For the arguments on war, see *ibid.*, pp. 301ff., 350ff., and 355ff. Zagoria gives what seems to be perhaps the most cogent statement on the issue in the sentence: "The real question, indeed, seems to be over how far to go in exploiting Soviet deterrent power."

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abandoning the revolution for the "peaceful road" of "revisionism."²⁴

The substance of these and other "ideological" arguments has been sometimes disagreements on policy, in which both sides retained, however, elastic and shifting views; but many of the arguments were attempts to point out the opponent's weaknesses by distorting his purposes.

The last major forum in which the Sino-Soviet battle was fought was the interparty meeting of all the parties of the communist movement. One such meeting had been held in Moscow in 1957 before the conflict had reached its height. It ended in a declaration signed only by the bloc members, which contained the party line as stated by the Soviet leadership and accepted by the 20th Soviet Party Congress. Its major point, that war was no longer inevitable and that communist victory could be promoted through coexistence and negotiation, was accepted by the Chinese communists. But after the personal conflict between Khrushchev and Mao reached its climax, a new interparty meeting had to be called by the Soviet leaders to reassert Soviet authority. According to a Soviet statement circulated among the delegates of other parties before the meeting opened, the meeting had been called by the Soviet leadership earlier than originally planned because the Chinese had violated the declaration of the 1957 meeting and had introduced a disruptive campaign within "certain foreign parties" and had even attempted to "denigrate and unseat Khrushchev personally, by incorrectly denouncing his travels in the West and his 'peace' policies."²⁵

In a comment at pre-meeting briefings, M. A. Suslov, member of the Presidium of the CPSU, pointed to the contradiction within the Chinese ideological statements and indicated that the other parties had to choose between the Soviet or the Chinese views.

²⁴See Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute," *op. cit.*, p. 16. Lowenthal calls this "probably the least serious and most purely demagogic one" of all the differences raised in the 1960 dispute. It seems to this writer that Lowenthal's accusation of demagoguery can be applied to most of the so-called ideological arguments in the Sino-Soviet conflict, even to those where behind the ideological battle there lies a real political or strategic issue.

²⁵See the article by Edward Crankshaw, in *The Observer*, London, May 20, 1962 and Griffith, *op. cit.* This account and interpretation of the November 1960 meeting by Griffith clearly shows the organizational aspects of the power struggle and its true character. Griffith, who has carefully compared the available statements of various party leaders on the 1960 meeting, has pointed to the confirmation of the Soviet accusation of the Chinese personal attack against Khrushchev in "Intervention de Maurice Thorez" in *Contribution de la délégation française à la conférence des partis communistes et ouvriers*, Moscow, November 1960, pp. 31-34.

The four issues that were mentioned by the French communist leader, Maurice Thorez, as the basis of the debate, "the character of our epoch, problems of war and peace, paths of transition to Socialism, and the unity of the international Communist movement and rules which regulate the relations among fraternal parties,"²⁶ are the obvious doctrinal and organizational issues at stake in a power battle for leadership of the movement. The first two concern themselves with the general problems of coexistence, the toughness of the stand to be taken in negotiations with the "imperialists," and the question of either supporting national liberation movements a la Bandung or the promotion of armed uprising. It is on these issues that the point of "demagoguery" mentioned earlier can truly be made.

V

The two other issues, those of transition to socialism and of the unity and rules of relations within the movement, are more directly concerned with the power struggle. The problem of transition to socialism concerns the question of who is ahead on the way to the final communist goal and who, therefore, has the claim to lead the movement. Mao Tse-tung's attempt to build up such a claim through the commune policy had failed. The statement of the Moscow meeting now determined where each party stood in the order of march on the general road.²⁷ The Soviet Union was naturally given the first place. The progress of Soviet economic planning and the advances of Soviet science were said to have "ushered in what is virtually a new era in the development of world civilization." The Soviet Union's claim to leadership as the vanguard of the whole communist movement is manifested in the sentence: "The Soviet Union is the first country in history to be blazing a trail to Communism for all mankind." The Soviet Union is also a "striking example and most powerful bulwark for the people of the world in their struggle for peace, democratic freedoms, national independence and social progress."

The Chinese communists are given special mention after the Soviet party but ahead of the other parties that have succeeded in conquering power in their countries. The people's revolution in China is mentioned for its contribution to shifting the balance of world forces in favor of socialism and for the impetus it has

²⁶Quoted from *Contribution*, *op. cit.*, in Griffith, *op. cit.*, footnote 15.

²⁷For the following comments, see the text of the 1960 Moscow Statement which has been given in *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1961, pp. 25-52.

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given to the national liberation movements, especially to those in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Next come the other People's Democratic Republics, which have shown "remarkable progress in Socialist construction" and together with the great Soviet Union "form the mighty Socialist camp."²⁸

The leading position of the Soviet Union is expressly declared at the end of the statement: "The Communist and worker's parties unanimously declare that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, and remains, the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement" The "experience" and the "example" of the Soviet party are stressed, and it is expressly stated that the decisions of the 20th Soviet Party Congress are not only of great importance for the Soviet party and the Soviet Union, "but have initiated a new stage in the world Communist movement, and have promoted its development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism."²⁹ The Soviet vanguard role, once stressed by Lenin in the Comintern, and challenged by Mao in the commune policy, was thus firmly reasserted in this meeting of the movement. It was this role alone on which Khrushchev's leadership was to be based.

This special role of the Soviet party as the vanguard of the movement is based on the progress achieved in the Soviet Union and on the distance it can maintain between its development and that of the other countries in the camp. Soviet leadership therefore depends on remaining in overall development ahead of the other camp countries, especially Communist China. Soviet economic aid to members of the bloc, especially to Communist China, will narrow the gap between Soviet and Chinese development and strengthen the Chinese leaders' rival claims. Chinese anger over the limitation of Soviet economic support to China and Soviet reluctance to give such support is therefore understandable also from the point of view of the power struggle for leadership. The question of China being able to catch up with the Soviet Union—after she failed to "surpass" her—is also linked to the advance of all the countries of the camp toward communism. Will the Soviet Union maintain its leadership to the end and enter the millen-

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 30. One may wonder why in this statement China is not listed again together with the other communist countries and the Soviet Union as a member of the camp. The reason may perhaps be that the omission of China in this statement on the camp avoided the problem of having either to place her together with the non-Soviet members or give her a leading position and thus further underline her special role already characterized in the paragraph devoted to China's contribution.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

nium first? Or will she assist her fellow socialist countries to draw even so that all may move into the stage of communism together?³⁰

In the 1960 Moscow Statement, this question is neatly avoided by a formulation that promises "extended cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance; gradual elimination, along these lines, of historical differences in the level of economic development, and the provision of a material basis for a *more or less simultaneous transition* of all the Socialist peoples to Communism."³¹

The vanguard role of the Soviet party enabled Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU to submit for acceptance by the Congress the Draft Program which was to determine the transition to communism for the whole communist movement.³²

The connection between this sudden preoccupation in the Soviet Union with the future road to communism and the Chinese experiment can be easily inferred. It was not enough for Khrushchev to refute the Chinese experiment; as leader of the vanguard he had to point out the true road. In the months preceding the issue of the new communist draft program, a number of articles in Soviet periodicals had discussed the communist future which in the years before had remained distant and undefined.³³ Then the program was to be approved by the 22nd Congress together with two other major issues—the further de-Stalinization and the attack against China's proxy, Albania—all designed to reassert Khrushchev's leadership of the camp and the movement.

In this vanguard role, secured by the Moscow Statement of 1960, the Soviet leadership remained free from all institutional formalities of the movement or the bloc and placed itself in an unchallengeable position: The greater experience, the more advanced stage, and the role as the vanguard on the road to com-

³⁰The role of the Soviet Union can perhaps be compared with that of a "rover" in cricket who has passed through all the wickets but does not touch the pole until he has helped the other members of his team on their course through the wickets. What the Chinese communists object to is that the Soviet rover does not give them proper support and even assists independent players in their game.

³¹Emphasis supplied. 1960 Moscow Statement, *The China Quarterly*, *op. cit.*, p. 32. This statement which had been first given by Khrushchev to the 21st Soviet Party Congress, was further watered down at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress by the phrase "within our historical epoch," which practically eliminates any claim for the necessity of narrowing the gap and reducing the Soviet advantage. See Mehnert, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

³²See the text in the *New York Times*, August 1, 1961. The Chinese communists challenged this right of the Soviet Congress to legislate for the *whole* communist movement. According to Chou En-lai, the new program "set forth for the Soviet people a grand plan for building Communism. . .," while *Pravda* even related: "The CPSU Central Committee is the true center of theoretical thought." (Emphasis supplied.) See Zagoria, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-73.

³³See *Osteuropa*, April-May, June, July-August, 1961.

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munism which made up the Soviet claim to leadership were not dependent on institutional methods of control that could be used against the Soviet Union.

This explains the Soviet resistance against all Chinese attempts to continue to anchor the Soviet leadership in an institutional form that would permit a challenge. Already at the previous inter-party meeting, the equality and independence of the fraternal parties had been stressed, and the Soviets had disclaimed any right to interfere in other parties' internal affairs. In fact, as we have seen, the idea that there was no need for one center of the movement goes back to the period of the Cominform in 1947. In the Moscow Statement of 1960, this principle is expressed in the formula: "All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have equal rights; they shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles and support each other."³⁴ The statement continues with a stress on the international solidarity of all Marxist-Leninist parties and on the responsibility of every party to the working class of its country, the international working class, and the communist movement as a whole.

If the communist movement as a whole is to follow its vanguard, all that is meant by this equality of the fraternal parties is the freedom to apply the principles or policies worked out by the vanguard to the conditions of their own countries. It is this principle that led Togliatti to interpret the Soviet point of view as "polycentrism," by which he meant that policy was applied in each country according to local conditions. This does not mean that each party, or "center," can go its own way. In fact, this kind of "polycentrism" is a Soviet defense against the Chinese challenge, although the term has not been used by the Soviets. Rather they have stressed that no center is needed.

Applying this principle to the camp, the Moscow Statement speaks of the camp as a "social, economic, and political community of free and sovereign peoples united by the close bonds of international socialist solidarity." They have "common interests and objectives" and follow the "path of socialism and communism," adhering to the "principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism." They are completely equal, but there exist no objective causes for conflict with national interests, since such conflict is possible only under the system of "national egoism

³⁴See 1960 Moscow Statement, *The China Quarterly*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

typical of capitalism.”³⁵ Referring to the declaration of 1957, the Moscow Statement of 1960 stressed that although specific historical conditions in each country had to be considered, survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism had to be eliminated in preparation for the goal, which is a “new society for all mankind,” already prepared through the formation by the socialist states of a “world system.” “Every Communist Party which has become the ruling party in the state bears historical responsibility for the destinies of both its country and the entire socialist camp.” The assumption is that because of the mutual interest, conflict of national interests is unthinkable, since all will follow the general path of the movement, which the Soviet Union leads.

The Chinese attempted to institutionalize the “leading role of the Soviet party” and thus submit it to criticism by the inter-party meeting. Leadership in this case would not be based on the vanguard role of the Soviet party and its leader but would have to be maintained through the correctness of decisions. Since such decisions could be challenged, it would be possible in interparty meetings to express an opposing position which would be a “minority position”—a minority position which could remain on the record. According to the speech made by the Chinese representative, Teng Hsiao-ping, “the minority is not bound to adopt the general political line adopted by the majority.”³⁶ Teng even intimated that, as at the time when Lenin split the Social Democratic Party into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, the minority might eventually become the majority. That this was an open, clear challenge to the Soviet leadership in the form of an organizational attack was clear to the other party representatives, and as the Belgians stated, “if the leading party can be ideologically and politically wrong, you begin to wonder who can take its place.” The Chinese were thus opposed to “polycentrism” and tried to institutionalize the Soviet party’s leading position in the movement in order to make it vulnerable to an organizational attack.³⁷ The Soviet attempt to counter this Chinese strategy by including in the statement a condemnation of “fractionalism” in

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 33.

³⁶Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁷This important aspect of the organizational battle between the Soviet and Chinese leaders is taken from the important article by Griffith who clearly indicates the organizational issue: “As all Lenin’s theories and actions so clearly demonstrated, the organizational issue is the decisive issue in any bureaucratic elitist movement,” a statement with which I completely concur. See Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

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the movement did not succeed, and the final Moscow Statement speaks only of the general necessity for unity.³⁸

The forms in which the power struggle between Mao and Khrushchev have been fought, the fractionalism, the use made of organizational methods to undermine and destroy the position of the opponent, lead back to Lenin, as does the vindictive language with which the rivals attack each other. But the point raised by Teng Hsiao-ping that the minority could become the majority, as at the time of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, also raises the question of a split. Such a split, however, would not be the result of conflicting national interests or ideological convictions, but rather an open and violent means of power struggle. It would not be based on a geographic polycentrism but would nevertheless rend apart the movement as a whole. It would be fought in each party of the bloc and the movement, and would lead to fractions within the parties siding with the ruling leadership or the opposition. It would lead to savage infighting in each party and government that would certainly weaken the communist power.

To avoid this danger the Soviet leadership has been "polycentric," not in the sense of recognizing many centers of independent policy-making, but of permitting greater local autonomy to other parties for local application of a general line determined by the Soviet party in the unchallengeable position of vanguard of the vanguard. The Chinese communist leadership has defended the monist unity of the movement and the bloc in its policy-making and tried to secure recognition of an institutionalized Soviet leadership in order to be able to attack the Soviet comrades in a *gremium* in which the Chinese leaders wanted to share the power of deciding the grand strategy.

VI

The enforcement of the political line has become a very complex problem for the leader of the center communist power, the Soviet party. Behind the problematic organizational framework of the interparty conference are, of course, other means of enforcing the political authority of Moscow. There is still the authority of Soviet tanks, which worked in Poland, East Germany and Hungary, but will not work in China, Albania, or even Yugoslavia. But there is another weapon, a more important one,

³⁸The Chinese attempt to institutionalize the control of determining the line and thus to create a base for opposition was to be further strengthened by their attempt to limit the signatures of resolutions to the parties of the bloc. See Griffith, *op. cit.*, footnote 22.

that the Soviet leaders can and will apply. This is the economic measures that the Soviet Union, as a powerful industrial country and the economic center of the bloc, can use to bring the obstinate into line. The economic policy of the Soviet Union within the bloc becomes, then, one of the most intriguing of bloc relations, and the economic relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China in particular have been a crucial area of cooperation and conflict between the two leaderships. The Soviet economic support that was promised to Communist China in the treaties of 1949 and 1954 and later, though not comparable in relation to the Chinese economy to some of the aid given by the United States to her allies, has been decisive in making possible the initial program of Communist Chinese industrial development. This aid consisted not only of the promised delivery of over 300 industrial plants but also in making available to the Chinese communists the services of over 10,000 Soviet experts who helped to start this increased industrialization program. It was the decrease of this aid after the confusion of the East European uprisings that led Mao Tse-tung to decide to go it alone, and it was with the promise of renewed and additional aid in industrialization that Khrushchev may have forced Mao's first resignation. When the battle was at its height, the Soviets withdrew not only their aid, but all their technical experts in China, contributing to the economic breakdown that followed the failure of the "Great Leap." It may well have been that the chaotic and catastrophic economic situation in China may have led Khrushchev to believe, at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress in Moscow, that he could now reinforce his authority over the obstinate Chinese leadership.

It seems, however, that Khrushchev underestimated Mao's ability to resist. The Chinese leader not only continued violent opposition to Khrushchev and to Soviet authority, but even gave economic and technical aid to Albania when Khrushchev applied the economic axe to that stand-in opponent, who had become the proxy through whom Khrushchev and Mao fought each other. But while Mao, in defending his position, may disregard the famine in large areas of Communist China, the weakening of communist power which results from economic decline cannot be long ignored, and the weakening of the whole bloc that would result from Chinese communist decline must be of grave concern to the Soviet Union as well. There is still behind the power struggle the unity of purpose and the common goal most important to all con-

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cerned. So there may well be a limit past which the battle will not be carried.³⁹

VII

What is, then, the effect of this power struggle on communist bloc policy and on the effectiveness of the communist threat? The opposition of the Chinese communist leader is a disloyal opposition and can lead to moves that are not only uncoordinated with Soviet policy but can be contrary to it. The tactics used by the two rivals, however, are not only weapons in the power struggle but serve also the overall communist strategic purpose. The inroads made by the Chinese communist opposition into the authority and central policy direction of the Soviet leadership may weaken the communist offensive. But what is lost in concerted effect may be gained by the widening of what becomes a double-pronged attack. Even rival action can be coordinated. We have only to think of the period before World War Two when the Japanese policy of the conquest of Eastern Asia was pursued by a government that had the overall responsibility for the safety of the empire, and at the same time by an autonomous military group that had the same goal but pursued it more recklessly and with less responsibility. U.S. policymakers who had to deal with both were led to grave errors in judgment at the time of the Manchurian incident and in the crucial years before the Marco Polo Bridge incident and Pearl Harbor. Even though the outcome ended in the defeat of Japan, the dualist Japanese system of government did not abate but rather increased the Japanese threat.

The Soviet-Chinese strategy in India, as well as in other countries, provides an example of a similar division of labor. When Khrushchev and the Soviets were discredited because of the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion, it was Chou En-lai who in his visits to Southeast Asia and India spread the Bandung spirit. When the Chinese communists took over in Tibet and then attacked the Indian border regions, it was Khrushchev in whom the Indian leaders placed their confidence. The misjudgment of the character of communism and of the Sino-Soviet conflict could hardly have been more plainly demonstrated than in this Indian

³⁹One of its weapons is a network of collaborators in other communist parties. The purges of the Stalinists in East European parties have strengthened Khrushchev's position in the bloc. But this too is uncertain. Tito purged his party of Soviet agents. Hoxha did the same, and Mao had his P'eng Teh-huai. In these cases, the Soviet leadership has not been too successful, and the weapon cuts both ways.

case in which communist aggression has been mistaken for traditional imperialism.

The Sino-Soviet conflict is a battle for leadership fought in communist terms. This kind of conflict, inherent in the communist system, has been given a new organizational framework by the emergence within the movement of a bloc of communist-controlled states. In the past, power struggles in the communist system have mostly led to the political and often physical oblivion of the loser. Total victory is still the purpose of the present struggle. To win, all doctrinal and institutional methods are used by the opponents; but in the amorphous institutional structure of the communist bloc and movement it has become more difficult to fight a struggle for leadership to its necessary conclusion. The personal power struggle between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung may end with the success of one or the other in removing his opponent or with the death of one of them. But the problem of the leadership of the movement and the bloc will even then not be solved.

This structural problem may be to our advantage. Yet this battle has not affected the character of the communist movement, its purpose, and the interrelation between doctrine and strategy, which indeed has only been underlined by the conflict. The internal rivalries of the communist movement must not be permitted to conceal the doctrinal and political entirety of the communist system which poses so grave a threat to our life.

SOVIET VIEWS OF U. S. OVERSEAS BASES*

by Alvin J. Cottrell

THE Soviets have consistently made the "liquidation of foreign military bases" a major item in nearly all of their proposals for disarmament and in their propaganda. A typical example is the Soviet disarmament proposal of June 2, 1960, which included as a key provision the abolition of "foreign military bases" of all kinds. Frequently it has been suggested that the Soviets might be prepared to make important concessions in return for the dismantling of a few U.S. overseas bases (e.g., SAC bases in Spain) or the missile bases in Italy or Turkey. Interest in such a trade revived during the October 1962 Cuban crisis when the Soviets proposed to dismantle their missile bases in Cuba in return for the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey. In view of the interest in such proposals, it might be of some value to assess how the Soviets have viewed the threat to them posed by U.S. overseas bases.

Obviously, an assessment of the importance which the Soviets assign to U.S. foreign bases can be only speculative. With this caveat, however, it may still be useful to infer a Soviet image of U.S. bases. This study will examine a wide range of possible motivations of Soviet concern over U.S. foreign military bases mainly in Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa. For it is primarily the bases in these areas which appear to have been the principal causes of Soviet strategic worries.¹

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or policy of the Institute for Defense Analyses or of any department or agency of the U.S. government. The author is indebted to John K. Moriarity, John Ponturo and Robert Strausz-Hupé for a critical reading of the manuscript.

¹This, in fact, is the exact order of area priority given by the Soviets. In other words, the Soviets appear to be primarily concerned about what we may appropriately call the NATO operational area. Cf. *State Department Bulletin*, July 7, 1958, pp. 12-22. It is significant that even though the Soviets have been focusing almost obsessively on the question of general and complete disarmament, they have made it clear nevertheless that they stand ready to discuss partial disarmament in Europe. The liquidation of foreign military bases in Europe is always prominent among the issues which they say are negotiable. The order of priority for partial disarmament negotiations given by Premier Khrushchev in his September 18, 1959 address to the UN General Assembly was as follows: (1) "The establishment of a control and inspection zone and the reduction of foreign troops in the Territories of the Western European countries concerned"; (2) "The establishment of an atom free zone in Central Europe"; (3) "The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Territories of European States and the abolition of military bases on the territories of foreign states"; (4) "The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Treaty"; (5) "The conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another." Cf. General Assembly Official Records: Fourteenth Session, 799th Plenary Meeting, pp. 34-38.

There can be little doubt that, from the beginning of the establishment of the U.S. overseas base system, Soviet political and military leaders feared genuinely the operational military implications of these bases. It is obvious, too, that the Soviets seized on the American overseas bases around the periphery of the communist bloc as convenient targets of propaganda. Nevertheless, the evidence is sufficiently clear that, whatever the overall motivation for their statements, the Soviets are sensitive to the threat posed by U.S. foreign bases and would like to bring about a general American withdrawal. The fact that Soviet propaganda has sought to exploit U.S. overseas deployments does not negate the sincerity of their endeavor to hasten their liquidation. Indeed, the Soviets have adduced U.S. airborne alert activities as a clinching argument for the liquidation of overseas bases. At the same time, they have shown little interest in our proposals to end such flights as a *quid pro quo* for even limited aerial inspection of Soviet territory.²

Soviet political and military leaders have been cognizant of the fact that it was the overseas air bases that gave the U.S. its early superiority in strategic delivery systems. Not until after Soviet missile progress had been dramatically demonstrated to the world did the Soviets begin to emphasize the superiority of missiles over bombers. Their post-sputnik campaign reflected the fact that the "neutralization" of U.S. nuclear delivery systems, still geared to strategic airpower, was now underway. Thus, Marshal Vershinin, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force, said in 1957: "In present conditions, bombers are naturally still being built. The U.S. especially emphasizes this kind of weapon. But missiles now call into question the expediency of further developing bomber aircraft, since the former are more reliable and dependable."³

²Cf. Richard J. Barnett, *Who Wants Disarmament?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 120.

³Quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 226. Soviet statements are not directed, as many in the West are prone to believe, only at foreign audiences. In the Soviet Union an article appearing under the signature of a Soviet military leader in an important journal often signifies opposition to a contrary view within the Soviet political-military hierarchy. Thus, we may assume that statements concerning the obsolescence of U.S. overseas bases and bomber delivery systems are addressed to influential Soviet, as well as foreign, audiences. An important debate on Soviet military doctrine took place shortly after Stalin's death in 1953 and lasted until 1955. The debate during this period seems to have been largely uninhibited, taking place as it did in the hiatus between the death of Stalin and the new Soviet regime. Since that time, however, Soviet political leaders appear to have reasserted control over any uninhibited discussion of military doctrine, shielding it against the outside world.

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Some Western students of military affairs have suggested that a considerable gap separates the U.S. and Russia in the assessment of the current strategic situation.⁴ Soviet views on war, insofar as we can ascertain them, indicate that Soviet military experts have clung to the traditional concepts of war much longer than their Western counterparts. Until after Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet military leaders apparently were enjoined from discussing the impact of nuclear weapons on traditional Soviet military doctrine. Almost immediately after Stalin's death, a number of controversial articles by leading Soviet military thinkers began to appear in Soviet military journals. It was not until 1955 that the literary debate was concluded, victory apparently having gone to those who argued that the advent of nuclear weapons required revision of traditional Soviet military doctrine, particularly with regard to the significance of surprise attack.

As a result of this debate, surprise attack, while not considered decisive in the unfolding strategic situation, was accorded greater importance in Soviet military doctrine.⁵ If the Soviets had not concluded until 1955 that the advent of nuclear weapons required some revision in their traditional strategic outlook, we may assume that they do lag behind the U.S. in their evaluation of some aspects of military strategy. This gap may extend to other military questions; one of these may be the importance of U.S. bases. It is possible that the Soviet military is still divided on this issue.

PSYCHOLOGICAL-IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The traditional Soviet fear of "capitalist encirclement" undoubtedly is still responsible in part for the Soviets' ostensible dismay at U.S. overseas bases. While the purely ideological motivation of their fear might have diminished, we must assume that a residue of so deeply ingrained a doctrinal view still influences Soviet policy, just as isolationism still influences some popular American attitudes toward foreign policy. Hence, American

⁴Cf. *ibid.*, Chapter 7, pp. 215-262, and E. Katzenbach, "Russian Military Development," *Current History*, November 1960, pp. 262-266. Katzenbach wrote as follows: "Thinking on strategic problems in the USSR is roughly three years behind American thinking. . . . In his January 14, 1960, speech, Premier Khrushchev expounded a doctrine quite like that expounded by the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, several years ago. It was 'massive retaliation' all over again." But Katzenbach hastens to add that while Soviet doctrine is now behind our own and following pretty much the same path, it may not always continue to do so.

⁵Cf. Dinerstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6; and Arnold Horelick, "Some Soviet Views on the Nature of a Future War and the Factors Determining its Course and Outcome," RAND Corporation publication T-97, September 15, 1958, pp. vii-ix and 43-44.

bases probably continue to symbolize "capitalist encirclement" to some segments of the Soviet hierarchy.

In the context of "capitalist encirclement," the Soviets probably view U.S. bases as one among the several components of the total U.S. military presence overseas.⁶ Indeed, when the Soviets call for the elimination of foreign bases, they employ the general term "foreign military bases," and rarely refer to any specific type of base.

George F. Kennan has suggested that the Soviet concept of "capitalist encirclement" springs from a basically defensive mentality and that the Soviet leaders feel insecure living in close proximity to rival power. Hence, they seek to eliminate *all* rival power in order to insure the stability of their regime.⁷ However, the Soviets no longer are talking openly about "capitalist encirclement." The increasingly frequent Soviet warnings against Western interference with "national liberation" movements and the statement by Khrushchev that the Soviets had every intention of promoting "national liberation" wars, suggest that the Soviets now believe they have found a method by which to leapfrog safely over Western forward positions and thus break "capitalist encirclement."

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

The Soviets may believe, as do many of our own analysts, that the high vulnerability of our overseas bases to missile and ground attack has greatly reduced their military utility for deterrence. The Soviets, ever since they launched their first earth satellite, have felt free to utter veiled missile threats. Apparently, they believe that U.S. strategic nuclear power has been neutralized at least in situations where the continental United States is not directly threatened. The Soviets appear to feel increasingly confident that they can safely risk less ambiguous conflict operations. Soviet intervention in the Congo, Cuba and Laos supplies evidence of the Soviets' new willingness to associate themselves more directly with political and military conflicts in which U.S. prestige is directly involved. In this respect Soviet missile capabilities are

⁶For example, in 1957, the Soviets estimated that the U.S. had 950 military bases on foreign soil, a number which could have only been calculated on the basis of the total American deployment abroad. Cf. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 131.

⁷"Control and Reduction of Armaments," Hearings before a Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, Part II, January 9 and 10, 1957, pp. 1010-1011. See also George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), Appendix I, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."

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invoked to deter Western interference with the "historical process" while at the same time serving to underwrite Soviet efforts to accelerate world revolutionary developments. U.S. nuclear delivery capabilities, poised on fixed bases at home and abroad, do not deter the Soviets from supporting forces hostile to Western interest. In this sense the Soviets have already achieved "counter-deterrence" against American strategic nuclear power in situations which fall below the threshold of an obvious issue of U.S. survival.

As early as 1953, Marshal Zhukov stated: "The closer [U.S.] military bases are to the objective of attack, the more vulnerable these bases become."⁸ In 1957, Marshal Vershinin said: "One can only wonder at the shortsightedness of those who do not consider that if these bases are close to us, then they are also not far from us."⁹ Also in 1957 Chairman Khrushchev wrote: "Can it be supposed that military bases are known only to those who established them? But if their location is known, then, given the present level of missile and other technology, they can speedily be rendered ineffective."¹⁰ Even more recently, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Andrei I. Yermenko has asserted that U.S. overseas bases have been rendered militarily obsolete by the development of long-range ballistic missiles.¹¹

On first glance, such an evaluation of the utility of U.S. overseas bases seems to contradict the Soviets' determination to eliminate them. Indeed, the Soviets, since the development of their ICBM, have stepped up their offensive against U.S. foreign bases. For example, the aforementioned Soviet disarmament proposal of June 2, 1960 included as a first-stage requirement the abolition of "foreign military bases" of all kinds.

The above statements are not, of course, proof positive that the Soviets really fear U.S. overseas bases from a military standpoint. It is quite possible that the preoccupation of Soviet political leaders with U.S. overseas bases is explainable largely in terms of Soviet political objectives. At the same time, however, we may assume that military motives still loom large in the Soviet military leaders' attitude toward our bases.

Given the position of the Soviet military in the power structure of the USSR, the military's concern over the bases could account

⁸As quoted by Garthoff, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁹*Pravda*, September 8, 1957.

¹⁰*International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1957.

¹¹*International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1960.

to some extent for the Soviets' ceaseless political offensive against them. This is not to say that Soviet political leadership is unconcerned about their political-military implications. Soviet military doctrine cannot but be influenced by the expansionist drive of Soviet imperialism.¹² In Europe, we must allow for the possibility that the Soviets are perplexed by the problem of how, in the event of war, they can take over a relatively undamaged Western Europe, given the ubiquity of U.S. basing arrangements in the NATO area.

Numerous Soviet statements express the belief that Western Europe would be devastated in a future war.¹³ Soviet threats to subject some European countries to rocket attack for playing host to U.S. nuclear striking power have been interpreted as mere psychological gambits. It is entirely possible, however, that the Soviets have an ulterior political-military objective in mind: They wish to avoid a nuclear conflict and the accompanying contamination so that the industry and resources of the advanced West European nations might be pressed into the domestic restoration of Russia in the event of war.¹⁴

It is not intended to suggest here that the Soviets are looking forward with any pleasure to fighting a nuclear war in which Europe would be the prize, but we must assume that they have contingent plans for such a war if it should occur. The Soviet leaders probably still remember that Russia's recovery from damages inflicted upon the Soviet Union in World War II was assisted by European reparations—estimates have ranged as high as \$25-30 billion—exactd by the Soviets after the war.

Despite Soviet statements to the effect that U.S. overseas bases are obsolete, we may be sure that there is at least one purely military consideration underlying Soviet fears of U.S. overseas bases. The Soviets know that their statements concerning the vulnerability of U.S. bases are valid only if they strike first. That the Soviets are aware of this fact can be seen from a statement by Marshal Zhukov as far back as 1955:

. . . any thinking person understands that the military bases of the USA, created around the USSR, China and the countries of the people's

¹²Cf. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Soviet Image of Future War* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 12-13.

¹³For example, cf. Y. Nalin, "Weapons of Aggression," *Red Star*, March 28, 1959: ". . . the siting of guided missile and thermonuclear weapons as well as the equipment of other bases in the countries, lays these countries open to retaliation of the most destructive kind. . . ." quoted in *Survival*, May-June 1959, p. 42.

¹⁴Garthoff, *The Soviet Image of Future War*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

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democracy, are absurd from the standpoint of a defensive strategy for the U.S., since they are so far from the objectives which must be defended that at any moment they can be annihilated one by one. It is another matter to use these bases in the aims of aggressive strategy, for dealing blows by an atomic air force. And it is precisely for that purpose that they are being built.¹⁵

The bases still represent a considerable threat to the Soviets if the U.S. should employ them in a pre-emptive attack. The Soviets may well doubt that the U.S. would unleash strategic nuclear forces in a premeditated surprise attack, but they may be quite fearful that we would not be so constrained during a protracted political crisis or in the midst of a limited military engagement. The Soviets may well believe that for the next several years the U.S. will still be able to deliver more megatonnage by airplane than by its missile systems.

Furthermore, the Soviets still maintain substantial anti-aircraft defense systems around Moscow and their other principal administrative and control centers. While this is not conclusive evidence that they still fear our overseas bases as such, it does show that they do not believe that bomber delivery systems are as obsolete as they frequently suggest. The very fact that U.S. bases are "soft" and, as the Soviets themselves have suggested, their exact location generally known, would tend to increase Soviet apprehension about them. In fact the Soviets apparently believe that the high vulnerability of U.S. overseas bases, particularly those in Europe and the Middle East, makes them valuable to the U.S. mainly in a "surprise attack." This point has been supported by two American specialists on Soviet affairs:

Soviet commentators have always construed the development of U.S. air bases around the periphery of the USSR as an indication that the U.S. and NATO in general count heavily on surprise attack. These bases, the Soviets maintain, can be quickly neutralized in war by Soviet strategic retaliation and many of them rapidly overrun by Soviet ground forces. They consequently reason that these bases could be of only limited use in the prolonged type of war which they (the Soviets) envisage. Therefore they contend that these bases are designed with only one purpose in mind—a surprise attack on the USSR.¹⁶

To reinforce the evidence that the Soviets view U.S. overseas bases as the launching sites of a potential surprise attack, we may

¹⁵*Pravda*, May 8, 1955, quoted in Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹⁶Cyril E. Black and Frederick T. Yeager, "The USSR and NATO," in *NATO and American Security*, Klaus Knorr, editor (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 43.

cite Chairman Khrushchev: "Today inflated armies, just like military bases moved far beyond national frontiers, are intended for attack; they are not needed for defense."¹⁷ Such statements may indeed be largely propaganda, but we must also allow for the possibility that they may not be completely devoid of genuine concern.

While U.S. military thinkers have frequently pointed to the importance of U.S. overseas bases for meeting limited communist military challenges, there is considerable evidence that the Soviets do not believe that limited wars involving both of the superpowers are possible. As suggested above, they may view our posture as largely designed for waging general war.

Major General N. Talensky, one of the Soviets' foremost military theoreticians, wrote:

The proponents of the theory of limited warfare often refer to the experience of past ages when most wars were relatively limited in character. Such arguments, however, cannot withstand serious criticism. Limited wars were possible under entirely different economic, political and strategic conditions. As a rule, the restricted scale of these wars was due to the lack of sufficient strength and means to wage them.¹⁸

Chairman Khrushchev stated, in January 1961, in the most widely publicized doctrinal statement by a communist leader since Stalin's "last thesis," that only "national liberation wars," i.e., civil wars between pro-Western and neutralist or anti-Western forces, are feasible and thus "just wars." The Soviet dispute with the Chinese communists may be sparked to a large extent by Soviet leaders' fear lest the aggressiveness of their Chinese ally in Asia embroil first the Chinese and ultimately the Soviet Union in a conflict with the U.S.—a conflict which could escalate into general war. Probably the Soviets have concluded that the American military presence overseas enhances the risk of a general conflagration.

There is considerable evidence that the Soviet political leadership—and this may mean primarily Khrushchev—believes that military conflict between communism and capitalism may no longer be necessary in order to bring about the final defeat of

¹⁷*Pravda*, January 15, 1960.

¹⁸"On the Character of Modern Warfare," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1960. See also Col. A. Konenko, "Local Wars in U.S. Policy and Strategy," Intelligence Document Branch No. 2097500, Department of the Army, ACSI (Intelligence translation #H-2589, UNCLASSIFIED).

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capitalism.¹⁹ But even if Khrushchev believes this, we do not know how far such views extend down into the Soviet power structure. In any case it seems unlikely that, confident though the Soviets might be, they could ever completely eliminate the fear that "moribund capitalism" might strike out at them as a last resort.²⁰

A principal claim frequently adduced by U.S. strategists for the continued validity of U.S. foreign bases is that these bases complicate Soviet offensive and defensive problems. It is often suggested that, in order to coordinate a surprise attack on all U.S. strategic delivery systems, the Soviets would have to attack U.S. foreign bases and continental U.S. bases simultaneously. Moreover, even a ground advance into Western Europe which threatened to overrun U.S. bases would confront the Soviets with the risk of general nuclear war, to the extent that it would lead to some degradation of the U.S. strategic posture, and thus might provoke a pre-emptive blow by the U.S. There can be little doubt that the Soviets are aware of some of the offensive and defensive problems posed by the U.S. base system. We have already alluded above to their concern over air defense. With regard to the offensive problem of coordinating a Soviet attack on U.S. strategic nuclear forces, there is not much evidence on which to base an answer. The Soviets would logically conclude, however, that any attack on a part of the U.S. strategic striking force overseas would at least raise the risk of a general U.S. retaliatory response. They know they would have to coordinate an attack on all U.S. bases, at home and abroad simultaneously. For example, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky made it clear that the Soviets are not unaware of the problems involved in coordinating an attack on a variety of strategic targets when he said: "Present day ballistic missiles guarantee a high probability of inflicting powerful strikes

¹⁹*Ideology and Foreign Affairs*, a study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, January 17, 1960, pp. 14-25.

²⁰See Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Strategy in World War III," *Army*, May 1960, p. 24. Mackintosh, endeavoring to answer the question of whether the Soviet leaders believe a third world war is possible, states: "My answer is yes, they do. Evidence of this lies in Soviet ideology and in what Soviet leaders tell their military officers and the Russian people. They appear to instruct their officers that as the political situation develops increasingly in favor of communism, as markets for the capitalists disappear, as military alliances disintegrate, there might come a time when the capitalist world, led by the U.S. could see only two alternatives: to surrender peacefully to communism, or to throw everything they have at the Soviet Union in a last desperate attempt to destroy the organizing center of the communist system."

simultaneously on a great variety of targets.”²¹ The “great variety” of targets to which Defense Minister Malinovsky refers undoubtedly includes U.S. foreign bases as well as those in the continental United States. Although we obviously cannot accept Malinovsky’s statement as proof that the Soviets believe they can coordinate a simultaneous attack on all U.S. strategic bases, it does indicate that the Soviets have at least thought about the problem. No doubt Malinovsky’s remarks were in part addressed to some skeptics within the Soviet military establishment. Malinovsky also compared the “easy” possibility of “completely” concealing the launching sites of missiles with the difficulty of camouflaging aircraft. It seems clear that the political and military leaders now in power in the USSR are in agreement as regards the superiority of missile delivery over aircraft systems. At the same time, however, it is conceivable that they have not been able to convince all segments of the military as to the correctness of their thinking.²²

In looking at the military threat of U.S. foreign bases as seen from the Soviet side, we have thus far concentrated almost exclusively on the bases as a retaliatory component of the U.S. offensive weapons “mix.” It is clear that the Soviets are also concerned about the military implications of U.S. bases in other ways than as an integral part of U.S. delivery systems. For example, there can be little doubt that the Soviets considered the bases used for the U-2 flights as a highly provocative threat. Certainly they viewed the U-2 flights as a vital link between U.S. nuclear delivery systems and U.S. overseas bases. We may also assume that the Soviets have the same concern over other U.S. air activities designed to gain intelligence which will improve U.S. capabilities for penetrating to targets inside Russia. It seems likely that Khrushchev’s pre-Summit rage in Paris in 1960 was inspired in part by Soviet fears that the U-2 flights, if continued, might be capable of reducing the present Soviet military advantage inherent in the concealment afforded them by their closed system. They probably believed that such flights were an indication of large-scale efforts on the part of the U.S. to enhance its counterforce capabilities and thus to increase the danger to the Soviets of a U.S. “surprise attack.”

We may infer the great concern with which the Soviets viewed

²¹*Pravda*, January 15, 1960.

²²It is indisputably clear that there was considerable disagreement among Soviet military leaders over the January 14, 1960, announcement of Soviet troop reductions and we may assume that disagreement over military policy and strategy extends to other areas as well.

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the U-2 flights if we add to our considerations the high probability that they still rely on a relatively "soft system" of fixed launching sites. Whatever fears they may have entertained in the past regarding a surprise attack by the United States on the USSR, such fears were reinforced by the U-2 incident.²³ The Soviets probably have been under the impression that first generation—i.e., fixed and relatively soft—delivery systems would meet their needs for some time to come, since any decision to open up the Soviet system to inspection is a political one which they were free to make or not to make. The U-2 flights undoubtedly worried them precisely because they feared that technology was wresting from their control a problem which they had heretofore considered primarily one of political choice—namely whether the Soviet system would be "open" or "closed." For the same reason, the Soviets have shown concern over orbiting U.S. satellite systems.²⁴

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A major Soviet foreign policy objective has been to neutralize as much of the Free World as possible and thus to "disengage" the U.S. from its ties with foreign countries. The Soviets consider the neutrality of a country as a step in the right direction, even though their ultimate goal may be to bring the country under communist control. Khrushchev said: "Those who are not against us are for us."²⁵ The Soviets know that neutrality is impossible so long as a country is granting base rights to the U.S.

A prime political-military objective of Soviet strategy has been the dissolution of the U.S. system of alliances, particularly NATO. In most instances the U.S. base system and the U.S. alliance system are inextricably interwoven. For example, the principal contribution of Portugal to the NATO alliance is that it offers the U.S. a base for support of SAC operations.

Even Spain, which is not a member of NATO, is intimately related to the alliance since it provides facilities to the U.S. for

²³It may be argued that the Soviets knew about the flights before and did not appear to be very upset about them. It is quite possible that they knew the flights were taking place, but that they were unaware of how effective aerial photography at such altitudes could be until they were in possession of the U-2's photographic equipment. In any event, it would have been embarrassing for them to betray knowledge of these flights before they could claim to have actually brought down a U-2 aircraft.

²⁴G. Zhukov, *International Affairs*, October 1959. Cf. their strong reaction to the MIDAS satellite which the U.S. recently placed in orbit. *Washington Post*, July 25, 1961.

²⁵Quoted in Frederick Barghoorn, "The Soviet View of America," *ORBIS*, Spring 1958, p. 102.

the deployment of the NATO "sword." In other words, the U.S. system of alliances and the U.S. base structure may appear to the Soviets as synonymous. If so, the Soviets probably believe that our entire alliance system will disintegrate if America's physical military presence is removed. In this respect, it may be possible that the Soviets' main concern over the U.S. bases is more political than military.

The Soviets may exaggerate the political effects of the dismantling of the U.S. overseas base system in the NATO area, where the U.S. has such an obviously strong military commitment. However, in some countries outside the NATO area where American military personnel are present, as in Iran or in Libya where we have base rights (and even in some countries like Pakistan or South Korea), the Soviets may believe that the host nation would opt for neutrality if the U.S. military presence were withdrawn. We must also note the strong possibility that not all NATO countries are entirely immune to the temptations of neutrality. It is possible that West Germany might choose neutrality if U.S. bases and forces were withdrawn.

Khrushchev's greatest innovation in Soviet strategy seems to have been the legitimization of neutralism as a strategic tool. One specialist on Soviet affairs has analyzed Khrushchev's policy as follows:

This new theory says to the uncommitted nations: You don't have to be for us; we don't intend to Sovietize you; all we want is to be on friendly terms with you; to obtain this you simply have to withdraw, or keep away from alliances which we feel are directed against us. If you don't accept American arms and American bases, you belong to the 'camp of peace.'²⁶

It is quite possible that, in their own minds, the Soviets equate U.S. military missions with bases, and neutrality with the withdrawal of U.S. missions. Indeed, in Iran the Soviet approach has been to tell the Iranian government that if it terminates the U.S. military mission, Iran will receive economic assistance from the USSR. The Soviets argue that Iran will then benefit even more than now because the U.S. will try to outbid the USSR with economic assistance, and Iran will thus have the best of both worlds. If the Soviets have made such an equation, i.e., that our military missions and our bases are synonymous (and their references to 950 bases mentioned above indicate that they have), then

²⁶Henry Pachter, "The Meaning of Peaceful Coexistence," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1961, p. 5.

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their insistence upon the "liquidation of foreign bases" aims at nothing less than the complete withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from foreign countries.

Another Soviet consideration possibly bears upon the satellites. U.S. bases in Europe, for example, have their counterparts in Soviet bases and forces located throughout Eastern and Central Europe, and Soviet logistic lines run through many East European countries. Premier Gomulka has said that Soviet forces are in Poland because U.S. forces are in Germany.²⁷

Then, too, there is undoubtedly much concern among East European peoples over what a war in Europe would mean for the peoples of that area. Such considerations may have prompted Poland's Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, to propose a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia and the two Germanys. Poland stands geographically athwart the most important logistic lines leading to Soviet forces in East Germany. We may assume that the Poles fear that, if war were to break out in Europe over the Berlin question, U.S. tactical nuclear power based in Germany would devastate Poland in the process of striking at Soviet logistic lines and bases in that country. We may conclude that the peoples of the satellite countries are as concerned as the people living in the NATO countries over the possibility of being victims of a U.S.-Soviet "limited" war in Central Europe.

Soviet military leaders undoubtedly press the Soviet government for the maintenance of bases in Eastern Europe to counter U.S. bases in Western and Central Europe. Such bases would, if viewed in the context of East European fears of atomic attack, complicate the political problems of the Soviet leaders vis-à-vis the satellite states. Finally, when looking at any problem involving Soviet motivation, we must always accept a strong presumption that the motivation is primarily political since, perhaps more than any other modern nation, the Soviets have accepted the axiom that war is politics by other means.²⁸ We may logically conclude that the Soviet political leaders, as opposed to the military leaders discussed above, view the bases as primarily a political threat or obstacle to the achievement of their political objectives, since

²⁷George F. Kennan, "Control and Reduction of Armaments," *op. cit.*, p. 1012.

²⁸Cf. Byron Dexter, "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1950; see also Robert Strausz-Hupé and others, *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), Chapter 3, "The Communists' View of Conflict: The Larger Strategic Vision."

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they probably believe that whether there will be war or not is, to a large degree, an issue over which they have some control.

Khrushchev has made it clear that competitive coexistence in effect means an intensified Soviet effort, short of direct military conflict with the U.S., to expand the socialist sphere and thus to bring about the defeat of capitalism, which the Soviet Premier claims is "not far off."

It is possible that the Soviet political leaders view U.S. overseas bases as a token of U.S. intent to counter the Soviet "nonmilitary" offensive with military means. U.S. overseas bases thus would present an obstacle to Soviet political-psychological strategy. For example, Soviet strategy in Berlin is largely political-psychological, but it could escalate into general war because of the link between NATO, Berlin and the U.S.

The Soviets have been desperately trying to separate the U.S. from its NATO allies and hence separate U.S. nuclear power from Europe. If they could succeed in this endeavor, Europe might be forced to bow to Soviet wishes. They probably believe that it will be difficult if not impossible to achieve such an objective so long as the U.S. maintains base rights in Europe. This is undoubtedly the motive behind the numerous Soviet threats to nations who are playing host to U.S. bases. In short, the Soviets would like to remove the threat of war which the U.S. overseas military presence still poses to their policy of "competitive coexistence." In this sense our bases, linked as they are to U.S. nuclear power, are making the "march of history" a risky business for the Soviets. The Soviets' very real concern over nuclear weapons may be prompted in some measure by the fact that the "inevitability" of a communist world victory has been greatly complicated by the advent of nuclear firepower, even though they have been fully aware of the role their nuclear capabilities can play in underwriting their progress toward that goal.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

There is a strong possibility that some budgetary concerns are also at the root of the Soviet attitude toward U.S. bases. It seems quite likely that the motivation behind Khrushchev's outburst against the U-2 flights was the fact that, after the U-2 fell into Soviet hands and after the widespread disclosure of the purpose of its flight, the Soviet political leaders became embroiled with the military in a dispute over the adequacy of Soviet defenses. It is possible that Khrushchev was placed in the uncomfortable

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position of having to defend the adequacy of Soviet defenses, only several months after he and Marshal Malinovsky had assured the nation that Soviet defenses were in excellent shape. It is important to recall what Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960. He said, "We are taking into account that our country is surrounded by foreign military bases. This is why we are locating our rockets in such a way as to insure double and triple protection; we can disperse rocket installations and camouflage them well."²⁹ And Marshal Malinovsky, in a speech supporting the Soviet Premier, spoke as follows: "The launching sites of missiles are easy to camouflage and even to conceal completely."³⁰

The Soviets are able to maintain a high degree of strategic invulnerability at much less cost than that required of an "open society" such as the United States. It may have been quite embarrassing for Khrushchev when the U-2's photographic equipment was captured, in view of its obvious implications as to gaps in that secrecy which is an integral part of the Soviet political system and defense policy. Any further expenditures on military items might greatly jeopardize Khrushchev's plans for the development of the Soviet economy, and ostensibly, his political objectives of seeking to gain world hegemony through demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet system in terms of socio-economic development. It is obvious that Khrushchev is intent on using Soviet economic growth as a means to woo the underdeveloped world and as a key element in his domestic policy—a policy aimed at making him popular with the Soviet masses by increasing the production of consumer goods.

The U.S. forward military position, which the bases dramatically symbolize, may place heavy strains on the Soviet budget. The declaration of the Soviet government on general and complete nuclear disarmament, which was spelled out in Khrushchev's September 18, 1959 speech to the UN General Assembly, suggested that economic considerations may be involved. The declaration contained the following passage:

The stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of some powers and the establishment of air, naval and missile bases increasingly close to the borders of other states compels the states against which these military preparations are directed to take the necessary steps to strengthen their own security and safeguard the peaceful life of their

²⁹*Pravda*, January 15, 1960.

³⁰*Ibid.*

peoples. The Soviet Union would like to undertake a complete conversion of [its] economy and resources to peaceful purposes so that they can provide the people with ample food and clothing.³¹

As suggested above, the Soviet political leaders, more than the political leaders of the West, depend upon the support of the military, and the military quite naturally tends to support larger military budgets than do political leaders. Military leaders are, for the most part, invariably cautious in estimating their relative superiority vis-à-vis a potential enemy; there is no reason to assume that the Soviet military does not conform to this pattern of behavior.

No matter how obsolete some of our overseas base systems may appear to us, the Soviets still face the problem of striking all of our bases in the event of war. Even though the U.S. may be able to distinguish between the function of the various types of U.S. bases, it is conceivable that the specific uses assigned to the bases are not too clear to the Soviets. Many of these bases have multiple functions. We cannot assume that the Soviets know exactly what role we have allocated to a given base—especially since it need not be the same role in war as in peace. Thus, the base itself as a symbol of its potential multiple utility may trouble the Soviets. The Soviet military undoubtedly argues that the Soviet Union must be able to cope with our entire offensive weapons “mix.” This “mix” includes even those bases on which aircraft are not actually deployed, but which add to our overall capabilities. In other words, a rollback of our military position may be a *sine qua non* of any substantial reduction in Soviet defense expenditures or possibly even in a restructuring of the Soviet defense establishment.

Our overseas base system may figure prominently in the arguments adduced by the Soviet military to justify the tremendous expenditures inherent in the maintenance of large ground forces. While it is widely believed that the easiest way for the Soviets to eliminate U.S. overseas bases would be by a missile attack, there is evidence that some Soviet military leaders view the problem differently. Some highly placed Soviet military thinkers argue that the only sure way to deal with the problem of U.S. overseas delivery capabilities is through a swift ground assault. They apparently reason that while missiles would be quite effective against stationary U.S. overseas bases, the newer generations of mobile delivery systems will require destruction through ground

³¹U.N. Document A/4219, September 19, 1959.

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attack.³² Looking at the problem in this way, the Soviets would consider all countries with which we have military arrangements as “bases” and thus conclude that the only way to deal with such “bases” is to overrun the entire country. They almost certainly view Western Europe in this manner.

As has been suggested, the Soviets seem to view our bases abroad as evidence that we are planning some form of surprise strategic attack, and further that our posture is primarily one geared to waging general war. Given this premise, it would be difficult for Soviet political leaders to sell the idea to the Soviet military that the USSR could afford further to reduce its ground forces, inasmuch as Soviet military doctrine still envisages a major role for all branches of the services in a general war. Since an important economic objective of the Soviet government seems to be a further reduction of Soviet ground forces and increased reliance on missile nuclear power, our military presence abroad may be the source of some disagreement between Soviet political and military leaders.

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet concern over the U.S. bases flows both from political and military considerations—“military” in this context meaning the strategic uses which these bases supposedly serve. As the Soviets’ own nuclear delivery capabilities have grown, political considerations have come increasingly to the fore as a principal source of Soviet concern over the U.S. overseas base posture.

The Soviets have focused their political offensive more on bases which either house, or are intimately related to, U.S. nuclear striking power. Their apprehensions appear to explain, to some extent, Soviet advocacy of such schemes as the Rapacki Plan for a “nuclear free” zone in Europe. But even this primarily military objective is tinged with strong political considerations, including the desire to assuage the fears on the part of their East European satellites of potential devastation in a nuclear holocaust. (This is not intended to suggest that purely military concerns vis-à-vis the bases do not figure importantly in Soviet calculations. Certainly, the Soviets still regard our foreign air and missile bases as the potential launching sites of a U.S. first strike against the Soviet homeland. They obviously are alarmed when our bases have presumably been used—as in the case of the U-2 flights—for gathering targeting information.)

³²Major General G. I. Pokrovski, *The Role of Science and Technology in Modern War*, pamphlet, Moscow, 1957, p. 24; cited in Dinerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

There is probably some relationship between our military presence abroad and the current size of the Soviet defense budget, as well as the structure and posture of Soviet forces. Thus, our forward military presence may figure in the debates between Soviet military and political leaders over force reductions in the interest of economy and the demands of the Soviet labor market.

It is worth noting that the Soviets never seem to vary the order of area priority when calling for the dismantling of U.S. overseas bases. The areas of closest proximity to the Soviet Union, i.e., Europe and the Near and Middle East, always appear ahead of North Africa—despite the fact that some components of SAC are located in the latter area. This suggests that the proximity of U.S. forces exerts some weight in Soviet thinking. It may suggest, also, that they might be more apprehensive of tactical bases abroad than they are of SAC overseas installations. This military concern must be viewed in the context of Soviet political strategy. So long as American military power is physically present at the frontiers of the East-West confrontation, Soviet “crisis strategy” (e.g., in Berlin) runs the constant risk of detonating a general nuclear war. More importantly, however, the Soviets see America’s military presence as a principal link in her political relationship with Europe.

Political motives appear to take precedence over military considerations. This becomes clear in any assessment of the relative emphasis placed by the Soviets on the withdrawal of U.S. bases from specific areas. The Soviets attach first priority to the liquidation of U.S. bases in the NATO operational area, namely Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa. The bases have been called the “cement of the (NATO) alliance.”³³ There can be little doubt that the Soviets also see them in this light. That a principal objective of Soviet policy is the dissolution of the NATO alliance cannot be questioned. The Soviets apparently believe—and perhaps not without justification—that if NATO disintegrates, the major obstacle to the “march of history” (beyond the U.S. itself) will have been removed.

The Soviet campaign to dismantle NATO may be animated by an increasing sense of urgency. The Soviets must calculate that, to the extent that the “march of history” spurred by Soviet strategy in other continents gains in momentum, the NATO countries are likely to close ranks more resolutely. Hence, the Soviets would

³³Townshend Hoopes, “Overseas Bases in American Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 1958.

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like to see the organization dissolved before they undertake major operations in other parts of the world.

An intermediate, but no less important, goal of Soviet strategy is the stabilization of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. The military presence of the U.S., despite its inaction at the time of the risings in Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956, still contributes to the instability of the Soviet East European empire, for it holds out hope of eventual independence to the peoples of Eastern Europe. In Soviet eyes, it will continue to do so as long as the U.S. fails officially to recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe. The Soviets probably believe that greater stability for the East European communist regimes would follow almost automatically the withdrawal of the U.S. forward military presence.

In sum, when the Soviets speak of the liquidation of U.S. bases, they really speak of "disengagement"—i.e., the withdrawal or thinning out of U.S. forces in Europe. "Disengagement" is the essence of the Soviet scheme for disarmament.

WHAT IS A WAR DETERRENT?*

by Dale O. Smith

IT should not be beyond the ingenuity of man to govern his affairs in such a way as to reduce the possibility of war, or limit its violence. To this end, much brainpower has been expended, with a great burst of intellectual activity in the last decade. No doubt the awesome power of nuclear weapons, coupled with the fear of an unfriendly and powerful rival nation, has accelerated the search for greater international stability.

I

Broadly speaking, the search for a war deterrent has given birth to two conflicting schools of thought. One, the traditional school, and the one upon which our national policy has successfully rested since the Korean War, is that of *military superiority*. Through our military superiority, according to this school, the rival will be deterred from attacking.

The other concept is rather new to military thought and has been arrived at through intellectual speculation. It is born of the despair of achieving a true military superiority. If, the question is asked, the United States wins a war but loses a large proportion of its population, has it really won at all? Answering in the negative, as one must when considering the present balance of forces, followers of the new school propose a novel solution. They reason, taking a leaf from the book of feudal wars when the contenders sealed the status quo by the exchange of hostages, that by making hostages out of millions of people in each country, stability will be assured.

In other words, if each country possesses relatively invulnerable "hard" intercontinental nuclear weapons (and *only* strategic weapons of this sort, such as buried Minutemen and submerged Polaris), and neither country can intercept the other's missiles, each country's cities are hostage to the other. In this way, each side can withstand a first strike and retaliate with enough nuclear power to destroy the other's principal centers of population. A mutual threat of so frightening a kind is believed to provide a mutual deterrent to war. Such an arrangement is called a *stable*

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deterrence. The term "stable" is derived from the notion that each country can still retaliate after a surprise strategic attack; if neither country relies on "soft" weapons which might be destroyed in a surprise attack, neither of them will be forced to strike first in order to utilize these vulnerable weapons.

There is a widespread belief and confidence in the possibility of a "stable" deterrence to war between the U.S. and USSR. Other terms, such as "balance of terror," "finite or minimum deterrence," or, an extreme version, "nuclear parity," identify variants of the same strategic philosophy. Essentially, they refer to a hypothetical international condition in which the two great powers have deployed enough hardened or hidden long-range nuclear weapons to destroy one another's cities, no matter which one strikes first.

The "stable" deterrent concept, reduced to military phraseology, represents a defensive strategy. It is reasoned that, if weapons are made so invulnerable that there is no military *need* to strike first, the sheer horror of nuclear war and the certainty of devastating counterattack on one's unprotected cities will deter both countries from assuming the initiative. Conversely, it is argued, unhardened and well-targeted offensive weapons (such as bombers) are only suitable for a first strike and thus cause instability by both threatening and inviting a surprise attack. These are the so-called "provocative" weapons. Refining this further, some argue that in order to reduce the arms race our national strategy should point toward an agreed finite number of hardened or hidden offensive weapons on both sides. Some advocates assert that only a few hundred are needed to lay waste to cities of the other side.

The final step in this reasoning is that *defensive* measures against these offensive weapons, such as anti-ICBM's or even civil defense, should also be equated or mutually reduced so that neither side would gain a strategic defensive advantage: a country well defended against ICBM's might be tempted to risk a first strike.

This concept is closely linked to that of conventional "limited" war. The "stable" deterrent school concedes that international conflict may lead to certain ancillary wars; but the stable deterrent would restrain each side from employing nuclear weapons of any sort. To employ nuclear weapons of any sort would probably lead, according to this theory, to an "escalation" resulting eventually in unleashing an intercontinental holocaust.

Herein lies a basic inconsistency. If the "stable" deterrent were truly effective, use of nuclear weapons in limited wars would not lead to escalation and therefore would not trigger a mutually destructive exchange on rival cities. In other words, if the argument holds true that major nuclear war would be deterred because of the mutual threat to hostage cities, it should hold true whether or not nuclear weapons are used tactically against purely military targets.

Should the postulated limited war be a central one—a war between the two principal antagonists—the advocates of the "stable" deterrent contend that each side would voluntarily limit itself to conventional weapons rather than risk the mutual nuclear exchange. Thus, war would be fought along the lines of World War I rather than World War II. One must keep in mind that "provocative" aircraft (by refueling, most warplanes can carry megaton weapons over intercontinental ranges) have largely been eliminated in the "stable" deterrent equation. So the conventional war would largely be tied to the ground as it was in 1914-1918.

There can be no doubt that the putative strength of an enemy's military forces, the difficulty of destroying his forces, and his counterattack capability have always furnished deterrents to war. Whenever it is believed that an enemy has superior power of this sort, the deterrence is comparably stronger. But one must always realize that in war, or in the contemplation of war, there is usually a wide disparity between the actual balance of military power and what is believed to be the balance. This fact tends to weaken the prospects for a stable deterrent.

II

It is doubtful that any political or military analyst could ever find an equality of power between any two countries. The elements of national power are infinite, varying from the confidence and resolve of one individual to the emotional heat generated in a legislative body by an international incident; or from the firepower of one rifleman to that of an ICBM; or from the patriotism of a school teacher to the callous opportunism of a racketeer. National power cannot possibly be measured by counting ICBM's. The sources of national power are dynamic, ever-changing and inconceivably complicated. Any attempt to compare the power of one nation to that of a near-equal rival will fail to assess many imponderable and unknown factors. National power is directly affected, too, by political and foreign policies.

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If the USSR, for example, were as unaggressive as Switzerland, the world power structure would differ considerably from the actual one. Hence it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to equate the power of two nations regardless of how armaments are measured, balanced and manipulated, simply because armaments alone provide only a fraction of the total power of any state.

Most stable deterrent philosophers argue, however, that the novel function of intercontinental nuclear warfare makes it possible today to achieve a measured stand-off in destructive capacities. Yet, there seems to be no reason why the same logic did not apply in a world without nuclear weapons. Two opposing land powers of an earlier century, each with comparable military force, could conceivably fight until every city was destroyed and every human being on either side was killed. This has never happened in history, simply because no matter how equally matched, few peoples have displayed that kind of collective resolve which would permit continued fighting to the point of suicide. One or the other belligerent usually gave up long before reaching the point of mutual annihilation—or one side only was annihilated.

Is there any reason to believe that states will behave differently under nuclear attack? After one or two massive exchanges of destructive power, it would seem very likely that one or both of the contestants would “throw in the sponge.” But the side most likely to hold on would be that side which *believed* it was ahead and *believed* it could survive. As always, the side which first lost hope of winning would capitulate.

Members of the stable deterrent school will argue that even one or two nuclear attacks in force would cause so many millions of casualties that the contemplation of any such exchanges is out of the question. Nevertheless, most military attention has been paid to offensive means of warfare. Each side contemplates the destruction of enemy weapons on the ground. It is generally recognized that the spill-over from these attacks is bound to obliterate some cities and fill the air with lethal fallout. Today, neither side has adequate defenses against such attacks.

Thus, if the present stand-off situation prevails, the “stable” deterrent may provide a way to turn back the clock so that both sides will prefer to fight with conventional weapons. The fallacy in this assumption lies in the fact that the dynamism of power is bound to oscillate, and one side or the other will probably develop defenses for blunting offensive attacks to the degree that

they might be endured and countered. Even now, means are available to provide fairly effective defenses, but public understanding of both the danger and the means to counteract it is apparently insufficient to cause the necessary steps to be taken. More confidence seems to be placed in the stable deterrent philosophy and its handmaiden, "nuclear parity," than in taking reasonable measures for defense.

Unconvincing also is the argument that, given a large but equal number of nuclear weapons on each side, an increase on one side of a few more, or a technological improvement by one country, would not upset significantly the balance of power. Military historians frequently point out that a minor military advantage can cause a major difference in the fortunes of war. More important, a *believed* advantage or disadvantage can spell this vital difference between defeat and victory even though the facts may be unrelated to the beliefs. Often this advantage cannot be measured or predicted in advance of the actual conflict. A typical example is supplied by the German advance in 1940 across Belgium and northern France. The German Army overcame an "impregnable" fortification (the Maginot Line) with fewer troops and less armor than the Allies had. What was the elusive quality which accounted for its overwhelming victory? This and similar historical riddles might be pondered by the nuclear parity school.

Fallout shelters and city evacuation plans and drills could save millions of lives in the event of war. So could effective anti-ICBM's. Who knows what technology and military science could develop were resources for defensive measures as readily available as they have been for offensive weapons systems? What could we be doing in space exploration and in space defense today if our vision had been a shade clearer in 1945?

III

Past failures to predict the future, however, should not cause us to throw up our hands and cry "all is lost." We can, now that we can understand nuclear strategy better, improve our military posture. We can find ways to strengthen our air and space defense in order to prevent an Armageddon. We can also find ways to reduce arms production and forces-in-being without risking national security.

Consider for a moment the advantage which would accrue to the Soviets if they were the first to introduce an effective evacua-

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tion and shelter program. They could launch an all-out surprise attack against us with not too much fear of a retaliatory strike. If we were not equally prepared in civil defense, the Soviets would have achieved a rather "stable" deterrent *in their favor*. The same would work in reverse if we first achieved effective defensive systems, active or passive, which could assure the safety of most of our population. It is a military (if not a natural) axiom that effective defenses are stabilizing. A porcupine gets into few fights.

But most "stable" deterrent advocates wish to limit defensive weapons. Otherwise, they say, the logic of deterrence breaks down: when cities are protected, their populations are no longer hostages. Few seem to have considered the political problem of convincing the American voter that, as a hostage, he must not seek to improve his chances for survival. Perhaps the American voter will not wish to play the role of hostage.

But there are more basic weaknesses in this stable deterrent hypothesis. It conceives of a balanced and nearly static world which never existed, and certainly does not exist today. Could the physical scientists who compose an important group within the "stable" deterrent school be picturing the finely balanced scales of a laboratory? The distinction is that human societies cannot be weighed as are chemicals, or measured as are elements of physical force. One cannot contemplate balancing anything unless the materials on both sides of the scales are inert. In world power politics, this is patently impossible. In terms of technology it is equally farfetched. One cannot predict what technological breakthroughs might occur, but one *can* predict that any agreement on balanced numbers or kinds of nuclear weapons would be out of date before the agreements were fulfilled. In this age of scientific and technological explosion, nothing remains stable very long.

Since the end of World War II, there have been at least three complete changes of strategic weapons systems—from B-29's and B-36's, to B-47's and B-52's, to B-52's and ICBM's. Since technological progress seems to advance at an ever-increasing rate, weapons systems actually become obsolescent before reaching operational status.

The advocates of "stable" deterrence seek to forestall the destabilizing effect of technological change by providing for the control and inspection of research and development. This measure would seem even harder to achieve. To order people to stop

inventing is like telling them to stop thinking. Many kinds of research for presumably peaceful purposes might have world-shaking military application. The research which led to the atom bomb initially bore no relation to any military research program. Neither did the invention of the airplane or the rocket, the railroad, telegraph, telephone, automobile or radio.

Regardless of arms control agreements, men will continue to think, to experiment and to invent. The knowledge that man now has of this world will always provide a springboard for the acquisition of more and more knowledge.

The designers of the "stable" deterrent hypothesis may have been influenced by the traditional British principle of "balance of power." One must look at this principle carefully to realize that the British were never quite content with a *true* balance of power, even if such a state of things had been possible. What they sought were combinations of alliances which tipped the balance in *their* favor. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain maintained a fleet able to outgun any combination of fleets which might have been allied against her. This condition hardly signified a balance. It was only when the German High Seas Fleet approached parity and the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente arrangements began to balance land power, that a most *unstable* situation prevailed. When the balance became unstable Germany saw a chance for victory in superior tactics, i.e., in rapid mobilization and attack, a course she pursued in 1914.

Even though exact parity is never possible, today the military power of the U.S. and USSR are comparable. One can hardly contend that this near-parity is creating a condition of stability. There can be little doubt that the trend is in the opposite direction. Each nation, struggling for ways in which to achieve an imbalance in *her* favor, and failing to do so, is creating the very instability which can lead to nuclear war.

International stability will probably not obtain until one side or the other achieves a clearly recognizable advantage. This does not mean, necessarily, that the stronger will inevitably conquer the weaker. World public opinion and economic motives have protected—at least, for some time—the independence of many weak states throughout history. But the philosophy of international communism will not tolerate the existence of the alliance of free states—if it becomes obviously weaker.

To assume a stable situation when, in the words of former President Eisenhower, "two atomic colossi confront each other

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across a trembling world," is to oversimplify and misread history and the dynamics of international politics.

To reiterate, a *mechanical* balance is not possible in any live social environment. Consider the effort to equate two individuals in a contest as closely controlled, regulated and inspected as a boxing match. Could one say that because the two rivals weigh the same they are equally matched? Could a "stable" deterrent deter either? Imponderable factors such as courage, speed, stamina, reaction time, motivation, muscular coordination, experience, coaching, and so on, would more than likely determine the outcome of the match. The multiplicity of factors which determine success in any situation, and the infinite variety of circumstances, preclude exact measurements of power balances. The meaningful axioms are few. There is one that seems to hold in any contest: the most skillful player, possessed of resources comparable to those of his opponent, wins.

States, like people, can, in the heat of controversy, blind themselves to the consequences of their acts. A country, prey to uncontrollable emotions, may go to war against impossible odds, with no logical chance of victory. Paraguay fought against an overwhelming alliance of Brazil, Argentina and Chile in 1864. Serbia stood up to the great Austro-Hungarian empire in 1914. England and France declared war on Germany in 1939 when they felt themselves to be grossly inferior.

Almost any country can be pushed too far, as was Hungary in 1956. It then feels compelled to fight regardless of the consequences. Patrick Henry's declaration, "Give me liberty or give me death," is not an isolated expression of human defiance of an intolerable situation.

Probably no military force, regardless of how superior it may be, could ever assure an absolute deterrent. People have been known to fight against whatever odds if sufficiently provoked. But if military superiority cannot provide an absolute deterrent, neither can nuclear parity. If war has been joined, nuclear parity will result in a mutual slaughter of populations with little chance of either side exploiting an advantage. On the other hand, the side possessing military superiority will at least dominate the enemy, dictate terms, and establish its pattern of government in the postwar world. In other words, a nuclear parity strategy would not provide for winning a war once the deterrent fails; yet millions would be killed. In a war fought by the United States from a position of military superiority in which enemy *military*

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forces alone are targeted, the civilian population would be spared deliberate destruction and hence fewer casualties would result. The political outcome would certainly favor the stronger power.

Neither eventuality is very attractive; the only winners in either event may be those who do not fight. But if military superiority provides the best chance of deterring war *and* of winning, should war occur, *and* of causing fewer casualties, a policy of seeking to assure this superiority would seem to offer the American people the best protection available in the nuclear age.

REGIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

by Sergio Barzanti

THE latest developments concerning the European Economic Community, the rejection of Britain's application for admission, the consequences for the future of the Atlantic Community—and particularly for the United States—of the now openly proclaimed “independent” policy of General de Gaulle, have all tended to concentrate public attention on the merely political aspects of European integration. However, even from the strictly economic viewpoint, several questions remain to be solved, and some of them threaten the consolidation of European unity perhaps as much as the disruptive political forces which have been much in evidence in the last few months.

Among the most serious problems is that of regional imbalance due to the underdevelopment of some of the regions of the Community. This disequilibrium, already notable now, will assume increasingly serious proportions when customs barriers between the member states are completely torn down and the technological progress of the most heavily industrialized areas of the Community is accelerated accordingly. It may therefore have grave repercussions on economic stability in a fragile and complicated structure like that of European integration.

REGIONAL INEQUALITIES IN THE EEC

It may seem somewhat contradictory to talk of “underdeveloped areas” within a technologically advanced and rich complex such as that formed by the nations of Western Europe. When we speak of underdeveloped countries, our thoughts turn automatically to the poorer countries of Asia, Africa or Latin America. In the case of Europe, the expression does not mean that these regions are underdeveloped in an absolute sense, measured by some unalterable standard; it simply means that they are underdeveloped vis-à-vis the rest of the country. In our specific case, the backward areas of what is now the European Economic Com-

munity are depressed in respect to other areas of the Community in general and to their national state in particular.¹

There are a number of "minor" underdeveloped regions in the Community, ranging from Schleswig-Holstein, part of Bavaria, and Lower Saxony in Germany, to Borinage in Belgium, Friuli in northern Italy, and others. At present, however, a few areas constitute the real "hard core" of the problem. These can be broadly identified as the *Mezzogiorno d'Italia* (continental southern Italy, plus the islands of Sicily and Sardinia), and southwest France, together with other scattered regions of France (Corsica, Brittany and the Alpine region). As far as the first is concerned, it is estimated that the per capita income in the south of Italy is at present slightly over 50 per cent of the national average and 40 per cent of that of the northern regions. What is perhaps even more serious than the disparities between income levels in the North and the South is the fact that the mechanics of the country's economic growth have been such—and this threatens to be even more the case in the context of the European Common Market—as to widen rather than reduce the existing gap.

France can be divided in two by an imaginary line stretching from Le Havre to Marseilles.² To the east of this line lies slightly more than half the national territory (including the Paris region), which contains two-thirds of the population, occupies almost 70 per cent of the workers and creates more than 70 per cent of the national product. Obviously these figures show the disproportion with the western half of the country, which is almost in its entirety in various stages of underdevelopment.

In Western Europe it is especially, but not exclusively, the regions bordering the Mediterranean Sea that are mostly affected by this form of underdevelopment. Some of the backward areas are so large that the economy of the country to which they belong is noticeably slowed down and weakened by their existence. This

¹The disparities in per capita income between the different regions of the national states reach the proportion of 5:1 in France, 4:1 in Italy, and only 2:1 in West Germany. The underdeveloped areas present the following characteristics: unemployment, underemployment and often irrational utilization of available labor; obsolete production techniques; a low standard of living; scarcity of local capital; and insufficiently developed agriculture. In these regions, 40 to 70 per cent of the active population work in outmoded agricultural enterprises. This percentage goes down to 5 per cent in the most advanced provinces of the Community.

²In his book *France Against Herself* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 20, Herbert Luethy states: "One half of France is practically excluded from the modern economy and makes no appearance in the contemporary market either as producer or consumer."

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is particularly true in Italy, where the difference between the North and the South is immense.³

A study of the economic situation of the Common Market area reveals that there is a heavily industrialized zone in the Center and North, surrounded by moderately industrialized regions, and finally an outer circle (except in the North) composed of more or less underdeveloped regions. Thus, the more economically advanced zones are congregated around an axis running from the Netherlands to northern Italy, through the valleys of the Rhine and the Rhône. This area comprises 30 per cent of the territory of the Community, 45 per cent of the population, and 60 per cent of its total economic production. Conversely, the outlying regions represent 70 per cent of the territory, 55 per cent of the population, and only 40 per cent of production. Looking at the Community as a whole, there is an evident contrast between a middle bloc of regions with strong economic vitality which, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, contains all the large industrial areas of the Community, and the peripheral regions, whose backwardness in relation to the others tends, as a general rule, to increase rather than to diminish. The first group has attained a very high level of employment and productivity. The second offers, on the contrary, a gamut of situations, all more or less clearly short of the optimum of employment, of which that of the south of Italy is by far the least satisfactory. And while the first group of regions offers possibilities of employment which generally tend to be greater than the local resources, the regions of the second group are still, in differing degrees, zones of repulsion. It is no doubt in the natural order of things that the vital forces of the Community will continue to concentrate in the zones which insure the greatest efficacy for their employment, and which are, furthermore, those where the territories of the Six border each other. But it would be prejudicial to the long-term equilibrium of the Community if this phenomenon were to continue indefinitely.

Hence, the regional inequalities within the Community present obstacles, brakes and potentially disruptive elements in the way

³“The most typical and most serious case of inequality in regional development is that of Italy. Industrialization has almost exclusively affected the North. The South not only suffers from the lower levels of income proper to agricultural regions, but also in this activity productivity is lower than in the North.” The Commission of the European Economic Community, *Rapport sur la situation économique dans les pays de la Communauté* (Paris, 1958), p. 53.

of unification.⁴ They are in fact an invitation to protectionism, escape clauses, preferential treatment, subsidies and all the factors which go against a liberalization of trade; also, in the last instance, protectionism and nationalism go together.

One recent development—the new category of European associate state—will greatly enhance the importance of the problem of regional inequalities and the necessity for finding a solution. The Treaty of Association between the European Economic Community and Greece, and the application for associate membership by Spain, suggest that additional countries with large underdeveloped regions may become part of the Common Market (even though their legal status will be different).

While the case of Spain is still pending (there seem to be, at least for the time being, political obstacles to the admission of that nation even to associate membership), Greece is already an associate state, effective November 1, 1962—the first European nation to achieve such status. It is “the final objective of the association to promote the economy of Greece, so that she may eventually become entirely part of the Community, with all the inherent rights and duties.”⁵ A long period of transition and adjustment, varying from twelve to twenty-two years, is foreseen, in order to allow the Greek economy, supported by the EEC member states, to embark on a thorough industrialization and modernization program. It is hoped that during this transition period the present state of underdevelopment of Greece,⁶ compared to most of Western Europe, will gradually give way to a mature economy capable of competing with those of the Six. The Treaty seeks to avoid the violent shocks that would automatically

“Inequality in regional development constitutes a crucial problem for the Common Market. The philosophy which inspired the Treaty is that, if decisive action is not taken, the gap runs the risk of following the example of Germany with the Ruhr, France with the Paris region, and above all of Italy, with the opposition of the North and the South. One of the most important tasks of the Economic Community, and one of the acid tests of its success, will be that of achieving not only the integration of the various economies, but the integration of the different regions by means of a quicker development of those which, within the confines of the national economies, have remained behind.” *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

⁵*Communauté Européenne* (The Monthly Information Bulletin published by the EEC, ECSC and EURATOM, Paris), Vol. VI, No. 11, November 1962, p. 11.

⁶“The Greek economy is typified by a low level of productivity, income per head and savings, resulting from difficult agricultural conditions, heavy rural underemployment and very little industry. Throughout much of the country the communications network is bad and power supplies inadequate. Skilled labour is scarce and technical education facilities are still insufficient.” The Ministries of Co-ordination and Foreign Affairs of Greece, *Greece, the European Economic Community and a European Free Trade Area* (Athens: Christou and Son, 1959), pp. 140-141.

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follow an abrupt merger of the economies of the EEC and Greece. Therefore, a number of "unequal" provisions are embodied in the Treaty. For instance, while the customs barriers of the EEC toward imports from Greece will rapidly reach the average level in force among the members of the Community, their exports to Greece will benefit only from a very slow, gradual liberalization of Greek customs barriers, thus affording a longer period of protection for infant Greek industrial enterprises.

Although Greece, and certain other European nations which might be admitted to the EEC in some form of associated status in the future, will present additional problems of regional underdevelopment to the Community, the analysis below will be confined to the territory of the Six. The methods to be used within the context of the Treaty of Rome are quite different from the special provisions envisaged by the Treaty of Association with Greece.

ACHIEVING A BALANCED GROWTH

On the basis of past experience it seems that these problems of regional economic disparity, despite great efforts, will not be solved by national governments. Indeed, it is certain that "the reinforcement of European solidarity is the indispensable condition for finding a satisfactory answer to the problems of underdevelopment."⁷ If a laissez-faire type of economy were applied in the Common Market, the outcome would probably be that the underdeveloped regions, far from improving, would lose further ground compared to the advanced areas of the Community. Industry and wealth would be polarized around certain areas, and agriculture would also be confined to specific fertile areas. Today's underdeveloped regions would grow in size and their economy would gradually deteriorate to form practically deserted areas⁸ (indeed, southwest France, which has already been undergoing this process, although on a smaller scale, has been called "le désert français"). In the first years of operation of the Common Market, the tendency to a concentration of the factors of pro-

⁷Communauté Européenne, "Où en est le Marché Commun?," *Les Cahiers de Communauté Européenne*, No. 6 (Paris: Service d'Information des Communautés Européennes, 1961), p. 7.

⁸"Even if it could be reckoned that the progress registered in the center will eventually be felt in the extremities, past experience should not leave too many illusions as to the inevitability of this process, and it actually incites the thought that it will be necessary to aid, and even to stimulate, this process by all the means compatible with the rules regulating the functioning of the Common Market." Communauté Européenne, *Exposé sur l'évolution de la situation sociale dans la Communauté en 1960* (Paris, 1961), Introduction.

duction in certain advanced regions has continued unabated, in spite of efforts by the interested governments to check it. A policy of decentralization appears absolutely necessary to reverse this tendency.⁹

The discovery of new sources of energy such as those of natural gas in Aquitaine and in the Po Valley, and the building of petrochemical plants in southwest France, in Sicily and in Apulia have opened new horizons to these less developed areas. The national governments, as well as the Executive of the Common Market, have already taken many measures to develop the existing resources, both human and material, in some of these less favored regions. Particularly important is the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (Southern Italy Development Fund), which was established in 1950, and whose basic aim is to improve, and in many cases create, the infrastructure which will eventually enable southern Italy to keep pace with technological and other developments taking place in the rest of the country and in most of the EEC. The French government created the various *Sociétés de Développement Régional*, clearly inspired by the Tennessee Valley Authority. These regional bodies coordinate basic programs of development within their areas of jurisdiction, which encompass all the economic activities taking place therein.¹⁰

These national programs have served to alleviate the problems of regional disparity, but they hold out little hope of a final solution. Today regional underdevelopment is no longer merely a national problem, to which a nation applies its limited resources, but it now affects the EEC as a whole. A Community-wide solution is much more likely to be a viable and realistic one than the present measures taken or envisaged by the individual states.¹¹ If and when a European government of some sort is finally formed—and this possibility does not seem likely in the near future, in view of the ideas prevailing among some of the most important European leaders—it will be one of its tasks to encourage the

⁹"Free-trade can modify the economic structure of a nation and build up a new, integrated structure; but, left to itself and unregulated, nobody can guarantee that this new structure will be in line with the exigencies of harmonious expansion or of balanced development." *Mondo Economico*, No. 28, July 15, 1961.

¹⁰"In a policy of development, the necessity of an orderly and simultaneous evolution of all compartments of economic life is paramount." Gabriele Pescatore, *Dieci Anni di Esperienze della Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1961), p. 23.

¹¹"The Common Market must not mean for any nation the opportunity to get rid of its burdens at the expense of its partners; it must remain the means of solving, in common, the problems each country used to face by itself." Georges Elgozy, *La France devant le Marché Commun* (Paris: Flammarion, 1958), p. 126.

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investment of private capital in the underdeveloped regions of the Community. The means of effecting this are several, ranging from fiscal facilities to low transportation costs; it must not be forgotten that in Europe the railroads and other transportation, with very few exceptions, either belong to the state, or state participation is so important that they are virtually controlled by it. Credit facilities and direct financial help should also be employed to this end. Furthermore, the law can prescribe that a certain percentage of the total investments of public concerns be put to use in the economically backward areas, as is now the case in Italy.

In the framework of a limited economic expansion, it is difficult to conceive of a concrete policy of regional development. "The best way to eliminate these structural weaknesses is not so much to solve them one by one, but to push the European ensemble into a massive and constant expansion."¹² The problem of giving a certain degree of homogeneity to standards of living among the various component regions of Europe is one of the most intricate of the many facing the Common Market Executive and the national governments. If the present disparities should persist, or even become more serious, social unrest and political insecurity would be rampant in parts of the EEC; such forces, together with many other potentially disruptive elements—nationalism in particular—would not augur well for the continuity and solidarity of the new union.

It is clear that the means of the national governments are limited and that, if a thorough and comparatively rapid solution is sought, the necessary expenditures and investments would far surpass the capabilities of any one national government. Another negative element is that at present, in a Europe of "sovereign" states, the various plans lack coordination, and their effectiveness is consequently diminished and retarded. For instance, there is little sense in building two big electricity-producing plants in Sardinia and Corsica at the same time, supplying a quantity of energy in excess of the local needs of either of these islands, when it would be much cheaper to build only one and install a system of cables and controls whereby the new source of electric power could be utilized on both sides of the seven-mile Strait of St. Boniface which separates the two islands. By the same token, it is illogical to subsidize a mine in, say, Sicily, when the same product can be obtained at much lower cost, including

¹²*Réalités*, No. 161, June 1959, p. 42.

transportation, from a mine in the French Massif Central. Conversely, coordinated rationalization would mean, for instance, that certain types of vegetables and other agricultural produce, which are very cheap throughout the Italian Mezzogiorno, would not also be grown in other parts of the Community under the protection of the state.

What the underdeveloped regions of the Community essentially need is capital for large-scale investment in such public utilities as railroads and highways, electric power stations, irrigation, port facilities and the like: "With the possible exception of the electricity, these are not usually profit-making enterprises and they will have to be owned and operated by the State or public authorities."¹³ Moreover, in the EEC, there is a basic problem of space; indeed, the Community is much smaller in size than the present industrial colossi, the United States and the USSR, or even large nations such as Canada, China, Brazil or India.¹⁴ Therefore, and also in view of its natural demographic increase, Europe cannot afford to "waste" vast areas whose state of underdevelopment will detract substantially from the general welfare of the Community. And less industrial might will also mean less defensive might, which certainly does not conform with the concept of the very important place Europe seeks to occupy on the international scene in the future.

In order therefore to insure a balanced, steady and sustained rhythm of growth, the European Executive will have to exercise a powerful influence on the economy of the Community. This is practically the only way to assure to the regions that have been left behind the necessary help in recovering lost ground and

¹³Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 108.

¹⁴Comparative areas are as follows:

	<i>Sq. Miles</i>		<i>Sq. Miles</i>
Belgium	11,779	USSR	8,600,000 (app.)
Federal Republic of		United States** ..	3,628,130
Germany*	95,913	China	3,800,000 (app.)
France	212,659	Brazil	3,270,223
Italy	116,224	India***	1,270,000 (app.)
Luxembourg	1,706	Canada	3,845,774
Netherlands	15,765	EEC	454,046
Total EEC	454,046		

**Including possessions, etc.

*Including West Berlin

***Including Kashmir

Source: *Statesman's Yearbook, 1961-62* (New York: St. Martin's Press) and *The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).

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reaching a level comparable to that of other parts of the Community.

SOME FACTORS RELATIVE TO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Naturally, not all the same rules and criteria of evaluation are applicable to each of the underdeveloped areas of the Community, or at least not in the same measure. For example, the surplus of labor, common to southern Italy and to Brittany, may induce new industries to establish themselves in these regions, taking advantage of the availability of the "commodity"—labor—of which there is already a substantial shortage throughout the rest of the Community. This means that the national governments must prepare the workers for their new tasks by helping them to learn skills that are indispensable in today's rapidly advancing state of technology. This will not be easy in some of the cases in question; there are also psychological obstacles to overcome. For instance, take the case of the young agricultural worker, whose family has owned the same plot of land for generations, and who sees himself torn between continuing the family tradition or abandoning it and acquiring skills to admit him to industry; or of the young, carefree, semi-illiterate southern Italian, not prepared by temperament or habit for the strict discipline and precision required by factory life. If really effective training programs, aimed at turning these unused sources of labor into skilled and semi-skilled workers, produce good results, enterprises from all over the Community, and also from outside, will certainly take advantage of this availability of labor to open branches *in loco*.

A consideration of the utmost importance is that, parallel to the rapid advance of science and technology and to the improved transportation facilities, a power revolution, directly affecting the poor regions of the Community, is taking place. This is due (a) to the discovery and exploitation of sources of power within these areas, such as in southwest France (Aquitaine) and Sicily; (b) to the greatly diminished costs of importing coal by sea from abroad to supply the coastal areas; (c) to the development of atomic energy, although its intensive industrial application is yet somewhat in the future. When the latter is fully developed, the poorer regions, through EURATOM, will then benefit from the use of this form of energy, under exactly the same conditions as the most industrialized areas, without any additional overheads due to transportation and other costs.

An important advantage possessed by the underdeveloped re-

gions is that, having very few industrial plants at present, they can build new plants without encountering the problems posed by obsolescence, for example, the disposal of old plants and amortization of costs. The situation can be likened somewhat to that existing in Germany soon after the end of the Second World War, when it became necessary to rebuild the industrial might of that nation from a comparatively low level, once the occupying Powers had so decided. Massive injections of American capital were poured into the German economy, and in a relatively short time her industry was afoot again, actually taking advantage of the new machinery to produce items often cheaper and of better quality than those of her competitors. It is evident that, if similar results, even on a minor scale, are to be attained in the underdeveloped regions of the Community, a massive quantity of capital is needed. And, as already pointed out, technicians and skilled labor have to be trained and prepared to meet the challenge.

THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The development of these areas, however, unlike the reconstruction of Germany, will have to be taken over mainly by public enterprise, because they are located in the midst of a heavily industrialized Community whose rich and technologically advanced areas would otherwise attract all the available capital and skills. With the solidifying of the Common Market, there should be a gradual shift toward a general European program of advancement for the underdeveloped regions of the Community. This would eventually be taken over by the European Executive which should rationalize the various national plans and advise the proper course of action to the national governments, which in turn should have a broad margin of autonomy in their execution. The guiding criterion should be the overall interest of the Community. The programs should extend over several years, bearing in mind that, after fundamental improvements have brought the now underdeveloped areas within range of the other regions, the benefit will be reaped by all parts of the Community, not only by those directly affected by the various forms of aid. The greatly enhanced economic possibilities and higher degree of sophistication of the poorer areas will considerably increase economic intercourse with the already advanced parts of the Community. Currents of traffic will be invigorated and will follow the paths opened up by the new exigencies and possibilities; and ever-increasing mobility of the inhabitants of the Com-

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munity will accompany and support this process.¹⁵ It is clear therefore that the end of the state of underdevelopment in the Community will benefit not only the regions at present directly affected by it, but Western Europe as a whole.

Particular care should be exercised by the national governments in the formative stage, when the various economies first come together (though the danger is attenuated in the Community by the gradualness of the process). The unification of Italy a century ago, which abruptly brought into contact the two component parts—the relatively industrialized and advanced North, and the agricultural and backward South—and the resulting disastrous consequences that were generated by the merger, should furnish some of the guiding criteria to the European Executive for cushioning and regulating the shock that will result from integration between regions having different levels of development. On the other hand, if the public authorities take care to avoid this danger, this does not mean that, once the pre-industrialization and industrialization phases are completed, the economies of the hitherto underdeveloped regions can be abandoned to the laws of the market. To do this would probably drive at least some of them back to the state of underdevelopment that characterized them before. Thus, governments should closely follow developments in these regions, and be ready to intervene, if necessary in a massive way, to correct the situation. But vigilance is different from tutelage; the task of the government will not therefore mean an indefinite period of support for the developing regions, but an awareness of their peculiar situation and a readiness to step in whenever necessary. The economy will thus be based on free enterprise, but the government will give the broad directions—indicative, not compulsory—and help it if circumstances so warrant; action perhaps somewhat similar to that presently being taken in France under the now-famous Plan.¹⁶ This kind of planning will be more than ever necessary in a Euro-

¹⁵“Free movement constitutes a first stage of that European citizenship that could become, in the not too distant future, a reality.” *Communauté Européenne*, Vol. VI, No. 7, July 1962, p. 3.

¹⁶“[The French Plan] is a method midway between total liberalism and total planning. It has certain advantages. Public authorities, industrialists, trade unionists, technicians, are all invited to participate in its realization. The principals are therefore many, and of very diverse origin. They have a common feature: the desire to stimulate an ‘enquiring’ spirit in correctly estimating the economic situation.” *Fortune Française*, May 25, 1961. According to *Le Monde (Sélection Hebdomadaire du Monde)*, March 14, 1962), “The Plan is essentially agreed upon between top representatives of capital and top representatives of the State, the first normally having more weight than the second.”

pean federation, where so many national and economic interests will clash.

Some advantages will derive to the developing regions of the Community by the freedom of circulation within the area. The January 1962 Brussels agreement concerning agricultural products will benefit most of these regions by enabling them to profit in full from the new opportunities offered by the large European market. Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome stresses "the harmonious development . . . of the entire Community," not only of certain regions. The fact is however that in most cases, even if the situation of the backward regions is improving, it is at a pace which is comparatively slower than that of the advanced parts of the Community. The problem, therefore, is how to reconcile the concepts "harmonious development, balanced expansion, increased stability," with this growing imbalance. The Treaty itself makes certain provisions to this purpose. Article 3, for instance, mentions the coordination of the economic policies of the member states, the *rapprochement* of national legislation, and similar matters. Also, a common policy in the areas of agriculture and transportation is foreseen.

AGENCIES TO PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The two main instruments designed to assist regional development within the Community are the European Social Fund and the European Investment Bank. The Fund was inserted in the Treaty at the insistence of the Italian delegation, for particular economic conditions made it necessary for Italy to obtain financial help in order to cope with large-scale unemployment. Mostly, if not entirely, this plight concerns southern Italy. The assistance given to the workers is directed at transforming them from laborers to skilled or semi-skilled workers, thus greatly enhancing their chances of finding work in the Community. The Fund also has other tasks, specified in Articles 123-128 of the Treaty.

The second original creation of the EEC Treaty specifically designed to help the underdeveloped regions of the Common Market is the European Investment Bank which, under Articles 129-130, is established in order "to contribute . . . to the balanced and smooth development of the Common Market in the interest of the Community. For this purpose, the Bank shall . . . facilitate the financing of the following projects in all sectors of the economy: projects for developing the underdeveloped regions. . . ." It purports to rectify, insofar as possible, the unfavorable position

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of these regions in order to fill or at least narrow the gap which divides them from the more advanced areas. It is interesting to note that profit-making is not within the scope of the Bank, a provision made expressly so that there should be no danger that it might prefer to invest its money in some of the other activities permissible under its statute and more advantageous from a financial viewpoint. While the Bank, in many cases, requests the contribution of the national governments, in the case of underdeveloped regions it takes care, unaided, of the financing of the projects approved. Funds are made available to the Bank by all member states of the Community, taking into account their Gross National Product, population figures and a variety of other factors.

The Study Committee of the EEC Commission has tentatively divided the territory of the Community into fifty-four regions easily recognizable for their historical, geographic and economic features. The needs and the potentialities of the underdeveloped regions will be considered on a European scale, by the European Executive. This will act in close cooperation with the national governments first and then possibly directly with the regional development agencies. Whereas these regional subdivisions, for the time being, respect national boundaries, the Commission proposes to re-draw them in a second stage, irrespective of national territories.¹⁷ It must also be noted that, in order to foster the development of the economically weak regions of the Community on a European scale, and to a certain extent independently of the national governments, the Commission has issued strict directives to the European Investment Bank stipulating that absolute financial priority be given to less-developed areas, and the Bank has complied with these.

It is obvious that a great deal of cooperation will have to take place between the Executive of the Common Market and the institutions of the national governments concerned with regional development, such as the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* or the *Sociétés de Développement Régional*. There will be common projects for geographically contiguous regions (roughly the equivalent

¹⁷"The Common Market, to become a reality, should remodel the economic map of Europe to be absolutely free of the political borders which have provoked the artificial separation of complementary regions. After the 'Europe des Patries' it would be appropriate to resuscitate a 'Europe des Régions,' such as already existed in the Middle Ages in an epoch precisely when Europe constituted a spiritual unity. If the regionalization of Europe is not to be for tomorrow, some—particularly the Italians—had hoped for a clearer affirmation of the Europeanization of regional problems. Their preoccupation is understandable, so great is the task that they must accomplish in the Mezzogiorno." *Le Monde*, December 10, 1961.

of the United States interstate projects). At other times, this coordination may take place according to economic divisions, with little emphasis on geographical considerations. For instance, a program elaborated by the Executive of the Community for marginal coal mines may at the same time concern the mines of Sulcis in Sardinia, those of Borinage in Belgium, and some in central and southern France. It is, however, indispensable that close cooperation be maintained at all levels between the European, national, regional and local authorities with, as far as possible, a clear definition of their sphere of action and responsibilities. It will take some time to attain such a high degree of unity; success will also depend heavily on how closely the economies of the member states will be meshed and on how political power will be distributed. From a practical viewpoint, strict coordination between the authorities of the three different echelons—regional, national and European—will provide a much more thorough knowledge of the various sectors of the economy of the Community and facilitate the elaboration of a program of development for the various underdeveloped regions as facets of a single problem: that of territorial development of the whole Community.

Sometime in the future, a European federal government will have to take on the role played hitherto by the national states in economic matters, and to insure a fair distribution of riches and opportunities between regions. It is likely that economic and political developments will to some extent increase the amount of government intervention in economic matters.

CONCLUSIONS

To integrate Europe does not mean simply opening the borders and leaving free play to economic forces, hoping that all will then be for the best in the best of all possible worlds. The economy of the new Europe will not be just a blend of the various economies of the member states. These must be harmonized and streamlined according to the needs of the Community. A policy of investment and of development in the underdeveloped areas of the Community must be consistently followed by the responsible authority and a credit system set up which, while based on economically sound criteria, should be available for supplying the capital needed for the various enterprises which will assist in the development programs without undue emphasis on immediate or short-range profits. Private credit institutes should operate along-

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side, and in cooperation with, a Central Credit Agency, run according to specific investment criteria, financially guaranteed by the Executive. This agency would assume the tasks connected with building the infrastructure, unrewarding from a financial viewpoint and which no private entrepreneur would otherwise undertake. Such a Central Credit Agency should have much more financial power, and be broader in scope, than the present European Investment Bank and European Social Fund, created by the Treaty and regulated by it.

If a bold program is devised and carried out—the foregoing recommendations provide some guidelines for such an effort—then regional underdevelopment will become a less critical problem in the general context of economic expansion in the Common Market and it can be solved by the combined participation of both private and public capital and enterprise. The resulting regional equilibrium will end the present state which finds unemployed labor, land and other resources in some parts of the Community, and a shortage of the same factors in other areas.

The task of correcting regional imbalances within the Community will be an important stage in the formative process of an effective European economic union which might lead, after a number of years, to some form of political union. It is undesirable that Europe should be composed of certain prosperous industrial areas, surrounded by an underdeveloped fringe. If the new Europe is to fulfill its potential and evolve into full maturity, it must utilize its resources to the maximum. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, President of the French National Assembly, makes the same point in this eloquent statement:

It is indispensable to underline the interdependence of the European movement and of the regional economies, for it poses a problem upon which depends, after all, the final success of the European idea. The alternative is the following: either the European institutions will be able to set up the appropriate machinery to promote a balanced development of the different European sectors, and in this case Europe will triumph; or else the Common Market will aggravate regional imbalances and then there will come about, sooner or later . . . the ultimate death of Europe.¹⁸

¹⁸Jacques Chaban-Delmas, "De Bordeaux à l'Europe." Article appearing in "Quelle est cette Europe?", edited by Jean Monnet, Chaban-Delmas and others, special issue of *La Nef* (Paris, April-June 1960), pp. 14-15.

THE WEST NEW GUINEA SETTLEMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ON August 15, 1962 Dutch and Indonesian representatives in the United Nations in New York reached agreement on the transfer of West New Guinea (or Irian Barat as Indonesians call it) to Indonesia by May 1, 1963, after an interim United Nations administration.¹ The agreement provides for an Indonesian guarantee of Papuan political rights, and stipulates that, before the end of 1969, the Papuans will be given an opportunity to indicate, probably through some kind of plebiscite, whether they wish to remain under Indonesian control or not.

Reaction to the agreement was mixed. In Djakarta President Sukarno called his August 17, 1962 Independence Day address "A Year of Triumph," and pointed out that the Dutch "acted in opposition to the course of history and that is why they lost." In Moscow and Peking there was official satisfaction, while UN Secretary-General U Thant, who had played a leading role in achieving the agreement, confined himself largely to noting its "historic" significance, and to extending congratulations all around. The Dutch government was less elated. Both Premier de Quay and Foreign Minister Luns stated that American pressure had forced the Dutch to sign the agreement. Luns asserted that there had been a sharp alteration of U.S. policy as of April 1962, resulting in the Dutch capitulation. He attributed the changing American attitude to the fear that if the New Guinea issue remained unresolved Indonesia might come under increasing communist influence. With the exception of one or two young Papuan leaders who had earlier sided with the Indonesians, Papuan reaction was one of deep disappointment. In the New Guinea Council, the area's proto-parliament, it was asserted that "America appears too weak to resist Russian machinations in Indonesia." In several places thousands of Papuans demonstrated, carrying signs with messages like "How many dollars for a Papua, Yankees?"²

¹For the complete text of the agreement see *Antara Daily News Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *ADNB*), August 20, 1962.

²"A Year of Triumph," *ADNB* (Special Edition), August 23, 1962; *ADNB*, August 27, 1962; *Peking Review*, August 24, 1962; *New York Times*, August 16, 17, 1962; *De Volkskrant* (Amsterdam), August 17, 1962; *Nieuw Guinea Koerier* (Hollandia) (hereafter cited as *NGK*), August 11, 17, 1962.

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The swift conclusion, after a deadlock of more than a decade, of the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands seems surprising. As late as September 1961 the Dutch government laid the responsibility for the continuing impasse at the door of Indonesia, which, it alleged, flouted "the right of self determination" of the Papuans; and only a few months earlier it had spoken of "the development plan of many years" for the territory. Indonesia meanwhile persisted in its earlier stated position that the Papuans had already given their political allegiance to Indonesia in 1945, and that there was nothing to discuss except the transfer of the disputed territory to Indonesia. The ill-fated invasion attempt by three Indonesian Navy motor-torpedo boats on January 15, 1962, and Sukarno's general mobilization order, on February 26, 1962, for all Indonesians between the ages of eighteen and forty, indicated that the Indonesians might resort to force to settle the dispute. The circumstances leading to the sudden agreement on August 15, 1962 therefore deserve closer analysis, while the varied reactions to the accord itself—cited above—invite consideration of its implications for the future. For a proper understanding of these matters, let us first look briefly at the history of the dispute over West New Guinea.

I

The so-called Round Table Conference in The Hague, in December 1949, at the conclusion of which Indonesia officially received her independence from the Dutch, may be said to mark the formal beginning of the dispute over West New Guinea.³ Article Two of the Sovereignty Transfer Charter agreed to at this conference excluded West New Guinea from Indonesia, but provided that its political status "shall be decided" by negotiations within a year. Dutch and Indonesians agreed that in the meantime the "status quo" of the territory "will be maintained," i.e., as an area under Dutch "authority." The Sovereignty Transfer Charter did not explicitly use the term "sovereignty" in describing continuing control by the Dutch of the area; the use, instead, of the term "authority" was dictated by a desire to avoid further conten-

³In this background sketch I have drawn on earlier publications, unless otherwise indicated. See by J. M. van der Kroef: *The West New Guinea Dispute* (New York, 1958); "West New Guinea in the Crucible," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 75 (1960), pp. 519-538; "Dutch Opinion on the West New Guinea Problem," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 14 (1960), pp. 269-298; "Toward 'Papua Barat,'" *The Australian Quarterly*, March 1962, pp. 17-26; "Nationalism and Politics in West New Guinea," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1961, pp. 38-53 and "Recent Developments in West New Guinea," *Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1961, pp. 279-291.

tion that might wreck the conference. But arguments that Indonesia did not in fact accept Dutch sovereignty over the disputed territory are not persuasive; e.g., in August 1950, Indonesian representatives themselves asked for "the transfer of sovereignty over West Irian to the Indonesian government."⁴

Discussions to settle the political status of West New Guinea proved fruitless. Even before they were held the Dutch had drawn up legislation to integrate the territory into the Dutch realm. The Dutch claimed that such legislation was necessary to establish the proper legal foundation for the administration of the territory, but the Indonesians complained that the Dutch were violating the spirit of Article Two of the Sovereignty Transfer Charter and its clear mandate that the area's political status would be decided within a year. Adhering to a more formally legalistic position, the Dutch interpreted the continuation of the "status quo" as a clear perpetuation of their sovereignty over the territory. They rejected the view of the Indonesians who pointed out that during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949) and before the Sovereignty Transfer various Dutch spokesmen had indicated that the new Indonesian state would comprise the whole of the former Dutch East Indies, and that there was no intention to exclude West New Guinea. The fact is, however, that these same Dutch spokesmen also contradicted themselves and made reservations about the inclusion of West New Guinea in a future independent Indonesian state.

Consistency of argument has distinguished neither side in the dispute. For example, just before their independence proclamation of August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, the chief Indonesian revolutionary leaders, made it plain that they did not believe that Indonesia should necessarily consist of the former Dutch East Indies and that they did not know the desires of the Papuans of West New Guinea. Hatta stated that "the people of Papua (i.e. New Guinea) too have the right to become a free nation," while Sukarno, in an independence appeal on August 23, 1945, addressed himself to Indonesians "from Aceh to Ambon," thus excluding all of West New Guinea.⁵ By January 1951, however, Sukarno was calling for a "mustering of force" by his people to acquire the disputed area, and warned: "Our struggle will be

⁴*Rapport van de Commissie Nieuw-Guinea (Irian) 1950, 3 de stuk, Uitgave: Secretariaat van de Nederlands-Indonesische Unie* (The Hague, 1950), p. 149.

⁵Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (sine loco, 1959)*, Vol. 1, pp. 201-212; *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Elfde Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties* (The Hague, 1957), pp. 123-124, 201, 217.

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continued on this basis—demand backed by pressure.”⁶ Yet, as late as 1956 Muhammad Yamin, a leading radical political ideologue and confidant of Sukarno, could declare during a visit in the Netherlands that he still had “patience in the Irian question”;⁷ still later, Indonesia’s principal military figure, Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General A. H. Nasution, alternately threatened force and disavowed the use of force in the settlement of the issue.⁸ Even observers sympathetic to Indonesia’s case have pointed out that Indonesia repeatedly changed the legal basis of its claim.

Three times, at the ninth (1954), eleventh (1956) and twelfth (1957) sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Indonesia tried to elicit support for her claim from the world body, but each time failed to win the necessary two-thirds majority. Each failure increased the sense of frustration and bitterness in Indonesia. As early as December 1954, after the first rejection by the UN, the noncommunist Djakarta press asserted that in the matter of West New Guinea the UN had become the instrument of big powers seeking to “legalize the continuation of imperialism” in West Irian. In February 1955, after Sukarno had declared that the “time has now come to intensify our efforts to bring West Irian back to the Republic,” the government established a “Legion for the Liberation of West Irian” (*Barisan Pembebas Irian Barat*—BPIB) which, within a few months, claimed to have 100,000 members who were receiving military training in order to prepare for “the entry into West Irian” either through negotiations “or by means of force.”⁹ In October 1954, forty-eight heavily armed Indonesians, under the auspices of the Indonesian Army, infiltrated into the Etna Bay area of West New Guinea with what the Dutch government termed “subversive” intent. Although quickly rounded up, they would be only the first of several thousand guerrillas to land in West New Guinea before the settlement was reached in August 1962. When the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1957 again failed to support Indonesia’s claim, some 50,000 Netherlands remaining in Indonesia were expelled, and Dutch

⁶*Report on Indonesia* (Indonesian Information Office, New York), January 29, 1951.

⁷*Elseviers Weekblad* (Amsterdam), September 1, 1956.

⁸See J. M. van der Kroef, “Nasution, Sukarno and the West New Guinea Dispute,” *Asian Survey*, August 1961, pp. 20-24.

⁹See survey of Indonesian press reaction in *Java Bode* (Djakarta), December 14, 1954; on the BPIB see *Nieuwsgier* (Djakarta), June 21, 1955.

properties and enterprises were expropriated by the Indonesian government.

Meanwhile the Dutch were accelerating their development effort in West New Guinea with its 750,000 Papuan inhabitants. Territorial budgets steadily grew (from 36.2 million florins in 1950 to 143.6 million in 1960), as did the Dutch contribution to make up the territory's budget deficits (from 15.5 million florins in 1950 to 84.1 million in 1960).¹⁰ There were significant advances in medical and hygienic services, in education and in other welfare services, but the area's economy remained largely undeveloped and dependent upon but a few exports such as timber, copal and hides. The uncertainty of the territory's political future, moreover, discouraged investment by private Dutch and other foreign capital. Dutch policy was evidently based upon the slow and careful construction of a simple economic infrastructure in which the Papuan entrepreneurial elite would play an increasingly important role. Of the more than 8700 government officials in 1960 about 4600 were Papuans, generally in lower and intermediate positions, but there was unquestionably steady progress in the "Papuanization" of the administration. On April 5, 1961, the New Guinea Council, the territory's embryo parliament, was formally opened; its twenty-eight members, some elected, others appointed, were predominantly Papuan. The establishment of the Council followed a marked upsurge of indigenous political life, which resulted in the formation of more than half a dozen political parties and the growth of a national Papuan consciousness.

II

On February 15, 1957, the long simmering dissatisfaction in many levels of Indonesian society with the policies of the Sukarno-dominated central government in Djakarta boiled over. A "Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic" was proclaimed in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes). Contrary to the expectations of many, the Sukarno regime did not collapse; most of the army remained loyal and the central government was bolstered by the advent of a spirit of radical nationalism in Java which sanctioned the imposition of an increasingly authoritarian regime—Sukarno's "guided democracy." By the end of 1958 the dissident "Revolutionary Government" had been reduced to ineffectual

¹⁰*Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea over het Jaar 1960 uitgebracht aan de Verenigde Naties ingevolge artikel 73 E van het Handvest* (Ministry of Interior Affairs, The Hague, 1961), pp. 87-88.

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guerrilla activity. Alternately leaning on the anti-communist army, headed by Chief of Staff Nasution, and on the fast-growing Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the Sukarno regime was not only able to maintain itself but also to become, in a sense, an indispensable balance wheel between Left and Right.

These developments came to form the basis of a new departure in the West New Guinea dispute. During the struggle against the rebels the central government developed a policy, first devised by Nasution, to create a "momentum" of national power directed initially against the rebels, then increasingly against Dutch control over West New Guinea.¹¹ This "momentum" policy drew on all the demagogic élan that Sukarno could muster in order to forge a new sense of national purpose. For their own particular reasons, the army and the communists endorsed the imposition by Sukarno of more authoritarian constructs of government amid an atmosphere of ceaseless sloganizing and mobilization of mass enthusiasm.¹² By the end of July 1959, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that his country would not introduce the West New Guinea question into the United Nations again, but would instead embark on "a contest" or "confrontation" of power with the Netherlands "in all fields," as Indonesia had done from 1945 to 1949. This, as Subandrio explained, meant that Indonesia would "consolidate" its political, military and economic strength so that "we now become a master in our own house," and he prophesied that "a time will come that the Dutch, whether they like it or not, will cede West Irian to us."¹³

Indonesia's new "confrontation" policy, designed to break a stalemate of almost ten years' duration, brought repeated threats of expropriation—never carried out—against foreign enterprises with some Dutch capital operating in Indonesia, e.g., Royal Dutch Shell; formation of new action groups like the "West Irian Committee," established on September 29, 1959; and increasingly war-like pronouncements by government leaders. A 360 million dollar arms purchase from Moscow, in January 1961, underscored the military aspect of "confrontation." But at all times a major feature

¹¹On this concept of "momentum" see the analysis by one of Indonesia's chief economists, former cabinet minister and "Revolutionary Government" supporter, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, published under the pseudonym Sumitro, *Searchlight on Indonesia* (*sine loco*, 1959), p. 43.

¹²It was this "momentum" policy to which Sukarno in effect referred when, in his August 17, 1962 Independence Day address, he spoke of his nation's struggle to regain West New Guinea as a national "character building" experience. "A Year of Triumph," *ADNB*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹³*ADNB*, August 4, 1959 and *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), August 10, 1959.

of this policy was the restoration of unity and security in Indonesia. On August 17, 1961, a formal amnesty was offered to all "Revolutionary Government" insurgents, who thereupon "returned to the lap of the Republic" in great numbers. Indicative of the emphasis placed upon securing national unity within the context of the "confrontation" policy was the remark of the Army Commander in West Sumatra that the army did not feel victorious because the "Revolutionary Government" had collapsed, but felt only gratitude to God "because with the return of our brothers we are facing a bright future in developing our country."¹⁴

Simultaneously the Indonesian government and the government-controlled news media began to spread reports of conditions approaching civil war in West New Guinea. This "psychological warfare," as the Dutch press and Dutch government spokesmen were quick to characterize it, was exemplified by an official Indonesian protest to the UN on December 22, 1960, asserting that the Dutch were guilty of "acts of terror" against the Papuans, and by stories about the "increasingly ruthless policy" of the Dutch, about "a campaign of continuous arrest, suppression and torture" of Papuans, and similar fabrications. Early in 1961 Indonesian spokesmen were claiming that "thousands of Papuans daily seek refuge in Indonesian territory," while "insurrections" were said to be "flaring up in almost every section" of the territory.¹⁵ Neither the independent West New Guinea press, often sharply critical of the government, nor the correspondents of Dutch newspapers in West New Guinea, nor foreign journalists who came to West New Guinea alerted by the Indonesian reports, were able to corroborate these Indonesian allegations, although there was a shortlived, small and ineffectual Indonesian-inspired underground movement in 1960-1961. It is not difficult to discern the tactic of "the big lie" in this Indonesian press campaign, and on March 20, 1961, three Papuan parties protested to the UN Secretary-General that they "no longer" wished to "tolerate the provocative and lying propaganda of Indonesia."

Another, and equally important, aspect of the new policy calculated to heighten international concern was the rapid acceleration of Indonesian infiltration into West New Guinea. In October 1959 and April 1960, small groups of infiltrators went ashore under

¹⁴*Indonesian Observer*, July 22, 1961.

¹⁵*ADNB*, October 21, 26, November 3 and December 27, 1960; February 13, 1961; *Persdocumentatie betreffende Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, The Hague), January 26, 1961.

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seasoned leaders who had made similar journeys in the past; by early May 1960, Dutch Defense Minister S. H. Visser reported to the Dutch lower house that four Indonesian infiltration attempts had been made in the previous six months in the vicinity of Fak-Fak alone for the purpose of "sabotage and espionage."¹⁶ In November 1960, still another group of some twenty-five Indonesians was put ashore. At first, Indonesian officials disclaimed any knowledge of these landings, but by February 1961 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio declared that "to be honest" he had to admit that Indonesian infiltrations had taken place, but he accused the Dutch of the same practice.¹⁷ In September 1961, scores of Indonesian infiltrators entered the territory near Sorong, and by early January 1962 Sukarno announced that a forthcoming Indonesian invasion might take place by means of "tens of thousands of sampans" on "some dark night."¹⁸ On January 15, 1962, Dutch naval units intercepted a small Indonesian invasion effort carried out by motor-torpedo boats; in the following March, just before Dutch and Indonesian negotiators were to meet near Washington to discuss the West New Guinea dispute, still another group of eighty infiltrators landed on the island of Waigeo.

Certain aspects of these invasion attempts are noteworthy. First, they assumed over time a more and more overt military character. Earlier infiltration groups, though all trained by the army, had usually worn civilian clothing and were only lightly armed; the November 1960 group (and its successors) generally wore army uniforms, was heavily armed, and, according to one of its members, had been addressed by Army Chief of Staff Nasution himself prior to its departure.¹⁹ Second, although the government-controlled Indonesian news media claimed at various times that the infiltrators had captured whole towns, were "encircling" others and "liberating" large territories, and were operating in "90 per cent of Irian" and even threatening the territorial capital of Hollandia itself,²⁰ the fact is that at no time did they constitute a serious military threat to the Dutch. In most instances the Papuan population quickly reported the presence of the invaders—although in the Fak-Fak and Manokwari areas the intruders found some support among the local Indonesian inhabitants—and the

¹⁶*Persdocumentatie betreffende Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, May 11, 1960.

¹⁷*NGK*, February 13, 1961.

¹⁸*Indonesian Observer*, January 8, 1962.

¹⁹*NGK*, December 6, 1960, April 24, 1961.

²⁰See e.g. *ADNB*, May 10, 14, 25, 29, June 4, 11, 1962.

effective Dutch military countermeasures, the lack of supplies, and the difficulties of the terrain rendered the infiltrators ineffective.²¹ Third, it soon became clear that the real significance of the infiltrations lay in their cumulative psychological effect, both on the West New Guinea inhabitants and in world capitals. The presence of guerrillas and saboteurs lurking in the jungle might prove in the long run to be rather demoralizing. At the same time, as no foreign power seemed inclined to urge Indonesia to cease the landings of these small groups of invaders, it became clear that such a gradually accelerating infiltration—a kind of invasion on the installment plan—could eventually escalate the scattered, military operations in the territory into a more serious conflict.

The infiltrations and the press campaign were integral parts of Indonesia's diplomatic strategy, calculated to convey the impression that West New Guinea was not just a remote and insignificant territory in the South Pacific, but a dangerous hot spot which, like Berlin, the Congo or Vietnam, might at any moment plunge the world into war. Indonesian newspapers assumed a more militant tone, ridiculing the idea that the Papuans could liberate themselves from the Dutch and expressing the conviction that in the near future Indonesian armed forces would be able to do that job;²² the foreign press reported that Nasution had assured Sukarno that Indonesian forces could conquer West New Guinea in three weeks' time;²³ and the Indonesian military attaché in Bonn confirmed that Indonesian diplomatic missions were sending regular reports to the governments to which they were accredited on "the precarious situation in and around West New Guinea."²⁴ In addition, the continuing assurances given Sukarno by both Moscow and Peking that they fully supported Indonesia's aggressive designs on West New Guinea could not but create growing apprehension in the West, particularly after the Indian conquest of Goa.

Meanwhile, the Sukarno regime continued to ignore needed economic development measures and indeed permitted the Indo-

²¹The ineffectiveness of the Indonesian infiltrators was pointed up by Brig. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, designated as chief UN representative for West New Guinea after the signing of the West New Guinea settlement. Rikhye declared that 400 Indonesian troops who had landed in the territory were prisoners of the Dutch, but that an additional 500 to 800 had not been accounted for. "I fear many of these may die in the swamp and jungle conditions," Rikhye said. *New York Times*, August 26, 1962.

²²Cf. e.g. *Bintang Timur* (Djakarta), September 30, 1959, and *Pemuda* (Djakarta), October 5, 1959.

²³*Persdocumentatie betreffende Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, February 20, 1961.

²⁴*De Volkskrant*, January 7, 1961.

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nesian economy to deteriorate further—thus presumably strengthening the popularity of the Indonesian Communist Party—for the sake of bolstering its war machinery. In 1960 the military's share of the 46 billion rupiah Indonesian budget was about 32 per cent; in 1961 its share had risen to nearly 50 percent of a total budget of 53 billion rupiah, while in the interim acute food shortages, skyrocketing inflation, stagnation of industry and serious imbalances in the export economy seemed to go on virtually unchecked.²⁵ The notion that somehow Indonesian leaders would have to be saved from their own folly became, under these circumstances, difficult to resist.

III

The threat of war, however, was only one feature of Indonesian policy. The same Nasution who reportedly backed Sukarno's aggressive designs to the hilt, also, with the approval of Sukarno, sought at the same time to influence Dutch opinion makers through informal diplomatic channels. In October 1960, Nasution visited Malayan Premier Tengku Abdul Rahman, who was then on the eve of a world tour, and secured his willingness to work informally for a solution to the West New Guinea problem in London and The Hague.²⁶ In April 1961, the Bandung publisher, Oejeng Suwargana, an emissary of Nasution, went to the Netherlands to discuss the West New Guinea question with political and business leaders (among them a former president of Unilever Corporation, Paul Rijkens).²⁷ Oejeng apparently promoted further discussions between Sukarno, then on a world tour, and prominent Netherlands. Although the exact extent of Oejeng's mediation efforts is still shrouded in secrecy, it is certain that he contributed ultimately to an accelerating change in Dutch public opinion at a high level. In June 1961, in Paris, Nasution himself met informally with Professor F. Duynstee, then a prominent figure in the Catholic People's Party, but the nature of this discussion remains obscure.²⁸ Still, there seemed to be a body of Dutch opinion ready to meet these peace overtures halfway.

²⁵Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Difficulties," *International Journal*, Autumn 1962, pp. 399-413.

²⁶On Rahman's mediation see *Indonesian Observer*, March 17, 1961 and Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Big Build Up," *Nation* (Sydney), February 11, 1961, pp. 10-13.

²⁷On Oejeng see *NGK*, May 8, 1961, March 20, 1962. During a visit with this writer in December 1960, Mr. Suwargana indicated that his mission had the approval of Sukarno.

²⁸*De Volkskrant*, June 24, 1961, *Vrij Nederland* (Amsterdam), July 1, 1961; *NGK*, June 28, 29, July 5, 8, August 8, 16, 1961.

Despite the seemingly hopeless deadlock and the rigid refusal of successive Dutch cabinets to accommodate the Indonesian claim during the 1950's, significant segments of Dutch opinion were opposed from the beginning to Dutch retention of West New Guinea. The Dutch Labor Party, for example, always harbored such sentiments. As early as 1951, H. Vos, Dutch Labor Party leader, urged a transfer of the territory to Indonesia under certain conditions;²⁹ in subsequent years this position attracted a larger following, although other influential Dutch Laborites in Parliament criticized the idea of surrendering the territory to a government as unstable as Indonesia's.³⁰ In some Protestant political circles, generally conservative but sensitive to the position of and appeals from Christian Indonesians and missions, the sentiment for a *rapprochement* was equally strong, although here again there were sharply contradictory opinions. Evidence of this was the reaction to the "Call for Reflection" issued by the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church in June 1956, expressing doubt about the "correctness" of the Dutch position in the West New Guinea dispute, which led to numerous protests and to a systematic refutation drawn up by a "Grievance Committee" of leading Dutch Reformed intellectuals.³¹ In other Protestant groups, Indonesia continued to be regarded as "a dictatorially governed economic chaos," and in these circles Holland's "altruistic intentions" in New Guinea were simply not in question.³² This same view was shared by many Catholic political groups,³³ but after 1957 critical voices began to be raised within the Catholic People's Party. It was especially Professor Duynstee, of the Catholic University at Nimwegen, who in this group became a principal advocate of a transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia.³⁴ To Dutch com-

²⁹*Het Vrije Volk*, January 20-22, 1951.

³⁰See e.g. Frans Goedhart in *Vrij Nederland*, January 8, 1955. By the end of 1960 the Labor Party's position seemed to be that Holland should seek some kind of international control over West New Guinea and that transfer to Indonesia would be "indefensible." See J. de Kadt, *Huidige Stand van het Nieuw-Guinea Vraagstuk* (Amsterdam, n.d.), pp. 9, 19-21. Subsequently, however, many in the Labor Party came to adopt a position of allowing a transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesian control under UN auspices and with due regard for Papuan wishes for self-determination.

³¹Cf. *Kerk en Nieuw-Guinea. Open Brief aan de Generale Synode der Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk* (Delft, 1956) and *Haagse Post*, August 25, September 8, 1956, January 5, 1957.

³²I.N. Diepenhorst, "Het 'Probleem' Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea," *Christelijk Historisch Tijdschrift*, Vol. 6 (1961), pp. 11-19.

³³See e.g. Bernard Verhoeven, *Nieuw Guinea. Vraagstuk van Verantwoordelijkheid* (Amsterdam, 1959).

³⁴F.J.F.M. Duynstee, *Nieuw-Guinea als Schakel tussen Nederland en Indonesië* (Amsterdam, 1961), especially pp. 408-412.

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munists and some other Marxists the official policy of developing West New Guinea to the point of self-determination was but a "mask for colonialism."³⁵ Other leading intellectuals, some of them later associated with the Pacifist Socialist Party, others without formal political affiliation,³⁶ became increasingly active in support of a policy of abandonment of Dutch control.

Of special significance in this constellation of views were the opinions of a dozen or so leading business magnates collectively designated as the "Rijkens group" (a term derived from the name of their principal spokesman, Paul Rijkens). In the informal contacts which, initially with official Dutch approval, the Rijkens group established with several Indonesian officials, including Sukarno and Nasution, the Dutch journalist Willem Oltmans, long connected with Indonesian newspapers, played a major role. The Rijkens group believed that the Dutch policy of retaining West New Guinea would prove disastrous, partially because of the grave danger of war with Indonesia and partially because the aim of Dutch policy, an independent West New Guinea, was deemed wholly unrealistic in view of the territory's undeveloped state. Not until early 1961 were the activities of the Rijkens group reported in the Dutch press; this created a furor because it seemed that the government was permitting highly important questions of state to be influenced by the efforts of individuals who had no official responsibility and whose views, moreover, seemed to run counter to the announced policy of the government. Late in June 1961 the cabinet officially dissociated itself from Rijkens' compromise efforts, and on the following August 15 Rijkens announced that on the advice of the government he was breaking off further talks with Indonesian leaders.

But the views of the Rijkens group continued to find much sympathy in the Dutch business world because they reflected an important new dynamic factor in Dutch politics and, therefore, in the West New Guinea dispute. This dynamic factor was inherent in the reorientation of the Dutch political and economic community toward the European Common Market and the growing political ties among the six members. This reorientation, not unlike De Gaulle's policies, required the resolute abandonment

³⁵A. Averink, "Zelfbeschikkingsrecht als camouflage voor kolonisatie," *Politiek en Cultuur*, September 1961, pp. 390-399.

³⁶A representative figure of this group was the leading Dutch legal scholar Professor B. V. A. Röling, of the University of Groningen. See the extended interview of Röling in *Haagse Post*, July 14, 1962. See also A. Teeuw, *Het Conflict met Indonesië als Spiegel voor Nederland* (The Hague, Bandung, 1956).

of every vestige of even the image of colonialism. Viewed in this new perspective, West New Guinea was to Holland what Algeria had been to France, an historic anachronism and a costly impediment to the process of integration in the developing West European community. This, and not the hope of reestablishing Dutch economic interests in Indonesia,³⁷ principally motivated Dutch big business in urging a compromise with Indonesia and the abandonment of West New Guinea. Moreover, the pressures allegedly exerted by the U.S. on the Netherlands during March 1962 to come to an accord with Indonesia, and subsequently the feeling of having been "betrayed" by the U.S. in the West New Guinea dispute that one can discern in the pronouncements of Dutch political leaders following the August 15, 1962 settlement, also strengthened the conviction in many quarters that only through a "Gaullist" kind of European community could Holland have a new future. The United States obviously could not be trusted. The following press comment in the leading West New Guinea daily is indicative:³⁸

Everywhere one certainly knows the figure of Sukarno, who has never kept his word, not even toward his own people, but precisely because . . . Dutch cabinet ministers crawled in the dust before such an individual this will have cost us the last vestige of respect in the world.

This applies equally to the U.S. and President Kennedy. They will soon enough discover in Latin America how this affair has also harmed their prestige, although that does not help us. Above all one shouldn't forget that Washington has betrayed us now, just as it will also some time, perhaps not far in the future, throw the whole of Europe to the wolves.

The only man who completely understands this is De Gaulle. . . . He

³⁷At the close of 1961 an interview with various Dutch business leaders, on their expectations respecting the possibility of a new "normalized" contact with Indonesia, indicated uncertainty and little hope of a reopening of economic opportunities for the Dutch in Indonesia. *Haagse Post*, December 16, 1961. At the end of July 1962, Indonesia's Minister for Basic Industry announced that whatever the outcome of the West New Guinea dispute, the former Dutch enterprises expropriated by Indonesia would "never be returned to the Dutch." *Indonesian Observer*, July 30, 1962. Early in September 1962, shortly after the Dutch-Indonesian settlement was signed, Antara news agency reported from Djakarta that "the government of Indonesia does not consider immediate resumption of economic relations with the Netherlands as urgent" and that in view of Dutch participation in the European Common Market Indonesia had "a reserved attitude" toward establishment of Dutch-Indonesian trade relations. *ADNB*, September 7, 1962. It should also be noted that the severance of ties with Indonesia has meant little or no long-range economic damage to the Netherlands and that even before it came to a complete rupture of Dutch-Indonesian relations at the close of 1957 over the West New Guinea dispute, Dutch capital had rapidly begun to move out of Indonesia. Cf. Wytze Gorter, "Enkele gedachten over de Economische Betekenis van het Verlies van Indonesië," *De Economist*, October 1960, pp. 641-658.

³⁸*NGK*, August 21, 1962.

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realizes that the Russians are winning the Cold War, not because they are strong but because the Americans don't understand things.

The only thing that can still save us is De Gaulle's solution of a united "Europe of Fatherlands," a European confederation, but in any event without England. This confederation should arm itself to the teeth, but for the rest declare itself neutral in the Russian-American duel.

IV

By the close of the 1950's official Dutch policy pronouncements that the "purpose of the Dutch government" remained that of allowing the inhabitants of West New Guinea to go through "as quickly as possible" the various stages of development, culminating in "their free choice about their future place in the world,"³⁹ could no longer hide the uncertainties and vacillations of day-to-day policy decisions. The effects of the Indonesian confrontation policy and the disunity in the Dutch body politic on the New Guinea question, even in the ranks of government parties, were increasingly felt. In view of Indonesia's aggressive tone, arms buildup and accelerating infiltration, the need for a strengthening of Dutch defenses in the territory also became more pressing. But it was soon evident that the government seemed reluctant to take the necessary measures for fear of domestic repercussions and heightening international tensions. When, on March 30, 1960, the government announced it was sending the aircraft carrier "Karel Doorman," accompanied by smaller vessels, to West New Guinea in order to "show the flag," the opposition to this move in the Dutch Parliament, e.g. from Labor quarters, was exceeded only by the furor in Indonesia. There the "Doorman" affair was in effect given as justification for the rupture, during the following August, of the few remaining diplomatic relations between Holland and Indonesia, and the Indonesian press erupted in a flood of heated accusations.⁴⁰ Yet, at the same time, the government continued to reject any comprehensive plan to bring West New Guinea to a state of adequate military preparedness, partly because of the cost of such a plan and also because of the government's conviction that the United Nations would not tolerate any Indonesian aggression.

The "Doorman" affair raised the question of the extent to

³⁹*Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer*, Vol. 2, 1959-1960 session, April 5, 1960, p. 2465.

⁴⁰Perhaps typical of the embittered Indonesian press reaction was the assertion of *Bintang Minggu* (Djakarta), September 4, 1960, that the "Doorman" was scheduled to pick up U.S. arms in Yokohama during its visit to Japan. The weapons would be used in West New Guinea.

which various governments, particularly the U.S. and Australia, were prepared to deter Indonesia from launching a full-scale attack. In May 1960, Dutch Defense Minister Visser stated that his government "could count" and did count on foreign assistance in the event of such an attack. Another uproar followed. Critics of the government alleged that Holland's "inflexible" West New Guinea policy now rested on foreign militarism, and searching Indonesian queries were addressed to the U.S. State Department. In the end Visser rather ignominiously closed the matter by having the words "could count" deleted from the official parliamentary record.⁴¹ On September 7, 1962, after the Dutch-Indonesian settlement, Foreign Minister Joseph Luns complained in the Dutch lower house that although former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had promised the Dutch aid in the event of an armed Indonesian attack and the Kennedy Administration had said it had not altered the U.S. position, it became increasingly clear that Holland could no longer count on American help.

In view of this domestic opposition, the cabinet of Premier Jan de Quay, whose principal base of support was the Catholic People's Party, began in the course of 1960 to move in a direction favored by many in the Labor opposition, namely, toward "an internationalization" of the conflict by seeking to place the territory under UN control. On October 4, 1960, Luns, speaking in the UN General Assembly, declared that his government was prepared to submit its West New Guinea policies "to the continuous scrutiny and judgment of the United Nations," and by January 6, 1961, the Dutch press reported that De Quay had with great emphasis renewed an invitation to UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld—originally extended in June 1960—to send a personal observer to West New Guinea to investigate conditions.⁴² The culmination of this policy—it was to be the De Quay cabinet's last trump card—came on September 26, 1961, when Luns proposed to the UN General Assembly the following plan for West New Guinea:⁴³

1. The Netherlands is ready to bring the administration of West New Guinea under the supervision of the United Nations and is ready to accept a UN guarantee of the right to self-determination of its inhabitants.

⁴¹*Haagsch Dagblad* (The Hague), May 14, 1960.

⁴²*Persdocumentatie*, January 6, 9, 1961.

⁴³"New Dutch Proposals Regarding Netherlands New Guinea," *Netherlands Information Service release* (New York), September 28, 1961, carries the complete text of the plan.

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2. To that end the Netherlands is ready to relinquish sovereignty to the people of West New Guinea.
3. In executing the above the Netherlands is ready to transfer its present powers to an international authority under the UN which would prepare the population for self-determination.
4. The Dutch government is ready to continue its financial assistance, amounting to \$30 million a year to the territory, without any strings attached.

In elaborating on these proposals, Luns declared that the Papuan population would be allowed to choose either (1) to join Indonesia, (2) complete independence, or (3) union with East New Guinea or adjacent islands; he also proposed the sending of a UN fact-finding commission to the territory. Indonesia immediately voiced its objection to the plan, and two substitute proposals were advanced: one by India, merely calling for direct Dutch-Indonesian negotiations under the President of the General Assembly, the other by the so-called "Brazzaville" countries and Togo, which stressed the principle of self-determination and urged resumption of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations under the good offices of the UN Secretary-General.

In the voting on November 27, 1961, however, neither the Indian nor the Brazzaville resolution acquired the necessary two-thirds majority; this would have decisive significance for the development of the dispute.⁴⁴ Although the Netherlands could boast that the U.S. had publicly associated itself during the debates with the Dutch policy of Papuan self-determination, the U.S. had also declared that the Dutch proposal did not "sufficiently recognize the intense Indonesian interest" in the disputed area.⁴⁵ Again, although the Dutch could claim that a considerable number of African states also supported the self-determination proposal and that Indonesia's position, as reflected in the Indian proposal, had obtained only one more vote compared to 1957 when the UN, with a much smaller membership, had last occupied itself with

⁴⁴The results of the voting on the Indian resolution were: 41 countries for, 40 against, 20 abstentions; on the Brazzaville resolution the results were: 53 for, 41 against, 9 abstentions. Indonesia backed the Indian resolution and opposed the Brazzaville proposal; the Dutch position was just the reverse. The U.S. supported the Brazzaville resolution, opposed the Indian.

⁴⁵On November 22, 1961, the U.S. representative, Jonathan Bingham, lauded the Dutch proposal as "imaginative and constructive," and supported the principle of Papuan self-determination, but also declared that Indonesia's claim on West New Guinea should not be ignored and that under an impartial UN administration, as envisaged by the Dutch proposal, "Indonesia would have access to the area." "U.S. Delegation Statement on New Guinea Question," *Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations release* (New York), November 24, 1961.

the question, the fact remained that the UN had not endorsed the Dutch idea; indeed, the Dutch, by demanding "internationalization" of the question, had in effect sanctioned the intrusion of new and unpredictable forces into the dispute.

Almost at once there arose a new wave of belligerence and war fever in Indonesia. On December 12, 1961, a new National Defense Council was formed—"in view of the mounting tension," as Sukarno put it—and in subsequent days Indonesia's President delivered increasingly warlike addresses to his nation, asserting that "the only language which is understood by the Dutch imperialists is force."⁴⁶ This campaign of belligerence culminated on December 19, 1961 in Sukarno's "Triple Command" to his nation: the raising of the Indonesian red-and-white on "Irian soil," the prevention of the creation of an independent West New Guinea state, and the mobilization of the nation to recover the disputed territory by force if necessary. In the early weeks of 1962 progressive mobilization was carried out and on January 15 Indonesia launched its ill-fated motor-torpedo boat invasion. The United Nations, having failed to take a clear stand in this dispute, as well as in the Indian attack on Goa (which almost coincided with the issuance of Sukarno's "Triple Command"), was certainly not disposed to intervene against Indonesia's increasing military pressure.

V

If these developments had the effect of further jeopardizing the existing order in West New Guinea there was little evidence of it in Papuan circles; indeed, one Hollandia daily, commenting on the mobilization in East Indonesia of men and women between sixteen and forty-five, jibed: "Do we have to become alarmed over what female military troops past the age forty can do to us?"⁴⁷ Perhaps one reason for this confidence was the continuing and noteworthy upsurge in Papuan political activity and national self-awareness. On October 19, 1961, a newly formed "National Committee" of about sixty Papuan leaders issued a "manifesto," expressing the desire of the Papuan people for their own place among the nations; with the approval of the Dutch, they proclaimed a new national flag for the territory, and a national anthem, motto and name, i.e. "Papua Barat" (West Papua), so that, as one of the committee members put it, "the world can be

⁴⁶*Indonesian Observer*, December 15, 1961.

⁴⁷*NGK*, January 6, 1962.

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convinced that the will of the Papuan people is not something mouthed on Dutch or someone else's instructions, but is as pure as we feel it to be."⁴⁸

During January and February 1962, the New Guinea Council adopted a series of resolutions, in most cases unanimously, demanding self-government for West New Guinea by 1970, Papuan participation in all future discussions between Holland and Indonesia, and the sending of a UN commission to determine Papuan wishes. The anti-Indonesian temper mounted, too. In January 1962, several thousands demonstrated in Manokwari to the accompaniment of drumbands and cries of "Away with Sukarno" and "Death to the Indonesians." The next month it was Fak-Fak's turn, and here demonstrations featured banners reading "West Papua for the Papuans." On April 16, 1962, when it became clear that American pressure on the Netherlands was making a transfer of the territory to Indonesia imminent, thirty-three Papuan leaders wired President Kennedy that "We Papuans are not Indonesians" and that "forced participation in Indonesian administration would be equivalent to a slave trade carried on by members of the United Nations."

Critics of the West New Guinea policy of the Netherlands tended to see all these developments as wholly unrealistic and as encouraging the Papuans to entertain expectations which the Netherlands would be powerless to help them to realize. But Papuan leaders appear to have been aware of the disunity in Dutch public opinion and of the uncertainty that powers like the U.S. would protect Papuan self-determination by force if necessary. Therefore, after the interest shown in Papuan self-determination by the Brazzaville group of African states at the UN, a number of Papuan leaders sought closer contact with these states. Early in April 1962 Frédéric Guirma and Maxim Zollner, respectively permanent representative of the Upper Volta Republic to the UN and the official observer for Dahomey at the UN, visited West New Guinea. After returning to the UN, Guirma voiced his support of Dutch policy and termed Indonesia's claim to the territory "very weak." Meanwhile the Papuan National Committee, on March 19, 1962, addressed an appeal to all "fellow Negroids" throughout the world to "use your influence to persuade the United Nations Organization that this menace of the Republic of Indonesia will be put to a stop." The Committee sent these

⁴⁸*De Tifa* (Hollandia), October 28, 1961.

appeals to Negro magazines and newspapers throughout the world, stressing the Papuan's racial identity with the African. In Denver, Colorado, a "New African League" was formed in support of Papuan aspirations, and its director, a West African student, composed the following verse which gained some popularity in West New Guinea:⁴⁹

DUTCH NEW GUINEA IS NEW AFRICA

O Virgin Island in the East—
New Guinea, land of sun and rain
Our Negroid people have increased
As those of African domain.

We have the same high right as they—
The right to live and grow and be
A people proud, in our own way
To forge our noble destiny.

The Netherlands will be our guide
Our friend for all the world to see
Till we shall raise our flag with pride
NEW AFRICA—we shall be free!

Pro-Indonesian sentiments, though of minor importance compared to the predominance of Papuan nationalism, have not been altogether lacking in West New Guinea. Along the southwest coast of the territory groups of East Indonesians long domiciled there have had some influence on the surrounding Papuan population. In January 1962, when the Dutch State Secretary for New Guinea, Theo Bot, visited Fak-Fak, members of the pro-Indonesian "West New Guinea People's Movement" (*Gerakan Rakjat Irian Barat*—GRIB) demonstrated before him, carrying signs urging union with Indonesia and incidentally giving the lie to the not infrequently heard charge that "To be anti-Indonesian is a condition of political participation in West New Guinea."⁵⁰

Even before the Indonesian invasion attempt on January 15, 1962, Dutch Premier de Quay had expressed a willingness to open new discussions without prior Indonesian acceptance of the

⁴⁹*Voice of the Negroids in the Pacific to the Negroids throughout the World* (*sine loco*, 1962), p. 3.

⁵⁰L. P. Singh, "Bases of Indonesia's Claim to West New Guinea," *The Australian Quarterly*, March 1962, p. 14. On April 14, 1961, the Dutch government declared that no obstacle would be placed in the path of a political movement in West New Guinea seeking peaceably to effect a union with Indonesia.

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principle of self-determination, although De Quay added that this willingness did not affect the Dutch view that the interests of the Papuans should be considered paramount. Indonesia rejected De Quay's offer on the grounds that the Dutch evidently were not prepared to abandon the principle of Papuan self-determination. It was at this inauspicious moment that the U.S. developed a new initiative. During his world tour, U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy stopped off at Djakarta and The Hague and apparently persuaded Dutch and Indonesian government leaders to participate in an informal conference to see if a compromise was possible. In a television interview on March 4, 1962, shortly after his return to the U.S., Robert Kennedy indicated support for the Indonesian position and rather severely criticized Dutch policy, particularly the Dutch educational effort in West New Guinea. This brought sharp reactions in the Netherlands and a protest telegram from Papuan leaders in West New Guinea to President Kennedy declaring that "Robert Kennedy should be ashamed of himself."⁵¹ There were many other Papuan protests. In retrospect, the U.S. attorney general's television remarks were perhaps the first unequivocal indication that Washington meant to exert increasing pressure on The Hague in the coming months. On March 20, 1962, Dutch and Indonesian representatives met near Washington, D.C., in the presence of a "third party," Ellsworth Bunker, former U.S. ambassador to Italy and India. His services had been offered to the UN by the U.S. and he became the Kennedy Administration's unofficial "presence" at the talks.

Increased mediation activity by Bunker and U Thant, backed by personal appeals of President Kennedy to Sukarno and De Quay, gradually produced the outlines of a compromise solution, attributed at one time to U Thant, then again to the Tanganyika delegation at the UN, but in fact the work of Bunker. The solution envisaged a two-year interim period to complete the transfer of Dutch authority to Indonesia; during the first year UN officials (non-Dutch and non-Indonesian) would replace the Dutch officials, and during the second year Indonesian officials would gradually take over, so that by the end of the second year Indonesia would have assumed complete authority. Indonesia would agree to make arrangements for "an exercise" of Papuan "freedom of choice," following an indefinite period of years (perhaps as many

⁵¹NGK, March 7, 1962.

as ten years).⁵² On April 9 the Indonesians announced their acceptance "in principle" of this solution, although in the coming months Sukarno would warn repeatedly that this acceptance did not include the two-year interim period, maintaining that "before the cock crows on January 1, 1963 West New Guinea would be Indonesian."⁵³ In West New Guinea, meanwhile, the report of the Bunker proposal led to immediate and sharp protests; Papuan leaders, in telegrams to President Kennedy and Premier De Quay, expressed their strong opposition to any proposal for Indonesian administration over the territory.⁵⁴ The Bunker proposals became known in West New Guinea as the "Bongkar" plan (from the Indonesian word meaning "to burglarize" or "to break in").

The De Quay Government considered the original version of the Bunker proposal inadequate because of the absence of guarantees for the Papuan; at the request of the Dutch, Bunker added a sentence explicitly recognizing Papuan self-determination and other rights. But by early April the Dutch seemed ready to accept an Indonesian takeover, regardless of Papuan reaction. On February 16, the West New Guinea Council had passed a resolution categorically rejecting any administration by Indonesia, but on April 5 both De Quay and Luns, in separate addresses to the lower house, declared that the Papuans could not force the Dutch to remain in the territory and that the government was not "a priori opposed to transfer of administration to whomever."

In the Dutch cabinet, however, a few voices were still raised against a hasty or full endorsement of the proposals. Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, in particular, seemed to believe that the Dutch should avoid any outright commitment to a resumption of negotiations on the relatively narrow basis of the Bunker plan; he was reported to favor a more flexible and "open" approach, in which any question might be raised during negotiations. This

⁵²For the text of the Bunker proposals see *ADNB*, May 29, 1962. Early in March 1962, the Agence France Presse correspondent in Djakarta reported that as a result of the conversations between Sukarno and Robert F. Kennedy during the latter's visit in Indonesia the previous month, Indonesia had agreed to give West New Guinea a chance at self-determination five years after a formal sovereignty transfer from the Netherlands to Indonesia had taken place, and that during the five-year Indonesian control period Dutch officials would be retained. *NGK*, March 5, 1962. There has, thus far, been no confirmation of this report, but if true, it would suggest that some key parts of the Bunker proposals might have originated from the Indonesian side.

⁵³*ADNB*, April 12, May 22, August 23, 1962.

⁵⁴*NGK*, April 11, 16, 1962.

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strategy was based, according to certain informed circles,⁵⁵ on Luns' conviction that the political and especially the economic situation in Indonesia would deteriorate so rapidly in the near future as to produce important changes in Indonesia's West New Guinea policy. Hence protracted discussions, i.e., discussions based on an "open" agenda, which might prolong the talks indefinitely or cause them to break down and thus buy the Dutch and the Papuans more time, seemed the wiser course. Moreover, a stiffening of Dutch policy appeared justified in any case, because Indonesian paratroops had been dropped near Fak-Fak on April 27 and on May 15, and West New Guinea airspace was repeatedly violated by Indonesian planes. At the NATO conference in Athens, between May 3 and May 7, 1962, Luns and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reportedly reached an agreement that during the future Dutch-Indonesian conference "all aspects of the Bunker plan and problems connected with it" would be discussed. At the same time, however, Luns was assuring parliament that the government did not a priori oppose a transfer of sovereignty "to anybody."

But the tension generated by the Indonesian paratroop drops seemed to make Luns' "protracted strategy" obsolete before it could be put to the test. In various parliamentary circles, particularly in the Labor opposition, there was concern that Dutch aloofness would provoke Indonesia to still more aggressive action; it was also believed that the U.S. regarded the Bunker plan as the best the Dutch could hope for and that further reluctance would force the U.S. to adopt a policy of open opposition to the Dutch. Moreover, Indonesia was exploiting Dutch procrastination, contrasting this with its own ready acceptance "in principle" of the Bunker program. During a stormy parliamentary session on the night of May 25 Luns' strategy went down to defeat. De Quay declared that there was no major difference between the revised Bunker plan and the Luns-Rusk formula; thus his government was prepared unequivocally to resume negotiations "on the basis" of the Bunker proposals. On May 26 the UN Secretary-General was so informed. This was the final turning point in the dispute.

Indonesia, probably realizing that victory was within its grasp, now began skillfully to procrastinate. Suspicions about Luns' policy and the reluctance of the Dutch cabinet to accept negotia-

⁵⁵Information on this point was received by the author from an official in the New Guinea section of the Interior Affairs Ministry of the Netherlands, whose name cannot be disclosed.

tions on the basis of the Bunker proposals seemed to justify the new Indonesian demands for "clarification." Though promptly informed by U Thant of Dutch readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Bunker proposals, Sukarno on May 31 declared that the Dutch still had not shown "a clear and firm attitude toward the Bunker plan," and Foreign Minister Subandrio subsequently justified further paratroop drops because of Dutch reluctance. On June 5, Sukarno, writing to U Thant, explained that "we have to step up our military activities" because of the Dutch defense buildup in New Guinea, but he affirmed that the Indonesian government still hoped for a settlement on the basis of the Bunker proposals. Sukarno was also of the opinion that Indonesian acceptance "in principle" of the Bunker proposals and Dutch agreement to a resumption of negotiations "on the basis" of the proposals suggested a significant policy difference. Although on June 5 U Thant had declared that he could not see any real distinction between the two formulas, on June 8 Sukarno was still complaining that there had been "no positive and clear statement from the Netherlands" about an acceptance of the Bunker proposals.⁵⁶

As Sukarno pursued his policy of procrastination, the foreign press reported that U.S. pressure on the Netherlands was mounting.⁵⁷ Contrary to U Thant's assertion, there was a fundamental difference between an acceptance of the Bunker proposals as the "basis" for discussion and an acceptance "in principle." Few knew this better than the members of the De Quay cabinet. Acceptance as a "basis" could still be interpreted as permitting a relatively "open ended discussion" that might range—and break down—over many tangential issues, whereas acceptance "in principle" meant, in effect, that West New Guinea in one way or another would come under Indonesian control. As early as May 28 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio asserted that Dutch acceptance of the Bunker proposal would mean "that West New Guinea has already been returned to Indonesia." The Dutch position placed a new burden on the mediation efforts of U Thant, for, as one noted Dutch commentator pointed out, in the end it seemed to be the UN Secretary-General who was the chief defender of the view that the Netherlands had also accepted the Bunker proposals "in principle." Meanwhile, although the De Quay cabinet came under increasing parliamentary and international diplomatic pressures to endorse the Bunker proposals, the cabinet's

⁵⁶ *ADNB*, June 1, 5, 6, 11, 1962.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, June 12, 1962.

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seeming resistance suggested that Luns might yet try to "sabotage" the Bunker plan.⁵⁸

On June 17 U Thant announced Dutch acceptance of the Bunker proposal "in principle"; Subandrio's immediate reply was that Indonesia would now first compare the Dutch and the Indonesian acceptances "in principle" with each other. On June 20 Sukarno cabled U Thant that he still was not satisfied with the Dutch position, and that acceptance of the Bunker proposals "in principle," as announced by the Dutch to U Thant "should stipulate the sequence of actions constituting the solution of the West Irian problem. This means that the free choice for the West Irian people will be executed after transfer of administration." U Thant replied the same day, stating that the Netherlands had signified, "without any qualification or reservation," acceptance of "the principle of the phased operations" of the Bunker proposals (i.e. the sequence of UN control, then transfer to Indonesian control, and ultimately the Papuan act of free choice).

But Sukarno was still not satisfied. On June 27 he wired U Thant that there still had been no official Dutch confirmation of U Thant's view that they had accepted the "phased operation" envisaged in the Bunker proposal; on the contrary, Sukarno alleged, on June 25 the Dutch State Secretary for New Guinea Affairs had been quoted as having said only that the Netherlands government was prepared to talk about the Bunker plan without any reservations. What the Dutch State Secretary had in fact said, then and earlier, was to become an added point of contention, but on June 28 U Thant replied to Sukarno saying that he had received from the Dutch delegate to the UN a statement that "the Netherlands Government confirms once more that . . . it accepts the sequence of events as laid down in the Bunker proposals on condition that it will receive, equally in accordance with the Bunker proposals, adequate conditions and guarantees for the rights and interests of the Papuans." U Thant also notified Sukarno that the statement of June 25 attributed to the Dutch State Secretary for New Guinea Affairs had not been made and that no other Dutch government authority had made such a statement.

Sukarno now expressed himself sufficiently satisfied, and on July 12 at the Huntlands estate near Middleburg, Virginia, the Dutch-Indonesian talks resumed in the presence of U.S. mediator Bunker. Although a successful conclusion was reached about a

⁵⁸G. B. J. Hiltermann, "Den Haag onder Druk," *Haagse Post*, July 14, 1962.

month later, another impasse threatened on July 26, 1962 when Indonesia demanded a much faster transfer of West New Guinea than the two-year period envisaged by the Bunker proposals. Reportedly, strong U.S. pressure on the Dutch broke the deadlock, and the Dutch gave in to the Indonesian demand in return for explicit guarantees of Papuan rights. Agreement was reached on August 15 and was followed by the approval of the Indonesian Parliament (September 1) and the New Guinea Council (September 1), although it is noteworthy that of the 28 members of the latter body only 14 voted, 12 for and 2 against; the rest either abstained or were absent. The Dutch lower house voted favorably, 127 to 9,⁵⁹ on September 8, and the less important upper house followed suit.

On September 21, the UN General Assembly approved the agreement, 84 for, none against, but with 14 abstentions, the latter largely from the "Brazzaville" group of nations. Maxim Zollner of Dahomey and Andrei Akakpo of Togo both termed the agreement "unsatisfactory" because in their view the document lacked sufficient guarantees for the full exercise of Papuan self-determination. At the UN Indonesia's Subandrio expressed "the sincere aim" of the Indonesian people to "start" as quickly as possible with the development of West New Guinea, so that its inhabitants could soon be "emancipated with the social conditions" of the inhabitants of other parts of Indonesia. The Dutch UN delegate, C. W. Schürmann was less sanguine: "It was with heavy heart" that the Dutch government agreed to the transfer to Indonesia "on the best conditions obtainable for the Papuan population," he said. Schürmann was at pains to emphasize that the Dutch had yielded not just because of the threat of war, but also because the UN seemed powerless to eliminate that threat of war: "The Netherlands Government regrets that in this instance no effective remedy was to be found against the use of force contrary to the obligations of States under the Charter of the United Nations."⁶⁰

One final aspect of the last stages of Dutch-Indonesian discussions should be mentioned in the context of Schürmann's charge that the UN was unable to prevent the use of force in the West

⁵⁹Three members of the Catholic People's Party, the principal government party, voted against the agreement, as did a single Labor deputy, whose party generally approved. The rest of the nays came from smaller Protestant groups.

⁶⁰ADNB, September 25, 1962 and "Statement by Ambassador C. W. A. Schürmann in the General Assembly on September 21, 1962," *Netherlands Delegation to the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly release* (New York, mimeo.).

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New Guinea dispute. That aspect was the accelerating Indonesian military campaign against West New Guinea throughout the delicate period of U Thant's mediation efforts in June and July, and even during and after the Huntlands conference. On June 23 new Indonesian paratroop units landed at Merauke; on July 3 Indonesian bombers violated the air space over Kaimana; on July 18 some thirty Indonesian military infiltrators, using sail and motor vessels, landed near Sausapor; on August 11, the West New Guinea government information service made it known that during the night of August 7-8 a group of 50 Indonesian troops had landed on Was Island, and that on the following night a second group had landed on Misool Island; on August 13 six Indonesian planes dropped several hundred paratroops around Merauke; on August 21 about 30 Indonesian military infiltrators were reported to have landed with rubber boats near Tanah Merah Bay—nearly a week after the signing of the Dutch-Indonesian agreement.⁶¹ Despite a Dutch protest to the UN, Indonesian military infiltrations continued; indeed, given U Thant's reaction to an earlier Dutch protest,⁶² Indonesia could not but feel emboldened to continue the infiltrations.

The objectives of these new infiltrations were soon apparent. For one thing, Indonesia hoped to force concessions because of the growing numbers of her military forces in the territory: toward the close of July during the Huntlands conference it was reported, for example, that Indonesia demanded a considerable shortening of the period of UN interim administration envisaged by the Bunker plan because, the Indonesians argued, "a new factor" had entered the West New Guinea crisis—the growing

⁶¹NGK, June 25, July 3, 20, August 11, 14, 25, 1962.

⁶²On May 16, 1962 Dutch Premier de Quay protested to U Thant regarding repeated recent Indonesian paratroop drops near Fak-Fak, appealing to the UN Secretary-General to "exhort" Indonesia to refrain from all aggressive action and to remind her of her obligations under the UN Charter. On May 22, 1962, U Thant made public his reply to De Quay, stating: "Your suggestion that I now approach the Government of Indonesia with an appeal, would, if accepted by me, imply that I was taking sides in the controversy, which I believe would not be in the best interest of all concerned." U Thant regarded it therefore as "appropriate" to appeal "both to your Government and that of the Republic of Indonesia" to refrain from aggression.

It has been Indonesia's position that landings by Indonesians in West New Guinea could not be constituted as unlawful because the territory is Indonesian and that "colonialism" itself constitutes aggression, hence the Dutch are the real culprits. U Thant's position, however, motivated by the desire to be impartial, could not but encourage Indonesia. "Letter to U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant from the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, J. P. de Quay," *Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations release* (New York, mimeo.), and ADNB, May 24, 1962.

number of Indonesian forces on the disputed territory's soil.⁶³ Undoubtedly another objective of the continuing infiltrations, however dubious their real military value, was to prevent a possible Papuan coup d'état facilitated by the unusually quick withdrawal of Dutch forces from West New Guinea as provided for under the August 15 agreement. In this connection the time provisions of the original Bunker proposal and those of the actual August 15 agreement take on added significance. If the original Bunker proposal had been adopted, Indonesia would not have acquired full control until August 1964, instead of May 1963, and a gradual Indonesian takeover from the Dutch under UN auspices would not have begun until August 1963 instead of January 1963. The shortened transfer period of the August 15 settlement could, in view of Papuan hostility toward Indonesia, have set the stage for an anti-Indonesian outburst.

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What implications does the West New Guinea settlement have for the several parties to the dispute? In the Netherlands there has been a significant accentuation of anti-American sentiment. Since 1949 there has been a "revanchist" segment of Dutch opinion, never quite reconciled to the loss of Indonesia and for whom the "focus of all Dutch sentiments of revenge became the New Guinea question."⁶⁴ From this point of view West New Guinea was more or less "betrayed" by an allegedly traitorous clique of industrialists and politicians whose behavior could not but convince Sukarno and the U.S. that the Dutch were unwilling to protect the interests of the Papuan.⁶⁵ While this "stab in the back" theory is far from generally accepted, other less extreme quarters have deplored the mediation of "amateur diplomats" (e.g. the Rijkens group). Disenchantment with the U.S., quite evident in the parliamentary debates on May 25, 1962 and in subsequent debates leading to the ratification of the August 15 agreement, probably has been augmented by the frustrated feeling that the Dutch were forced to "betray" the Papuan; indeed, this disenchantment reached such proportions after the details of the Huntlands settlement became known that an important segment of the Dutch press felt constrained to warn its readers that distrust of the U.S. would, in the long run, undermine the West. From the initial

⁶³NGK, July 27, 1962.

⁶⁴T. van Tijn, "Zelfbeschikken," *De Nieuwe Stem*, February 1962, p. 114.

⁶⁵Representative of this view is H. A. Lunshof, "Het Verraad," *Elseviers Weekblad*, May 26, 1962.

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bitterness and anti-U.S. feeling there has now emerged a broader sentiment in favor of the so-called "Gaullist" view of a consolidated Europe, less dependent upon the United States. Paradoxically, this development is likely to bring a coalescing of the interests of the "amateur diplomats" in the Dutch business community (with their vision of a new Holland in a European community) and of the colonial diehards who, their "revanchism" having taken an anti-U.S. direction, now also seem ready for a similar "Gaullist" concept of Europe.

There has indeed been a re-evaluation of the United States, a shift away from the confidence of the days when the leading Dutch financial daily predicted a growing U.S. realism toward the new nations that would strengthen Holland's hand in West New Guinea.⁶⁶ Accepting and even taking comfort from the inevitable, Dutch opinion now seems mainly interested in safeguarding Dutch economic rights in West New Guinea and in the decisions of the joint Dutch-Indonesian Commission which, according to Article 22 of the August 15 agreement, is "to study the nature" of the Dutch holdings in the territory.

While for Indonesia acquisition of control over West New Guinea has been the realization of a long-hoped-for national objective, the August 15 settlement has also robbed the country of its principal national unifying dynamic.⁶⁷ All the old problems of political instability and economic decline now make themselves felt with redoubled force, and it becomes more difficult to justify lack of economic progress, authoritarianism in government, the postponement of elections, and the drastic curtailment of civil rights. A mitigation of the military emergency has been promised by May 1, 1963, but it remains to be seen to what extent Indonesia's "guided democracy" in the future will allow for political opposition and freedom of the press.

In the meantime, grave economic problems remain as a source of political instability. If the allegations of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns and others are correct, i.e., that the U.S. pressed the Netherlands to come to terms with Indonesia because of American fears that the prolonged West New Guinea crisis was strengthening communism in Indonesia, then U.S. policy may have been based upon an illusion. It is quite true that the Indo-

⁶⁶L. Metzemaekers, "Nieuw Guinea als Toetssteen," *Financieel Dagblad*, May 1, 1957.

⁶⁷J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia After the West New Guinea Settlement," *United Asia*, Vol. 14 (1962), pp. 591-597.

nesian communists and other political groups have lost an important psychopolitical issue with the settlement of the West New Guinea dispute. However, it is the *continuing economic deterioration* of the country that keeps winning recruits for the communists, and communist party strategists recognize this fact. Thus in the spring of 1962 the Indonesian Communist Party's Politburo adopted a resolution condemning "the opinion held by some people that the struggle to liberate Western Irian should take precedence over the needs of the people," since such an attitude "shows a disregard for the sufferings of the people" and an "inability to manage the economy."⁶⁸ The resolution recommended that West Irian's liberation should be carried out jointly with improvements in the people's living conditions, and communists were called upon to promote food production and to urge the government to abandon price increases.

As a result of the August 15 agreement, and the U.S. role in helping to achieve that agreement, a new era of improved U.S.-Indonesian relations is said to have begun.⁶⁹ U.S. aid to Indonesia is being stepped up in line with the recommendations of a U.S. survey of the Indonesian economy carried out in 1961. Nevertheless, additional capital injections will not bring important benefits any more than did those in previous years so long as certain basic and unpopular decisions are not taken to reform the Indonesian economic structure, e.g. tax reform, easing of distribution and marketing controls, pruning of the enormously swollen bureaucracy, a new budget and overseas trade policy, and more safeguards for private foreign capital now reluctant to enter the country.

In West New Guinea Papuan leaders appear to have resigned themselves to the August 15 agreement. The strategy devised by Nico Tanggahma, a New Guinea Council member, seems to have won considerable acceptance in circles which still hope for an eventual independent West Papua state. This strategy envisages a heightening of Papuan political sentiment to resist any Indonesian efforts "to destroy our aspirations" and a subsequent effort to seek freedom through the promise of free political choice.⁷⁰

⁶⁸*World Marxist Review*, May 1962, p. 64.

⁶⁹Indicative is the essay "A New Chapter in U.S.-Indonesian Relations" by Edward D. Sinaga, an Indonesian graduate student and president of the Indonesian Student Association of the United States. This association is largely controlled by the Indonesian government and functions in fact to supervise the Indonesian students in this country. Mr. Sinaga's essay was prepared at the request of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) and was inserted by him into the *Congressional Record*, November 2, 1962.

⁷⁰*NGK*, August 24, 1962.

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personal leadership seniority enjoyed by Mao Tse-tung. In addition, changes in the international geopolitical and technological environment since Stalin's demise have introduced new reasons for policy debates between Moscow and Peking. These debates, in turn, have affected the tactical approaches of the entire international communist movement and its individual parties to the principal conflict with the noncommunist world. Therefore, attempts by Western observers to gain perspective on the implications of the continuing quarrels between the two major communist powers transcend in importance efforts to evaluate the various other past and present conflicts among communists.

Each of the three books under review contributes, in its own way, to a more precise understanding of the complexities of the Moscow-Peking axis.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the most useful of the three volumes is the excellent collection of essays edited by Kurt London. The outgrowth of a symposium held in Japan in September 1960, the book draws together the contributions of scholars from eleven countries. A number of approaches are utilized in their analyses of the divisive and cohesive factors which affect day-by-day relations between Moscow and Peking. Their comparisons include attention to sociology, economics, ideology, agriculture, policies toward Afro-Asia, and other issues which both create conflict and necessitate its resolution. Perhaps the most significant contribu-

tion of the book is an implicit one. It dispels two erroneous myths which, surprisingly, still enjoy far too much credibility in the Free World: (a) that alliances between communist states, unlike their Western counterparts, involve little compromise between incompatible national goals and mutually shared objectives; and (b) that such compromises necessarily lead to an abrogation of the alliance.

In this brief space, it is impossible to discuss in detail all of the arguments presented in the various essays reproduced in *Unity and Contradiction*. Some of those which, by their choice of subject matter, lend themselves most readily to a comparison with the interpretations presented by Donald Zagoria will be examined subsequently.

Other essays in the uniformly excellent collection also furnish essential perspective for an assessment of Sino-Soviet relations. By placing the problem into historical and disciplinary contexts, they complement the more detailed approaches utilized in the works by Hsieh and Zagoria.

Cyril E. Black's discussion of "Political Modernization in Russia and China" traces the historical differences in the two societies and points to the contrast in their comparative stages of development. He concludes that: "In domestic affairs, these differences can be tolerated, and can to a considerable extent be concealed behind a screen of opaque terminology. In foreign affairs, where co-ordination is essential and publicity unavoidable,

the different roads to modernization of Russia and China are more readily apparent." (p. 17.) H. F. Schurmann discusses organizational contrasts in the Chinese communist and Soviet socio-political systems; Masamichi Inoki describes Mao's adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the requirements of China. Other contributors analyze Sino-Soviet policies toward Japan, India, Yugoslavia and North Vietnam; still others examine the economic policies of the two powers. Peter S. H. Tang discusses the effect of territorial issues on the Moscow-Peking relationship. The book concludes with three essays on conflict resolution and its role in the functioning of the Moscow-Peking axis. An epilogue by Kurt London discusses the Sino-Soviet relationship in the context of the gradual evolution of the international communist movement into a unique "socialist commonwealth."

Donald Zagoria applies the technique of content analysis to his detailed study of Sino-Soviet relations between the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in February 1956, and Khrushchev's attack on Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress, in October 1961. In her book, Alice Hsieh carefully traces the evolution of Chinese military doctrine and strategy from 1945 to July 1959. Addenda on the dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, in September 1959, and on Chinese reactions to the Soviet strategic ideas enunciated in Khrushchev's January 14, 1960 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet supplement her text.

Both Hsieh and Zagoria introduce convincing evidence that the Chinese leaders placed greater emphasis on the *military* (as contrasted to the political) significance of the first announced Soviet ICBM test in August 1957 and the subsequent sputnik launchings. Both authors argue that the CPR subsequently asked for—but probably failed to receive—nuclear weapons from the USSR. This rebuff of the junior partner in the alliance—combined with Moscow's reluctance to accept, for purposes of military strategic planning, the Chinese assessment that the balance of military power had shifted decisively to favor the communist bloc—prompted the Chinese military leaders ultimately to adopt what Hsieh aptly has termed a "transitional strategy." Until China could develop her own nuclear weapons, her freedom of action for military and political maneuver vis-à-vis the major Western powers would, of necessity, continue to be limited by her reliance on the Soviet nuclear deterrent shield.

How can the subsequent Chinese decision to revive the Taiwan Straits crisis, in August 1958, be reconciled with the concept of a "transitional strategy?" Hsieh argues that the CPR leaders were motivated primarily by a desire to test the validity of the more cautious Soviet estimate of the East-West military balance. She concludes, quite rightly, that one of the principal effects of the 1958 Taiwan venture was to underscore, to Peking, its military dependence on the USSR. Chinese communist in-

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ability to achieve, in the face of U.S. opposition, even localized military objectives without overt Soviet support was clearly demonstrated.

By contemporary communist definition, "local wars" involve a confrontation with an imperialist power. After the 1958 Taiwan crisis, the CPR seemed to accept the fact that such wars can be waged only at the decision of the Soviet Union. China's acquiescence to such military interdependence, as Hsieh implies, undoubtedly stemmed directly from the lack of an indigenous military capability to pursue any alternative course, at least for the time being.

As part of their "transitional strategy," Hsieh argues, the Chinese communists sought, by such maneuvers as skirmishes along the Indian border in 1959, to keep alive an image of "an independent entity with which both Asia and the West had to deal." (p. 185.)

In discussing China's declared intention to manufacture nuclear weapons eventually, Hsieh expresses valid doubts as to whether, even if China succeeds in developing an indigenous nuclear capability, she ever can overcome the disadvantages of the U.S. and Soviet head start and thereby divest herself of military dependence on the USSR. While Hsieh stresses the concept of Chinese military dependence on the Soviet Union, in my opinion the relationship between the two powers in the military sphere might be more accurately described as *interdependence*. It is the Chinese who have had more current and extensive experience

in the types of warfare best suited to the exploitation of "revolutionary opportunities" in the newly-emergent nations of the underdeveloped world. As Hsieh points out, whatever nuclear capability the CPR may succeed in developing in the foreseeable future—barring considerable Soviet assistance—is likely to lag far behind the achievements of the two principal nuclear powers. As long as this is the case, Chinese freedom of action to wage "local wars"—by communist definition of the term—will continue to require Moscow's approval.

Against this background, that portion of the exchange of polemics between Moscow and Peking since 1956 which has focused on the role of war versus the advantages of "peaceful coexistence" in the nuclear age falls into perspective.

Zagoria is to be commended for emphasizing the ambiguity of Khrushchev's formulation, in his speech to the 20th CPSU Congress, that even while imperialist states continued to exist in the world, war no longer was fatalistically inevitable. As subsequent amplifications by Soviet spokesmen (including Khrushchev's own remarks to the 21st CPSU Congress in 1959) were to demonstrate, the formula was, from the outset, highly conditional. *If* the economic strength of the Soviet Union outstripped that of the West, *if* the economies of the other bloc nations continued to grow stronger, *if* the "peace forces" intensified the struggle to win the world for communism by all means short of all-out nuclear war, and *if* neutralist nations gravitated to-

ward the USSR, this realignment of the international balance of power would create possibilities for eliminating the role of war, even though capitalism continued to exist in part of the world.

Far too frequently, other Western scholars have overlooked this aspect of Khrushchev's "inevitability of war" formulation. I am unable to agree with Boris Meissner's assertion, in his essay in *Unity and Contradiction*, that Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress, "renounced two basic theses of Lenin: the inevitability of war in the imperialist epoch and the use of violence for a communist seizure of power" (p. 136).

Despite the highly conditional nature of Khrushchev's formula on the role of war, by 1959 the Soviet and Chinese leaders were engaged in a tactical debate about the desirability of a *détente* with the West. A compromise on the trade-offs between the role of violence and the application of "peaceful coexistence" tactics in pressing on with the global revolution in the nuclear age seems to have been achieved by the time the Moscow Declaration of December 1960 was promulgated. (These developments are discussed in greatest detail by Zagoria, and are touched upon in several of the essays in *Unity and Contradiction*.)

The question of Sino-Soviet doctrinal differences on the preferred tactics for exploiting "national liberation movements" is discussed in Zagoria's work and in Hugh Seton-Watson's contribution to *Unity and Contradiction*. One can-

not dispute Zagoria's assertion that the CPR and the USSR disagree, to some extent, over when local communists should form—and terminate—temporary alliances with the national bourgeoisie in newly-emergent states. However, his treatment of the problem is somewhat shallow. Chinese and Soviet factions undoubtedly exist in the indigenous communist parties of many underdeveloped nations, and the mass media of the two powers clearly have reflected differences over tactical priorities during such potential "revolutionary situations" as the 1959 uprisings in Iraq. Nevertheless, as Seton-Watson suggests, the communists always have had difficulty in determining how to categorize and deal with the bourgeoisie in any given country at any given time. The Chinese seem now to prefer to support those elements of national revolutionary movements clearly controlled by the local communists. This preference is understandable, since Stalin's policy of supporting the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled united front in 1927 brought the Chinese communist revolutionaries to temporary disaster in their own country. However, as Seton-Watson points out, CPR policy on this point has not been entirely consistent. The Chinese were applying "coexistence" tactics to their relations with Nehru, U Nu and Sukarno even earlier than the USSR (in the case of Nehru, they later reverted to violence). Moreover, they supported the Algerian rebels, not clearly communist-controlled, while Moscow was vacillating between

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denunciation of De Gaulle's suppression of the rebellion and advocacy of a negotiated cease-fire.

The respective positions of Moscow and Peking vis-à-vis the national bourgeoisie in the newly-emergent states over a given period of time raise one key question perhaps more poignantly than any other element of Sino-Soviet foreign policy. Is a division of labor, a bona fide intra-axis dispute, mere indecisiveness, or a combination of these factors the most prevalent characteristic of Moscow's and Peking's relations with the non-communist underdeveloped nations? Seton-Watson suggests a partial answer that might apply to the future, although he is careful to point out that unknown factors are involved. He states that if the Soviet Union ever attains a position as a major trading power, thereby acquiring greater freedom to manipulate its prices according to political—rather than economic—factors, this could have a great impact on the course of future communist exploitation of the national bourgeoisie in underdeveloped areas. I would develop his point a step further. If, meanwhile, the Chinese continue to emphasize, in their approach to the national bourgeoisie, an updated version of the old strategy of support for the "united front from below," a true division of labor in Sino-Soviet policy on the exploitation of the "revolutionary opportunities" inherent in national liberation movements might develop.

Another source of Sino-Soviet differences pertains to divergent

methods for solving their respective domestic problems. Such variances are inherent in the different stages of development which have been achieved by the two nations. In addition to the de-Stalinization issue, differences over agricultural policies became a source of serious controversy in 1957-1958, when the Chinese took increasingly radical steps to accelerate collectivization.

In his essay in *Unity and Contradiction*, Boris Meissner discusses the communes as a manifestation of China's rebellion against Soviet political and social doctrine. He begins by summarizing Soviet theories on the various stages required to accomplish the laborious process of effecting the transition from "building socialism" to "attaining socialism" and thence to "building communism" and the eventual arrival of a "classless society." Meissner then proceeds to argue that the Chinese commune experiment was the climax of a series of deviations from the accepted Soviet ideological pattern. He states: "The conception of the commune was, so to speak, Peking's ideological declaration of independence" (p. 128). Certainly, Mao's ideas were a partial rejection of the traditional concept of phased and gradual advance toward communism. But would the citizens of the USSR, who have been able to obtain a few more consumer goods in recent years, object to a denial by the Chinese regime of material incentives for its own citizens? More important, Khrushchev was highly skeptical of Mao's plan to do away with

material incentives at such an early stage of "building socialism," as he took pains to point out to a "capitalist enemy," Senator Humphrey. If the Soviet leader worried about the impact of Mao's communes on the desires of nations other than the USSR to "build socialism and communism" rapidly, he did not discuss his concern publicly. Still, whether or not the Soviet leader considered that Mao's moves constituted an "ideological declaration of independence" is debatable. Whatever the case, a Chinese retreat was formalized in the resolution on communes adopted on December 10, 1958. This revised policy (a) restored material incentives, (b) downgraded Mao's concept that permanent revolution would continue even after communist seizures of power, and (c) acknowledged that "building socialism" in China would take a long time.

Zagoria, who does not seem to share Meissner's opinion that the December 1958 resolution was intended to be no more than a partial Chinese retreat, fails to mention the subsequent Chinese decision, of April 1960, to accelerate the formation of people's communes in the cities. Meissner argues that this development supports his point that the December 1958 retreat was intended, from the outset, to be a temporary one.

In asserting that "Stalin's only major pronouncement on the agricultural communes [in Russia] occurred in his report to the 17th Party Congress" (p. 118), Zagoria has overlooked two of Stalin's 1930

writings on the subject. Moreover, his allusions to the relationship between Chinese policy on the communes and "Right" and "Left" factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are difficult to follow. What pressures on Mao were being applied meanwhile by the two CCP factions is not spelled out in detail.

An essay by Otto Schiller in *Unity and Contradiction* compares the evolution of Soviet and Chinese agrarian policies. Schiller concludes that recent developments in both nations have weakened still further the individuality and independence of the peasants. His analysis suggests that agriculture is likely to remain one of the most problematic domestic issues for both regimes for a long time, irrespective of how their divergent approaches to a solution of their agrarian difficulties may affect the Moscow-Peking relationship in the future.

Space does not permit a detailed discussion of those portions of Zagoria's work and of *Unity and Contradiction* which deal with such other important questions as the effects on the Sino-Soviet relationship of policy divergencies over methods for dealing with Yugoslavia, Albania and de-Stalinization. Nor has it been possible to trace here the reactions of other communist parties to the various issues that have been raised during the exchange of polemics.

However, those aspects of the Sino-Soviet alliance selected as examples for purposes of this discussion suffice to illustrate the pattern

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which characterizes contemporary relations between Moscow and Peking. The relationship between the two principal communist powers—and, indeed, among the various elements of the entire international movement—has become far more complex since the Soviet monolith began to be replaced by a peculiarly communist type of commonwealth. This more loosely organized revolutionary movement is attempting to adjust important conflicts like that between Moscow and Peking within the framework of ideological and organizational polycentrism. Lacking the military capability and the economic strength to do otherwise, Communist China has, thus far, remained a junior partner of the USSR.

So far, cohesive factors and pragmatic considerations have contained the Sino-Soviet relationship within the bounds of controlled conflict. Barring an act of total irrationality on the part of the leadership in either Peking or Moscow, there is no reason why the two powers cannot continue to contain their differences within the framework of Leninist-Maoist “non-antagonistic contradictions” for the foreseeable future.

THE NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM*

by *R. N. Rosecrance*

The military and scientific correspondents of the *Manchester Guardian* respectively, Leonard

**The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. By Leonard Beaton and John Maddox. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1962. 216 pp. \$5.00.

Beaton and John Maddox, have provided us with a very useful introduction to the problems confronting any nation which may wish to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Their major conclusion: “There is no justification for a mood of resignation born of the impression that nuclear weapons are spreading as inevitably and surely as electric power or any other symbol of modern industrialism” (p. 210) is in welcome contrast to the more breathless predictions of the National Planning Association study of a few years ago which claimed that twelve nations were on the threshold of nuclear weapons and that fourteen others might feasibly create them at some point in the future. The authors provide a needed corrective to the view once formalized by Denis Healey that any nation which has the physical ability to make the bomb will do so. Canada might have built her own nuclear weapons at any time since 1957, but refrained from exercising her option. India, with the most developed nuclear program in Asia, might, according to Beaton and Maddox, produce a bomb within the next two years, and yet has so far accepted political renunciation. In Europe, far from a greater dispersion, there is even the possibility that national nuclear establishments may be reduced or eliminated.

Essentially, there are two reasons for the relatively slow pace thus far of the weapons spread. The first is that nuclear weapons are not equivalent to nuclear capabil-

ity. The costs of a minimum weapons production establishment are not great, nor are they beyond the resources of most industrial countries. As Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, John McCone estimated that the initial cost of facilities which could produce one bomb per year could be as little as \$50 million. Defense, command and control, and delivery capabilities, on the other hand, are likely to be more expensive. In the American and Soviet cases, undoubtedly, the delivery and ancillary expense has been far more than the cost of the bomb itself. Despite the advanced nuclear research that went on in Britain in 1939-42, and the British experience in the American war-time program, the British capability as a whole is now becoming rapidly obsolete. The necessary delivery systems are simply not available at a cost that Britain can easily pay. It is possible, though not certain, that economic factors will also preclude a retaliatory French *force de frappe*, sustained solely by national effort. These examples suggest that new nuclear powers will find it difficult, even impossible, to attain a deterrent status similar to that enjoyed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Secondary nuclear force will not get over the primary deterrent thresholds set by the two nuclear superpowers.

Acceptance of a more minimal capability, the two authors claim, has its problems. Lesser quarrels will be influenced by defense systems available from the two most powerful states. Hence, local wars

in Asia or Africa may also have to meet the standards of a central nuclear confrontation. Since both great powers have presumed interest in retarding the spread, they may be willing to provide purely defensive military capabilities to nullify the possible advantage of an opponent's rudimentary nuclear force.

Secondly, political factors have slowed the spread of weapons even where technical competence has been assured. Canada abjured nuclear weapons as early as 1946 when she had the second operative reactor in the world. Jawaharlal Nehru's criticism of nuclear tests would not accord with an Indian decision to produce the atomic weapon. Canada's middle power status was not deemed consonant with a nuclear force; India's moral status would be similarly jeopardized. An option to produce a bomb is now or will shortly be available to five or six states in addition to the present four nuclear powers, but that is no guarantee that it will be exercised. The spread is not inevitable.

The major merit of the book lies in this, its conclusion. It is an excellent corrective of previous views, and is justified on this count alone. It is, however, an incomplete analysis of a very complicated problem. The implications of the nuclear spread for the stability of international relations are not fully explored. It seems probable that diffusion will increase the probability of local conflict, but it does not follow that this will *necessarily* enhance the risk of central con-

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flict. To the degree that the U.S. and the Soviet Union dissociated themselves from fledgling nuclear states with a penchant for aggression, local war might not raise the prospect of great power thermonuclear involvement. The achievement of truly anonymous nuclear forces (pseudonymous or catalytic capabilities) seems beyond the competence of nations now on the threshold of nuclear status. The destabilizing portents of diffusion will be likely to depend largely on political factors governing patterns of alliance and opposition.

Reactor capabilities in many countries are not the product of indigenous effort. Most power and research reactors are under international or bilateral control, while the knowledge acquired by a national weapons program would depend upon future creation of purely national facilities. Since the transformation of a power program into a weapons program requires a recycling of fuels, it would be difficult to conceal in an international arrangement; it is barely possible that Beaton and Maddox have made the reactor problems look easier than in fact they are.

At the same time the major defect of the book is its emphasis on technological factors. If political factors occasionally further renunciation of a nuclear course, they sometimes mandate it. The British postwar nuclear weapons program began on October 29, 1945, largely on Attlee's retrospective justification: "We had to hold up our position vis-à-vis the Americans." Imponderables such as prestige and

status still command enormous sums and willingness to sacrifice. In this connection it is interesting that major efforts at nuclear diffusion up to the present have been confined within the two great alliances in world politics where the small national force developed could only be redundant of central alliance capability. In the future, nuclear weapons will very probably be developed in the nonbloc environment, even without great power assistance. When this occurs, pairs of enemies are likely to obtain weapons at different times, and the incentives to preempt an opponent's nascent capability will be overwhelming. The two major nuclear powers can influence the symmetry of diffusion, but only by speeding it up. The distinction between defensive and offensive weapons, as we have seen, is not an easy one to make.

Finally, the dispersion of weapons (or the Nth Country Problem) is bound up with questions of psychological disposition. It is probably true that nations in different stages of social and political development are more or less reckless in their use of force on the world stage. For various reasons neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seem to be the most restless spirits in contemporary international politics. The spread of weapons, then, may well extend to more adventurous challengers of the status quo and greatly enhance the dangers of reckless action. The Nth Country Problem may have been overestimated in the past, but it remains unsolved, nonetheless.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE
DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE*

by Laszlo Hadik

The Federal Republic of Germany, no longer content with fulfilling its obligations to NATO by contributing manpower and real estate, is seeking a place in the highest councils of the Alliance. Helmut Schmidt's *Defense or Retaliation*, which is the first comprehensive German contribution to the vast English-language literature on NATO strategy, is both a plea for West Germany's admission to high-level NATO planning councils and an exhortation to West Germans to rise to the occasion.

The plea is unique in that it opposes the idea that a country has to be a member of the Nuclear Club in order to shape Western Europe's defensive and deterrent strategy. The exhortation is unusual, to say the least, in that it clearly espouses causes which are unpopular or touchy in the West German political arena. Essentially, Schmidt's commonsense approach is a plea for the elimination of existing inconsistencies between NATO's avowed goals and its actual capabilities.

The author of this book has been a member of the Federal Parliament and of its Defense Committee since 1953. As such, he has become one of the foremost German experts on questions of defense policy and strategy. He has also had great influence, notwithstand-

ing the fact that he is a member of the opposition Social Democratic Party.

Much of the reasoning behind West Germany's claim to a voice in how Europe shall be defended is commonplace. It includes, of course, the fact that West Germany will be a battlefield (at least initially), the doctrine that NATO forces are to fall back fighting so as to achieve a "pause" before nuclear weapons are introduced, and the widespread anxiety that even an attack disastrous from the German viewpoint might not be regarded as worth the use of strategic nuclear weapons by the United States. Such questions have also been raised by American authors, and Schmidt's familiarity with the vast American literature on the subject allows him to give increased clarity to the fears he expresses.

What Schmidt does not do, however, is to take traditional refuge in the course which favors the proliferation of triggers on NATO's nuclear deterrent. He clearly and emphatically dismisses proposals such as the creation of national nuclear deterrents or of a NATO deterrent in which the have-nots would have equal weight with the U.S. None of these solutions, he says, circumvents the basic dilemma of building a deterrent which may fail and which, if it failed, would be of no defensive utility as far as Europe is concerned.

Schmidt sees NATO as having arrived at an impasse following a ten-year cycle of causes and effects. In order to offset the inferiority of

**Defense or Retaliation, A German View.* By Helmut Schmidt. New York: Praeger, 1962. 264 pp. \$7.00.

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the Free World in conventional power, the doctrine of nuclear retaliation was adopted, leading to a continued neglect of conventional armaments. The resulting imbalance between weapons which were out of proportion to the likely forms of aggression, led to the addition of tactical nuclear weapons rather than to the increase of conventional arms. The gap was filled by fractionalizing nuclear weapons instead of "beefing up" regular forces. The European members of NATO, of course, had to be equipped with and trained to use these nuclear weapons, leading them to a desire for their own tactical nuclear arsenal. When the U.S. denied them such equipment and training, Britain and France elected wastefully to divert resources to create their own potential without American help, instead of bolstering their conventional defense capability.

The irony of this sequence, according to Schmidt, is that national nuclear capabilities have not added one ounce to the credibility of a nuclear deterrent for Europe, for they still only apply to those contingencies which are covered by the U.S. deterrent. Now, as Schmidt sees it, the European members of NATO want to squeeze the last ounce from deterrence and are hiding, ostrich-like, from the reality that with such a strategy Europe is indefensible. "The problem of NATO in Europe is one of creating, not further retaliatory forces, but rather real possibilities of defense."

There are two parts to Schmidt's

suggested solution. The first is to eradicate the notion that tactical nuclear weapons improve the defensibility of Europe either by making up for manpower inferiority or by allowing the use of strategies which favor our side. Schmidt says the arguments against the feasibility of a tactical nuclear defense are of at least equal weight with those that try to justify the present policy. For one thing, the announcement that we would use tactical nuclear weapons from the beginning assures their simultaneous if not prior use by the aggressor. On balance, the aggressor is no more vulnerable to tactical nuclear weapons than is the defender when both have these weapons, and there is always present the great uncertainty of when the conflict might escalate into the extremes of total war. In any case, what may remain a limited nuclear engagement as far as the U.S. is concerned would most certainly be so totally destructive near the battlefield that Europe would not have been defended but destroyed. In view of this, and in view of evidence from repeated NATO exercises in which the territory of Greater Germany has been the target of more than 300 atomic bombs, Schmidt wonders that West Germans have accepted the NATO strategy so complacently.

The present NATO strategy is thought by Schmidt to leave only three choices for the West if deterrence by the threat of retaliation should ever fail. These, along with the possible or probable consequences, are: 1) resistance with conventional weapons, possibly

leading to defeat; 2) no resistance, surely leading to the disintegration of the Alliance and partial conquest of the NATO area; and 3) retaliation with nuclear weapons, very possibly leading to suicide at least for the European members. Schmidt agrees with the view many Americans have expressed, that NATO's present shield forces are too big for a tripwire function and not large enough to provide effective defense except for the smallest and most unlikely conflicts. The more recent concept of a "pause" is also assailed both for reducing the deterrent value of a threat of automatic nuclear response and for suggesting that West German territory will be traded for whatever time it may take NATO to make a strategic decision. Schmidt is emphatic in saying that Germany should not be interested in a strategy which calls either for a liberation of the country after some "final" battle has been won elsewhere, or for a defense structure which is calculated to turn every military conflict automatically into nuclear war.

Militarily, the answer is for Germany and the rest of Europe to field so many divisions equipped with such advanced conventional weapons as to be able to defend Europe at the Iron Curtain. What is more, Schmidt says: "The optimum goal of German defense policy and strategy would therefore be the creation of an armaments structure clearly unsuited for the offensive role yet adequate beyond the shadow of a doubt to defend German territory." Even

as an "ideal" goal, this is a tall order. However, if one thinks of it, as Schmidt does, as the elimination of all inconsistency between the strategy aimed at deterrence and that directed toward actual defense, the suggestion is eminently sensible. The only hitch is that present NATO plans, despite the "Forward Strategy," cannot call for a conventional defense at the Iron Curtain because present NATO posture does not even approximate the capability necessary for such a task. Schmidt does not hesitate to say that such a conventional all-purpose deterrent must be built. Moreover, he suggests that the additional manpower and weapons can be raised in Europe, and particularly in West Germany, if it is convincingly demonstrated that the dilemma of suicidal defense or abject surrender can thus be more surely prevented from arising.

The second part of Schmidt's remedy is to call for a political offensive and a continuing effort to maintain and improve stability in Europe. Not only is this seen as necessary if the development of both halves of Europe is to continue, but also if any permanent solutions are to be achieved. Unfortunately, however, Schmidt's consideration of this most vital concomitant of an adequate military defense is extremely disjointed and treated *ad seriatum* rather than in any integrated fashion.

One of the areas which Schmidt examines with welcome realism is that of arms control. He insists that defense and disarmament

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strategies must interlock, and believes that only when NATO has achieved the kind of all-purpose deterrent called for above will the Soviets "negotiate" seriously on disarmament. In any case, he cautions, the West's disarmament or arms control strategy must be approved by the individual members of NATO and must do justice to their separate interests. It is a measure of Schmidt's optimism that he thinks substantial progress can be made in an area requiring so much imagination and intellectual courage. Moreover, his is an optimism not carried away by wishful thinking nor frustrated by the sterility of approaches which call for a "good example" from the West and can adduce nothing more than blind faith in "humanity's wish for survival" as a guarantee of reciprocation. Although not spelled out in detail, Schmidt's formula provides guidelines for a credible and safe initiative by the West.

Of more immediate interest to Germany is the concept of "disengagement," which receives Schmidt's imaginative attention. The highlights of his short discussion are that disengagement does not necessarily have to be incompatible with military equilibrium in Europe, that the two Germanys would not necessarily have to leave their respective military blocs for some arms-limitation scheme to take place, and that the West's only alternative to the status quo is not some dangerous concession.

Rather surprisingly for such a prominent political figure, Schmidt

does not shy away from Germany's most touchy political question—reunification. He points out that the connection between Germany's defense policy and her reunification policy has been manifest since 1950. Not only does he approve this, but he says that it is inevitable and that the Alliance should take this into account. Unlike disengagement, however, reunification is said to be incompatible with Germany's participation in NATO. Nevertheless, Schmidt says that the defensibility of "free" Europe is a prerequisite for bringing freedom to areas presently under servitude. This must be achieved, he says, through a combination of effective defense, the avoidance of provocation, correct relations with neighbors to the East, and vigorous peaceful competition. Although Schmidt sees the outlook for the sixties as "not a good one" on this score, he is a firm believer in the road he outlines.

One can appreciate the author's efforts to point out the fallacies and inconsistencies of NATO's present strategy and posture, although on this side of the Atlantic we will readily accept German anxieties on this score even while rationalizing our way out of the consequences. However, it is unfortunate that the ideas of greatest significance in Schmidt's book should be relatively neglected. A truism we are all too seldom reminded of is that even a perfect defensive structure will not result in solutions to the European problem or create stability over the long haul if it remains purely pas-

sive. Schmidt gives express recognition to this fact, not only believing but predicting that a "solution" of such problems as Berlin, Germany and Europe will occur on political rather than military battlefields.

The military power necessary to defend Europe will, at the same time, be an adequate power structure for the achievement of political goals. Schmidt recognizes the necessity for a politically useful NATO power structure, but only hints at the potential uses of such power. One such hint is that the temptation to resort to minor aggression, which our present strategy of deterrence still affords the Soviets, will be eliminated. Thus denied one of their favorite weapons—nuclear blackmail—the Soviets might be more easily and more profitably brought to the negotiating table. On the Western side, the removal of many of our present fears will allow much greater flexibility in our diplomacy. As a result of these two effects, the present diplomatic impasse, wherein the actual or imagined national security interests and prestige commitments of the two blocs are incompatible, might be ended.

Given this essential insight, Schmidt's strongest argument for an increase in NATO's conventional force levels could have been the desirable effect of making the East-West struggle more peaceful rather than the very great danger of deterrence failing under the present setup. Moreover, to argue

for the greater political flexibility and effectiveness of NATO (excluding surrender or appeasement) is the logical consequence of pointing out the inconsistencies in NATO strategy. Unfortunately, Schmidt did not go far enough.

Schmidt's plea for a more widespread and more sophisticated study of strategy in West Germany will have an effect before long. West Germany is even now a key member of the Alliance, but it is also the member whose individual national problems most seriously affect NATO's own concerns. It is this same West Germany which, rightly or wrongly, has come to be regarded as among those most obdurately opposed to negotiated changes in the status quo. It seems, therefore, that Germany's greatest contribution to NATO strategy might be to explore and study the consequences and opportunities which can be reaped from the eventual achievement of a defensible Europe, and in this way to assist in achieving this vital objective.

Schmidt is under no illusion that Germany is or will be a great power, nor does he argue that any country besides the U.S. should be the leader of the Alliance, but he does insist that Germany must earn the right to be a judge of the soundness of NATO policies and strategy. If the political wisdom glimpsed in Schmidt's book were to permeate a school of West German political and military strategists, their innovations would be as welcome as their judgment.

Books Received

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Appeasement—Road to War. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Rolton House, 1962. 211 pp. \$3.95.

A strong anti-communist interpretation of the East-West confrontation. Mr. Chamberlin analyzes topics such as appeasement, disarmament, coexistence, summitry, and the Berlin and Far East crises, and then sets forth general policy guidelines for the U.S.

Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. Edited by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 274 pp. \$5.00.

An attempt to devise a scientific study of international relations by applying the technique of decision making to international issues. The authors discuss the various "strategies" for a science in international relations and apply their theories and strategies to a study of the decision of the U.S. to resist aggression in Korea.

Freedom in the Western World. By Herbert J. Muller. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 428 pp. \$8.50.

The second of three projected volumes on the History of Freedom. This study of the growth of freedom in the Western world from the Dark Ages to 1800 follows Professor Muller's first volume, *Freedom in the Ancient World*.

The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time. By Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 189 pp. \$4.00.

An analysis of the problems and prospects for economic development. Mr. Heilbroner, author of several popular accounts of economic history, calls for fuller U.S. support of economic development efforts. However, he warns that this process will not propel backward nations toward democracy and free enterprise systems, but more likely toward authoritarian government and collectivist economics.

A History of the Croatian People. Volume II. By Francis R. Preveden. New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. 240 pp. \$7.50.

This second volume of a projected five-volume history of the Croatian people deals with the history of Croatia and Slavonia from 1397 to 1664, Bosnia and Herzegovina from ancient times to 1669, and Dalmatia from 1403 to 1718.

International Regional Organizations: Constitutional Foundations. Edited by Ruth C. Lawson. New York: Praeger, 1962. 387 pp.

In this collection of the texts of the constitutions of twenty-five regional organizations, the author describes the origin, structure and function of each organization and includes a selective bibliography. Professor Lawson believes that these groups illustrate the growing interdependence of the world although they still demonstrate wide variety in institutions, powers and procedures.

A Primer of Economic Development. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Macmillan, 1962. 210 pp. \$5.00.

The author, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, attempts to describe the complex process called "economic development," and discusses the different techniques and the difficulties involved in the application of this process in countries with different political, social and cultural traditions.

The Revolution in World Politics. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962. 477 pp. \$7.95.

This volume of papers, presented to the 1961 national meeting of the American Political Science Association and to a conference at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, explores the revolutionary political, economic, technological and ideological forces which are reshaping the world. The essays treat topics such as modern protest movements in Britain, France and Japan, the revolutionary movements of Nasser and Castro, Pan-Africanism, Soviet and Communist Chinese foreign policies, bipolarity, international legal order, arms control and world order, economic development, and the military problems of guerrilla warfare and deterrence.

The Secretariat of the United Nations. By Sydney D. Bailey. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962. 113 pp. \$3.50.

The focus of this small volume is the conflict between the idea of an independent UN civil service and the pressures for political representation in the Secretariat. Mr. Bailey, Director of the Quaker United Nations Program and author of *The General Assembly of the United Nations*, examines Khrushchev's motives in denouncing Hammarskjöld's administration of the Secretariat, describes Hammarskjöld's conception of the Secretary-General's role, and appraises the current pressure to hire the UN staff on a geographical basis.

II. MILITARY AFFAIRS, ARMS CONTROL, TECHNOLOGY

American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy. By Robert Gilpin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. 352 pp. \$6.95.

A scholarly inquiry into the politically relevant ideas, attitudes and behavior of those scientists who have influenced the formulation of U.S. nuclear weapons policy since 1945. Gilpin shows that the higher the governmental level at which the scientist advises, the more likely it is that his technical advice cannot be disentangled from his political assumptions and desires.

Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Toward a Synthesis in National Security Policy. By J. David Singer. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962. 279 pp. \$5.50.

A political scientist at the University of Michigan's Mental Health Research Institute relates the problems of deterring war, stabilizing the international military environment, and modifying the arms posture of the leading powers through various forms of disarmament, tension reduction and efforts to exert a beneficent influence upon the adversary's choices.

The Legacy of Hiroshima. By Edward Teller with Allen Brown. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962. 325 pp. \$4.95.

The scientist who is often called "the father of the H-bomb" reflects on Hiroshima, the fall-out scare, nuclear secrecy and disarmament. The author calls for passive defenses for population survival, a second-strike capability, preparedness for limited nuclear war, and the establishment of world government based on freedom and democracy.

The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America. By Melvin Conant. New York: Harper, 1962. 204 pp. \$5.00.

A timely and careful study of the problems of North American defense, the

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issue of nuclear weapons, and related political, economic and military questions in the relations of the two nations.

The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. By S. E. Finer. New York: Praeger, 1962. 268 pp. \$6.50.

An inquiry into the motives and the modes of military intervention in the internal political affairs of countries.

Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. By George Liska. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 301 pp. \$6.00.

A theoretical analysis of the structure and dynamics of alliances, which focuses upon the reasons which bring them into being and the factors which may subsequently affect their cohesion and efficacy or even lead to their gradual dissolution or sudden collapse in times of strain.

The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship. By John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee. New York: Praeger, 1962. 226 pp. \$5.50 (paper, \$1.95).

After tracing the 16-year record of arms negotiations, and analyzing the propaganda, diplomacy, psychological strategy and political purposes of the two sides, the authors call for more adroit "gamesmanship" on the part of U.S. policymakers in the formulation of disarmament and arms control strategy.

The Politics of Western Defense. By F. W. Mulley. New York: Praeger, 1962. 282 pp. \$6.75.

The author, a Labour Member of Parliament who has been Vice President of the Assembly of the Western European Union, analyzes and interrelates the major problems confronting NATO: deterrence, the nature of the Soviet military threat, the kind of forces needed for the local defense of Europe, the political control of nuclear power, negotiations for disarmament and arms control, and the future of NATO institutions.

The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Edited by John J. Johnson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. 427 pp. \$8.50.

Eleven comparative studies of the important role of the military in the underdeveloped countries by experts such as Edward Shils, Lucian W. Pye, Edwin Lieuwen, Guy J. Pauker, Manfred Halpern and James S. Coleman. The contributors explore the political, economic and social attitudes and preferences of the military elites and address themselves to the question why military regimes promote national development and democratic practices in some countries and hamper similar growth in others.

III. UNITED STATES

In Brief Authority. By Francis Biddle. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962. 494 pp. \$5.95.

Francis Biddle, in his second volume of memoirs, writes of his experiences during the Roosevelt years, especially his responsibilities as Attorney General during World War II and as a member of the International Military Tribunal which tried the major German war criminals at Nuremberg.

Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960. By Norman A. Graebner. Princeton: Van Nostrand (An Anvil Original), 1962. 191 pp. \$1.45 (paper).

A brief survey of the major policies pursued by the U.S. in the post-World War II period. The text is supplemented by twelve important speeches and articles by American and foreign statesmen.

Fulbright of Arkansas: The Public Positions of a Private Thinker. Edited by Karl E. Meyer. Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1963. 279 pp. \$5.50.

Karl Meyer, editorial writer for the *Washington Post*, traces the development of Senator Fulbright's thinking on world affairs, as revealed in his speeches, letters and papers. The material includes his early and continuing support for the UN; his views on Senator McCarthy, China, Berlin, the "radical right," nuclear weapons, civilian control of the military, and desegregation in the South; and his private memorandum to President Kennedy in which he opposed the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion.

John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal. By Richard Goold-Adams. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962. 309 pp. \$5.50.

An examination of the late U.S. Secretary of State as a man and as the chief architect of U.S. foreign policy and Alliance diplomacy from 1953 to 1959. The author is, on the whole, moderately critical. He concludes that "a hundred and fifty years ago he (Dulles) would certainly have been regarded as a great man. His moral qualities, his toughness, his self-assurance, his energy, and his great intellectual capacity would all have constituted a complex of power and rectitude. . . . But in the modern world even these are not enough. Greatness requires at least some instinct for the feelings and aspirations of others, a humanity, a sensitivity which Dulles lacked."

IV. WESTERN EUROPE

The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism. By F. W. Deakin. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 896 pp. \$10.95.

A detailed account of the last years of Mussolini's rule, from autumn 1942 to the death of *Il Duce*. It is primarily a study of the rivalries between two twisted personalities, of the inefficiency of Italo-German cooperation on the diplomatic and military levels, and of the collapse of the Fascist regime.

The European Executive. By David Granick. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962. 384 pp. \$4.95.

An evaluation of the impact of industrial growth, changing social patterns and economic integration upon the managers of business in Western Europe. The author examines European methods of management recruitment, attitudes toward expansion of production and sales, and labor relations.

The MRP and French Foreign Policy. By Russell B. Capelle. New York: Praeger, 1963. 191 pp. \$5.50.

Professor Capelle examines the role of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* in foreign affairs in France during the eight years in which the party held office, 1946-1954. He examines the MRP's successes, failures and the policies of its leaders on four key plans for European integration—the Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, political union and the Pfimlin Plan. The MRP positions on such issues as Indochina, North Africa and the UN are also presented.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940. Edited by Colonel R. Macleod and Denis Kelly. New York: David McKay, 1963. 434 pp. \$7.50.

A first-hand, day-by-day account of events on the eve of World War II and the period of the Battle of Britain by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of Britain's Home Forces.

V. SOVIET BLOC

A History of Russia. By Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 711 pp. \$10.50.

A comprehensive survey text on the history of Russia. This volume, well-illustrated, provides a basic introduction to the cultural and intellectual attainments of the Russian people and to the early growth of the nation prior to Peter the Great. The author concentrates his attention, however, on Imperial and Soviet Russia, and clearly states his own position and the views of other specialists on the major issues and disputes in Russian history.

Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma. By Aleksandr Kaznacheev. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1962. 250 pp. \$4.95.

In June 1959, the author, a twenty-seven-year-old diplomat at the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, sought asylum in the U.S. Embassy. In this book, he tells of the reasons for his defection, the detailed operations of a Soviet Embassy, the important duties of the Soviet intelligence network, and the relations between the Soviets and Chinese communists in Southeast Asia.

Polish-Soviet Relations 1932-1939. By Bohdan B. Budurowycz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 229 pp. \$6.00.

An account of Polish policy toward her powerful neighbor to the east in the period from the signing of the nonaggression pact of July 1932 until the fourth partition of Poland in September 1939. Relying upon official documents, memoirs and secondary sources in several languages, the author recounts Poland's efforts to preserve her territorial integrity and freedom through a policy of balance between Russia and the growing power of Nazi Germany.

Russia Enters the 1960's. Edited by Harry Schwartz. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1962. 278 pp. \$6.50.

Mr. Schwartz, a member of the Editorial Board of the *New York Times*, provides a valuable documentary report on the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, including the culmination of the anti-Stalin attacks, the sharp exchange between Albanian and Soviet leaders, and Chou En-lai's defiance of the Moscow line. The author's commentary places these developments in perspective, and he also includes a section on "Soviet Economic Growth to 1980."

Ukrainian Nationalism. (Second edition.) By John A. Armstrong. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 361 pp. \$7.50.

The story of Ukrainian nationalists who tried in vain during World War II to break away from the Soviet Union. The author surveys the background of Ukrainian nationalism, evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of nationalist sentiment in the Ukraine, assesses the impact of nationalism on the Ukrainian people and life, and shows why the Ukrainian nationalists failed to achieve independence.

The U.S.S.R. and the Future: An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU. Edited by Leonard Schapiro. New York: Praeger, 1963. 324 pp. \$6.00 (\$2.25, paper).

An analysis of the new program adopted in 1961 by the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU. Among the subjects analyzed by sixteen specialists are the program and its relation to the Marxist-Leninist tradition, coexistence and revolution, the problems of nationalism and revisionism versus dogmatism, the economics of "1980," Soviet agriculture, wage policy under full communism, the new rules of the CPSU, education and creative freedom, and the Soviet armed forces. The appendices contain the texts of the 1919 and 1961 Party programs.

Yugoslavia and the New Communism. By George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. 546 pp. \$8.00.

A detailed and sympathetic analysis of Tito's communist system. The authors provide 150 pages of background information up to the Yugoslav-Soviet split of 1948, and then discuss the internal political, economic and social developments of the post-1948 period and Yugoslavia's international position.

VI. EAST ASIA

Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. By Donald N. Wilber. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962. 320 pp. \$8.75.

This study of Afghanistan is the eleventh volume in the series, "Survey of World Cultures," each of which brings together into one comprehensive volume a wealth of factual information on a country and culture—its geography, history, government, politics, economics and sociology.

The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia. By Jan Romein in collaboration with Jan Erik Romein. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. 448 pp. \$7.50.

A chronological description of the rise of nationalist forces in Asia from 1900 to 1960 by a Professor of Theoretical History at the University of Amsterdam. He treats all parts of Asia, including Soviet Asia, the Arab world, South and South-east Asia and the Far East. The account is, in the author's words, "frankly anti-colonial and written more or less from the Asian point of view because only in this way can one hope to explain Asian nationalism."

Borderlands. By Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn. New York: Knopf, 1962. 335 pp. \$6.75.

Two journalists report on little-known places along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc—places which have not often been in the news, but which may well become troublespots in the near future. These are Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island; the islands of the Sulu Sea between the Philippines and North Borneo; the home of the Shans and Kachins along Burma's border with China; Sikkim, between China and India; Afghan Turkestan; and Turkey's eastern provinces.

Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960. By Louis J. Walinsky. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. 680 pp. \$10.00.

A case study of economic development in Burma, written by an economist who helped to formulate Burma's initial economic development plan and later became chief economic adviser to the Burmese government from 1953 to 1959. Mr.

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Walinsky provides sections on Burma's social, political and economic background, the preparation of the eight-year development program, its implementation year-by-year and by major sectors and projects, the special problems encountered, and the implications for Burma, other underdeveloped countries and the U.S.

Indonesian Communism: A History. By Arnold C. Brackman. New York: Praeger, 1963. 336 pp. \$6.50.

A former correspondent, who has reported on events in Southeast Asia for the United Press and *Christian Science Monitor*, traces the fortunes and "zigzags" of the Indonesian Communist Party, today the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. Mr. Brackman discusses the abortive revolts of the Party against the Dutch in 1926 and against the embattled Indonesian government in 1948; the schisms, leadership and recent spectacular growth of the Party; and its role on the Indonesian political stage today.

North Vietnam Today: Profile of a Communist Satellite. Edited by P. J. Honey. New York: Praeger, 1962. 166 pp. \$4.50.

Nine experts discuss various aspects of government and society in North Vietnam: the political leadership of Ho Chi Minh and the likely succession, the efforts to unify all Vietnam under communist control, the role of the intellectuals, collectivization and the economy, the replacement of education by indoctrination, and local government and administration.

Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan. By Frederick S. Dunn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 210 pp. \$5.00.

The late Director of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, examines U.S. policies relating to the Japanese peace settlement. He traces early U.S. planning from the immediate pre-Pearl Harbor days through World War II and the early years of the Cold War; describes the tactics and policies followed by John Foster Dulles in his mission to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan; examines the developments at the San Francisco conference of 1951; and considers the effect of the settlement on the security of the Western powers since 1951.

People's War, People's Army. By Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Praeger, 1962. 217 pp. \$5.00.

This is the Viet Cong insurrection manual for underdeveloped countries, written by the commander of North Vietnam's Army. These speeches and essays of General Giap provide not only the tactical doctrine for insurgency operations, but also the political guidelines for winning over the local population. Roger Hilsman and Bernard Fall write brief introductory notes about the significance of the book and the life of the author.

Social Changes in Jogjakarta. By Selo Soemardjan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. 440 pp. \$6.75.

Applying to his study the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and economics acquired while a student at Cornell University, Dr. Selo Soemardjan examines the administrative, social and cultural changes which have taken place, particularly in village communities, in the Jogjakarta area of Central Java. The study covers the last years of Dutch rule, the Japanese and revolutionary periods, and the first eight years of independence to 1958.

The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers: The Chinese Intelligentsia Under Mao. By Mu Fu-sheng. New York: Praeger, 1962. 324 pp. \$7.50.

An account of the position of China's intellectuals, poets, artists, writers and scientists under the communist regime. The author, an engineer, returned to

China in 1957 to work for his country only to return within a year and a half to the West. He shows how China's political and cultural history has shaped the present regime, provides a first-hand account of the "hundred flowers" movement of 1957, reports on Mao's successes and failures in China, and warns that the Mao regime, separated from the West by a nearly impassable gulf, is likely to survive for an indefinite period.

VII. AFRICA

African One-Party States. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. 483 pp. \$7.25.

Six authorities discuss the reasons for the emergence of one-party governments in Tunisia, Senegal, Guinea, The Ivory Coast, Liberia and Tanganyika. They treat of the early history, lands and peoples, current political institutions and problems, and future prospects of these countries.

Congo, My Country. By Patrice Lumumba. New York: Praeger, 1962. 195 pp. \$5.95.

This book was written by Patrice Lumumba in 1956-57 but remained unpublished during his lifetime. Writing in a moderate tone, Lumumba discusses a broad range of topics, including the purpose of colonialism, the economic integration of the Congo, political rights, legal and police reforms, European settlers, and the role of Congolese intellectuals in building a nation. In an introduction, Colin Legum, the Commonwealth correspondent of *The Observer*, charts the evolution of Lumumba's political ideas and writes sympathetically of his political activities before his death early in 1961.

Handbook of African Economic Development. By Guy Benveniste and William E. Moran, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1962. 178 pp. \$5.50.

An examination of the external factors influencing the economic development of Africa. The authors review the programs of the Common Market, the OECD, the U.S. and individual European nations. They conclude that African economic growth depends on three external factors—an increase in trained foreign personnel willing to teach Africans their skills, a greater investment of foreign funds in local production rather than in extractive industries, and a concerted effort to expand export markets for African products.

New Forces in Africa. Edited by William H. Lewis. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962. 132 pp. \$3.25.

A collection of ten papers presented by specialists on African affairs at a colloquy held at Georgetown University in 1962. Included among the papers are "Pan-Africanism or Fragmentation?" by John A. Marcum; "Problems of Economic Development," by Mark Karp; and "Prospects for a United Maghrib," by Abderahim Bouabid.

The Political Development of Tanganyika. By J. Clagett Taylor. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 229 pp. \$6.00.

The author, an educational missionary in Southern Rhodesia, traces the development of Tanganyika from the period of German administration to independence. The period of the British mandate and trust and the role played by TANU, the nationalist movement for independence, are described in considerable detail. The author also examines the racial policies pursued by the British government which helped to create Tanganyika as a multiracial state.

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Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919. Volume I. By Sir W. K. Hancock. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. 619 pp. \$10.00.

The first of a two-volume biography of the second Prime Minister of South Africa. Relying upon recently published collections of letters and papers, the author examines Smuts' part in the Boer War, assesses his influence in the formative years of the Union of South Africa, and treats in detail his participation in Imperial defense during World War I and in the Paris Conference of 1919.

VIII. LATIN AMERICA

Chile and the United States, 1880-1962. By Frederick B. Pike. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963. 466 pp. \$7.50.

A survey of political, economic and social developments in Chile and the course of Chilean-U.S. relations from 1880 to the present. In endeavoring to "discover what Chileans think is true about their dealings with the United States," the author has relied almost exclusively upon Chilean sources. He is particularly concerned about the "critical situation" in Chile, which he attributes to the fact that "Chile has clung to a set of values associated with a rapidly disappearing way of life . . . a sociological structure based on paternalism, and on the perpetual existence of a participating, privileged minority that is served by a non-participating, nonprivileged majority."

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